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Cabinet Documents

Reference	Date
CC(67) 38th conclusions, minute 1	13.6.67
CC(67) 39th conclusions, minute 3	15.6.67

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO TUNIS

TELNO. 193 11 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.
YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 134.
YOU SHOULD TAKE THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO DELIVER
THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA

QUOTE. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE. I FULLY SHARE YOUR CONCERN THAT THE TRAGIC FIGHTING IN THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED AFTER THE CLEAR CALL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON ALL PARTIES CONCERNED TO CEASE FIRE. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAVE GIVEN THEIR FULL SUPPORT TO THE EFFORTS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO AN END AND I AM GLAD TO SAY THAT OUR LATEST INFORMATION IS THAT THE CEASE-FIRE ARRANGED BY GENERAL BULL IS BEING OBSERVED. WE SHALL CERTAINLY NOT HESITATE TO CONDEMN ANY VIOLATIONS OF IT.

2. THROUGHOUT THE PRESENT CRISIS WE HAVE USED ALL OUR INFLUENCE, BOTH PUBLICLY AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND, AS APPROPRIATE, IN PRIVATE TO URGE RESTRAINT ON ALL CONCERNED. YOU MAY BE ASSURED THAT WE SHALL CONTINUE TO DO THIS. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO USE YOUR GREAT PERSONAL INFLUENCE IN THE SAME DIRECTION.

3. HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR HAS TOLD ME YOUR VIEW THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN THE FIGHTING ON BEHALF OF ISRAEL WERE SIMPLY A PREFABRICATED EXCUSE FOR MILITARY DEFEAT. I WHOLE-HEARTEDLY SHARE THIS VIEW. BUT THE FACT IS THAT THESE MALICIOUS LIES ARE CAUSING DAMAGE TO BRITISH INTERESTS AND TO THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE ARAB STATES WHICH I AM SURE YOU DESIRE AS WARMLY AS WE DO. MY COLLEAGUES AND I ARE DOING ALL IN OUR POWER TO MAKE CLEAR PUBLICLY THAT THERE IS NO FOUNDATION OF TRUTH WHATSOEVER IN

/THESE

THESE STORIES. WE HAVE, AS YOU KNOW, OFFERED THE FULLEST FACILITIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS TO DEMONSTRATE THE FALSITY OF THE CHARGES. BUT AS LONG AS THIS LIE CONTINUES TO CIRCULATE IT CAN ONLY EXACERBATE THE ALREADY EXPLOSIVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I HOPE YOU WILL DO EVERYTHING IN YOUR POWER TO CONTERACT THESE ALLEGATIONS. I NEED NOT SAY THAT IF YOU COULD SEE YOUR WAY TO DENOUNCING THEM PUBLICLY THIS WOULD BE A CHARACTERISTICALLY COURAGEOUS CONTRIBUTION TO THE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND SANITY IN THIS TROUBLED AREA. UNQUOTE.

SOSFA SENT 2150/11 JUNE

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PPPPP

Israel (PLO)

CONFIDENTIAL

June 11, 1967

The Prime Minister tells me that he discussed with the Foreign Secretary early in the morning of June 10, Mr. Brown's minute PM/67/60 of June 9 about the announcement that Nasser had tendered his resignation.

The Foreign Secretary explained rather more fully than in the minute his general view of the approach that should be taken to this matter. The Prime Minister said that he agreed that we should orchestrate the view in Arab countries that Nasser had let them down. But he considered that we should not overtly or counter-productively be seen to be trying to "topple Nasser", who if he remained, would (in the Foreign Secretary's words) be a "dead duck".

The Prime Minister also advised against any open dispute with the BBC in this matter. He considered that the news that we had sought to pressurise them in this way would leak and, in any case, this would be the wrong issue on which to have a row with them.

Michael Palliser.

C.M. MacLehose, Esq., C.M.G., M.B.E.,
Foreign Office.

BRITISH EMBASSY

PRESS RELEASE

R. 23

2 June, 1967

PRESS CONFERENCE HELD BY THE RT. HON.
HAROLD WILSON, BRITISH PRIME MINISTER,
AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY ON FRIDAY, 2 JUNE, 1967

Q. Mr. Prime Minister do you expect the common declaration of Great Britain, the United States and other powers to be published soon?

A. I think you know the position so far as the very grave situation in the Middle East is concerned. We are all pursuing our efforts in the Security Council to try and get an honourable settlement, to take the steam - the danger - out of the situation, but concurrently, as my colleague the Foreign Secretary said in the House of Commons in London on Wednesday, we are pursuing, as others are, with the principal maritime powers, the possibility of a statement reasserting the right of freedom of passages through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. Discussions on that are still proceeding. I would not like to forecast at what point they will be completed or a statement issued.

Q. If, as a final result, the UAR refuses to open the Gulf of Aqaba, will Great Britain, in concert with other nations, exert force to open up the Straits?

A. I have nothing to add to what I said in the House of Commons the other evening. That is a hypothetical situation that you are raising and I don't think its necessarily wise to say too much about what might happen in hypothetical situations. But again, both the Foreign Secretary and I said in the House that naturally we are considering the situation that might arise if both the Security Council failed and the Declaration failed to achieve the necessary objective and some thought and discussion is going on for that eventuality.

Q. Could you tell me, Mr. Prime Minister, whether on the basis of your recent soundings, diplomatically, in Moscow you have the opinion that the Soviet Union is seeking to contain the crisis in the Middle East or to inflame it?

A. The Foreign Secretary was in fact in Moscow last week: he had discussions with Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Kosygin and I fully accept what the Foreign Secretary was told of the Soviet Government's desire to see restraint exercised in the Middle East.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, you were quoted in Ottawa as saying that you only have one or two days left to solve the tense situation in the Gulf of Aqaba. Can you tell us what you meant by it?

A. I didn't say one or two days, I said it looked as though we might have only one or two days. I have said all the week that it looks as though perhaps we are fortunate, we have a little more breathing space than looked likely perhaps last weekend, which was a very critical time, but as I said, time is not on our side. Whether we have a week or more or only a day or two, we have to use every minute of that time to try and avoid the crises which may result.

Q. Do you see any connection between Vietnam and the Middle East situation? Do you see Russia using the Middle East to make us slow down in Vietnam?

/A. I am aware

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A. I am aware there are a number of theories about the Soviet position, I'm not sure it is very rewarding to speculate on motives of various countries in this connection. I am more concerned to join with others to see what can be done to get a peaceful settlement. Insofar as we are concerned with Soviet motives, I would have thought they are more connected with the Soviet Government's view of their influence in the Middle East rather than with the tie-up between the Middle East and South-East Asia.

Q. Mr. Holt of Australia has been here stressing the importance to Australia of a British Military presence in South East Asia. What have you been able to tell President Johnson about our intentions in that respect?

A. We have discussed that too, I would like everyone to know that although we naturally have been principally concerned in our discussion today with the very critical situation in the Middle East, this has not prevented us from having serious discussions about Vietnam and about the long-term position in South East Asia. I don't think I can say very much about our discussions on the position east of Suez, the long-term position, but we have naturally been anxious to discover the American Government's point of view on this and in a week or two's time, next week in fact, I shall have an opportunity of discussing this with Mr. Holt in London and also with representatives of New Zealand, shortly thereafter.

Q. In your discussions with President Johnson have you discussed the military commitments of the United States and Great Britain and the problems connected with meeting those commitments simultaneously?

A. I am not sure which military commitments you are talking about - NATO or what?

Q. All the military commitments of the U.S. and Great Britain, in different parts of the world.

A. Oh I see what you mean. Sorry. No I don't think it would be right to say that that was one of the categories in which our discussions took place.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, is it the British position that this declaration of the Maritime Nations should be specific on the point of the right of Israeli-flag ships to pass through the Straits of Tiran?

A. To answer that question would be I think to disclose the prospective wording of the Declaration, which is a matter for discussion with the other Maritime powers. But I think I can go so far as to say this - we are concerned with the assertion of the acceptance of the Straits of Tiran and indeed the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway. Very many Maritime Powers, practically all of them, Britain and the other countries which took part in the discussion in the General Assembly following Mr, Hammarskjold's settlement of this question, a negotiated settlement, all these countries at that time made quite categorical statements about the position of the Straits of Tiran as an international waterway and a number of countries have reiterated the statements they then made. That is the basis for the Declaration.

Q. In your talks today did you ask President Johnson to stop bombing North Vietnam and are you optimistic about your discussions along that line?

A. We had a very full discussion on Vietnam and President Johnson is very fully aware of our position on Vietnam, but I don't think it would be very helpful to go into any detail about what we said to each other today. I should say we are in continuous touch on all these matters, not only on my frequent visits to Washington, and of course we had a discussion recently in Bonn as well, but of course I am in touch with him on many occasions in between, through the particular mechanism we have for maintaining contact between one another.

Q. To expand that last question. There were specific reports from London that you had come here to warn President Johnson that the U.K. would not go any further in the escalation of the war and that there would be a clean break. Would you care to comment on those newspaper reports?

/A. I never

A. I never comment on newspaper reports as you know. It would be a full time job. But the President knows and always has fully understood (and indeed I have explained this to the House of Commons) our position on escalation.

Q. There is some concern that there might be a "Suez Crisis", if the UAR should refuse Western warships the right to pass through the Canal. Could you tell us your feelings about free passage through the Suez Canal?

A. The Suez Canal is of course not an international waterway, an acknowledged international waterway governed by a General Convention as in the case of the Gulf of Aqaba, but governed by its own specific Convention to which all signatories are a party, and obviously anyone who might think of unilaterally breaking that Convention would be taking on themselves a very serious responsibility indeed, but again I think this statement which was based, was it not, on a newspaper report, not this time from London, again must be regarded as hypothetical.

Q. Can you spell out what you said on the White House lawn this morning about co-operation in economic affairs?

A. Yes, I was referring here to the continuing contact that we have with the U.S. Government and with our European colleagues in a number of fields, in the field of economic aid and also in the field of monetary reform; and I was saying that, in our preoccupation with the Middle Eastern crisis none of us would want either in our discussions or in our future actions to neglect the vital importance of economic co-operation which both of us put so high in our scale of priorities.

Q. As now envisaged by the British Government, would such a Declaration include a statement by the Maritime Powers that they are prepared to assert the right of free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba?

A. I think to answer that would again be tending to outline to you the sort of draft that might emerge from the discussions.

Q. Great Britain has made great strides recently on her balance of payments problems, but there seems to have been practically no economic growth over the past year. Do you see an early end to what is sometimes called "economic stagnation"?

A. You are certainly right in referring to the tremendous and remarkable improvement in our balance of payments. When I was here, the first time here in my present job, in December 1964, we were then running at a rate of annual deficit (on our trade and payments) of £822,000,000. Last year we had reduced this on a comparable basis to rather less than £190,000,000. This year we shall be in surplus, and of course in order to do this we have had to do some very tough things, including interference with economic growth, which was absolutely essential if we were to get the balance of payments right, which is in itself a conditions for future growth. But as the Chancellor of the Exchequer explained to the House of Commons in the Budget speech, we now see the way clear for a period of growth ahead and a period of growth which does not, as in the past depend on getting the balance of payments in jeopardy.

Q. Could you tell us when you foresee that this Declaration that we have heard so much about will be published?

A. I wouldn't like to speculate on that. If I played rather safe and put a date rather further than what I hope, you might think I was being very defeatist. If I put it rather earlier and it was a day or two later you would all run headlines saying how monstrously we had failed to meet our target.

/There are

There are a number of countries involved. We can't dictate to them, our other maritime partners can't dictate to one another, so I hope it will get out quite soon. Everyone concerned recognises the urgency of getting it out as soon as possible.

Q. What in your view are the chances of restoring some form of U.N. presence along the borders between Israel and Egypt?

A. This is something that all of us attach very great importance to, as part of a long term solution or medium and long term solution for the problems of the area. We feel and have said quite clearly as others have, that the decision to withdraw the UNEF was precipitate and regrettable and we would like to see some form of United Nations active presence restored there, but it is fair I think that in proposing this we should insist that it should be stationed on the Israeli as well as on the Arab side of the frontiers in question.

Q. In connection with this petition, Declaration, are we submitting it to any of the Communist powers for their consideration?

A. We should be very glad to have their adherence, it is by the way a Declaration and not a petition. We should naturally be very pleased to have the adherence of all Maritime Powers, and, of course, in the last 20 years there has been a very great growth in the Maritime importance of a number of the East European countries which now are very substantial.

Q. Are they being consulted about it?

A. They will have a chance to sign it, if they feel able to associate themselves with it.

Q. Do you see any likelihood of tensions in Berlin or other locations or do you see the Middle East crisis in isolation?

A. I think we've got enough trouble haven't we? Of course there is always the possibility at times of international tension that there will be flare-ups in other areas. And indeed in the past week or two we have had very serious difficulties, riots for example in Hong Kong. I would not feel that it was either probable or wise on the part of those whose very strong passions have led to this crisis to feel that they were a part of general orchestration of the kind that you have in mind. I would have thought that orchestration here would only add to the dangers.

Q. Do you foresee any likelihood of a conference of the Maritime powers?

A. If we thought it was the most helpful step of course we would propose it, but as I have said time is not on our side. I think the right forum for conference techniques is the United Nations, it is the Security Council who have been meeting this week and who have adjourned their meeting. Equally we support the initiative taken by General de Gaulle for a four-power meeting, under the aegis of the U.N. but I think to go off in a separate direction now and propose a Maritime conference which would take some time to get organised would really be playing about too much with the very limited timetable that perhaps is all that is open to us.

Q. Does the Prime Minister propose visiting the United Nations Headquarters before returning to London?

A. Yes, I am going to New York tomorrow morning from here and shall be lunching with the Secretary-General.

Q. The Australian P.M., Mr. Holt, said today that the U.S. was at one with Australia in wishing to see Britain maintain a significant military presence east of Suez. Did President Johnson confirm this? And could you tell us if your programme of withdrawal from the area will be in any way tied to the progress of the Viet Nam war?

A. I have already partly answered this question, haven't I? I think the position of the United States on this is well known. I don't think I needed to fly the Atlantic to know what the position of President Johnson on this matter would be, and Mr. Holt is certainly well within the facts in what he says so far as that is concerned. I shall be having discussions with Mr. Holt, as I said, in London next week, and with Mr. Marshall, before any decision is taken.

Q. What do you envisage is the main forum for these consultations on the Maritime Declaration? Would it be in the U.N.?

A. The discussions are taking place capital by capital.

Q. There is quite serious concern in this country and in Congress that, if it comes to the point of having to act to prevent aggression in the Middle East, we really can't depend on Britain or our other Western allies. Is there anything you can say to reassure us in this regard?

A. What do you mean about "can't depend"? You mean you feel that Britain would not honour any undertaking entered into?

Q. A feeling that, if we had to take strong action, this is all speculative of course, in the form of actual military commitments, we would be left going it alone again.

A. Well, in the first place of course we have not yet come to any final decision about what might have to be our attitude if, as I said, unhappily there was no solution at the Security Council and unhappily the Declaration did not produce the desired results, but I think that the word "speculative" is an understatement to suggest that if Britain did undertake any particular action she was likely to run out on it; that would be I think inconceivable. But the whole question is speculative because there has been no decision about what action would be appropriate <u>if</u> the Security Council, <u>if</u> the Declaration, were to fail. I think it probably would be right that many of those who've considered the problems of the declaration and of anything that might follow would feel that any bilateral declaration by one or two countries, however important in the maritime sense, would of itself be far less meaningful than a truly multilateral declaration covering the great majority of the Maritime powers. And also of course if any other action were to become contemplated it should be on a multilateral basis, preferably through the Security Council, but one can't guarantee that that will be the case.

Q. It is your feeling that once this Declaration is issued by a group of Maritime nations that it will be the prelude to some negotiations with President Nasser, or is it just going to stand out there in the air on its own?

A. There must be negotiations, must there not? The public statements of the leaders of the countries concerned in the Middle East are so strong, involve such a high degree of commitment, even dangerous commitment, that all added up together shows they are quite incompatible and the only result must be a head on conflict. There must therefore be negotiations, and even ahead of any possible Declaration that is the purpose of the discussions in the Security Council.

Q. On Vietnam we are told that the diplomatic track at the moment is sterile. I wonder, Sir, in your opinion do you feel that there are any peace possibilities that do exist now that are not being taken advantage of?

/A. I believe

A. I believe that so far as Vietnam is concerned there is a general willingness to get to the conference table as soon as there is any sign at all of any green light or hint of green light from Hanoi that they would come. The British Government have played their full part on a very large number of occasions; I won't weary you with the whole list of them. The latest was of course in February when Mr. Kosygin was in London, and at the right moment we shall not hesitate to make proposals if we think the conditions might be right for getting Hanoi to the conference table and I'm sure that when we do that we shall have the full support of the United States in doing it.

Q. Do you consider the free passage of traffic under Israeli flag to the port of Eilat as vital for Israel?

A. I don't think it would be helpful to go into the particular interpretation of what this Declaration might well say, but since you raise the question of the Israeli flag, a great number of Israeli-flag vessels actually go through those Straits. What I think is regarded as vital for Israel is the freedom to use the Strait for getting essential cargoes through to Eilat, and the same is true of course in the case of Jordan in relation to the port of Aqaba.

Q. Have you had any indications from Peking that they are willing to assist in placating the tensions in Hong Kong?

A. I have not had any recent messages from Peking.

Q. To return to Europe, there has been some talk here about a North Atlantic Free Trade Area as an alternative to Britain joining the Common Market. Have you had any talks about contingency alternatives to the Common Market and what do you think of such an idea?

A. No, none whatsoever. We have had no talks during my visit here or in Canada about such an alternative. I have said once or twice in the House, of course there are possible alternatives, possible contingent alternatives, if our application is not successful. There are alternatives, viable alternatives, no one believes that if we don't get into the Community Britain is finished, or that Britain's prosperity and economic viability will be impaired. But what the Government feels is that, if we do get in, there is a chance of more rapid growth and of much more rapid growth for Europe as a whole, not only for Britain, and of course the political advantages that would follow - political in the sense of greater unity of Europe and greater power to play an important part in world affairs for Europe. Having said that, the other alternatives in so far as they exist, or might be brought into being, are alternatives, but they are second best in our view compared with entry into the Community. But there has been no discussion while I have been on this side of the Atlantic this week.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, if there must be negotiations, what value will this Declaration of the Maritime Powers have anyhow?

A. Well of course the ideal thing would be that the negotiations in the Security Council be fruitful, in which case the Declaration will not be necessary. But we have to face the possibility that the immediately proposed negotiations in the Security Council are not fruitful. In these circumstances it is very important that the Maritime Powers should declare their position on the subject. We shall still need negotiations at the end of the day.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, what is your analysis of how the British people feel generally about U.S. policy in Vietnam?

A. Oh, this is a difficult one. I might begin by asking you how the American people feel about it, but I get so many reports about that that I am not sure that I could answer very meaningfully about the position in Britain. I know what the House of Commons

/thinks

thinks about it; I hear it every day, six hundred and thirty very strongly expressed views. I would feel that a very large number of people in Britain feel that in so far as the problem is not merely a Civil War but a question of aggression into the South from the North that it must be resisted; at the same time I feel that a very large proportion of my fellow countrymen are not only deeply concerned as I know the United States is deeply concerned about the continued suffering involved in this war, and all that must essentially flow from it, but are also deeply concerned about the dangers of escalation to something far worse, and deeply concerned about the effect of this continuing struggle in inhibiting moves to reduce tension between East and West. I think that is probably the view that most of my fellow countrymen would feel. There are some of course who feel very strongly about particular aspects of it, particular policies that are being pursued. There are some who talk about peace in Vietnam who only want to see victory in Vietnam, victory be it for one side or the other, mostly the other. These are the very enthusiastic people, and I wouldn't want for one moment to deny their right to do it, whoever they may be. The only place I went to last year where I didn't get demonstrators of that kind was when I was in Moscow, but I get it up and down in Britain and I think a number of people do feel very strongly about it. I think all of us recognise, as the Commonwealth Conference recorded, that we have got to see concessions from both sides, if we are going to get the parties to the Conference table. And having got there, we see no reason why an honourable solution, in which the people of Vietnam will run their own affairs, can not be secured.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister. Does your answer to a previous question mean that you envisage in the shipping Declaration or in its implementation special arrangements for Israeli ships as a possible concession to Mr. Nasser?

A. No, it will be a general assertion of the right of free passage. In any subsequent negotiations I have no doubt that some would put that proposal. It doesn't follow that we would go along with it.

Q. Sir, I don't quite understand what impact a general assertion of maritime rights is going to have on restraining President Nasser, if you don't have an enforcement clause going with it.

A. I'll take note of your statement. Have you got a question as well? This is an addition to the action we are trying to take through the Security Council. It may well be that of itself this does not ring the bell. I hope it will. As I said in the House the other day, and I repeated once or twice this afternoon, if it doesn't we shall have to start thinking, or at least we shall have to press on with the thinking, what would then be appropriate but I think it would be wrong to cross that bridge before we come to it.

Q. Is the first order of the British in the Middle East to keep the peace or to end the blockade imposed on the Gulf of Aqaba?

A. I think that question which I agree is in question form is a false antithesis. I believe that one of the factors which led to in the end a degree of restraint being shown last weekend that not everyone expected, was the feeling, the confidence, that

/perhaps

perhaps the threat to close the Gulf of Aqaba would not be pursued. If therefore their confidence is not justified, if there is a closure of the Gulf of Aqaba with the stranglehold that this would involve for Israel, then I believe that we are at a very dangerous state in which the possibility not only of a local conflict, brutal and horrible though that would be, but perhaps a much wider conflagration might be a matter only of hours. Therefore the question of the Gulf of Aqaba is directly related and is a necessary condition of securing a situation in which we can avoid war.

Q. How much time do you think we have to cool this thing down in the Mid-East? Is it a matter of hours, days or weeks this time?

A. Might be any one of these three. Could be that there will be a week or two in which to create a situation in which restraint will be exercised by all concerned, and we can then proceed over a rather longer period to get perhaps a permanent settlement. But it might well be that we shan't have very long and that the matter might come to a head. As I say we have, it seems, a little time, a little breathing space, but time is emphatically not on our side, and that's why we need a sense of urgency at the Security Council and elsewhere.

Thank you Mr. Prime Minister.

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TRANSCRIPT OF PRIME MINISTER WILSON'S

PRESS CONFERENCE

2 JUNE, 1967

IN OTTAWA

Mr. Tom Earle:

We are very honoured to have with us this morning the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Wilson, who has very kindly, with a very busy schedule, worked in this Press Conference. He must leave at 8:25, because he has to be in Washington early this morning . . . .

Question No. 1:

Mr. Wilson, it seems at the moment that President Nasser of Egypt has won everything that he lost in 1956. Would you agree with that assessment of the situation?

Answer:

I don't think we're going to solve any problems by making premature assessments or value judgments or comments on personalities. We're facing, I think, still a very grave situation, and I think all of us have got to keep pretty cool and keep our eyes on the ball. I think the time for historical judgments will be when history comes to judge what we're doing.

Question No. 2:

It's not a historical judgment that we want - it's the judgment of the situation as it is at the moment and the likelihood or otherwise of hostilities resulting from the situation and the likelihood or otherwise of Canada and Britain being drawn into those hostilities.

Answer:

Well first as to the likelihood or possibility of hostilities, this is as I say a very tense situation. I think many people would feel that last week-end for example, there were many who thought that we could be on the very verge of hostilities, of

. . . fighting

fighting in the Middle East. We all know the dangers of a possible escalation. Now it appears, we all hope this anyway, that we have got a breathing space. We have got time - time that's got to be used and used pretty quickly but its not a breathing space that one could describe as a kind of equilibrial situation because there are those in the Middle East, for example, who perhaps held their hand in the face of very strong pressures but only did so in the hope that certain threats that had been made will not now be carried out. I am referring, of course, to what is really the centre of this problem and that is freedom of passage to the Gulf of Aqaba. Therefore the time that we have, if we have a day or two, or a few days, must be used to solve that as well as other problems in the Middle East. Without that, I believe we plunge very rapidly back to the same tense situation that we faced last week.

Question No. 3:

Sir, what about your talks here with Mr. Pearson?

Answer:

They were very good, they always are. I had as I think you know, long talks with him and then he came to the High Commissioner's residence after his period in Parliament for the budget speech and we had a further talk going on for an hour. Communications between Commonwealth Prime Ministers are confidential but I think you can assume we discussed the situation in the Middle East very intensively and a few other world issues as well, but this one principally. And I think our assessment of the problems is very close - it has been of course right through. We have been exchanging messages, been in touch with one another, and I think we both feel that this problem in the Gulf of Aqaba is perhaps the flash-point in the situation, and both of us feel very strongly that the solution must be sought through the United Nations. It is

. . . only

only if we fail to find a solution - I mean to the wider problem not just the problem of the Straits - it is only if we fail to find a solution through the United Nations that other action might have to be considered.

Question No. 4:

How much time do you think we have been afforded by Israel's holding up?

Answer:

That's what's very hard to answer I think. We debated it in our Parliament at a very full and I think a very constructive debate in Westminster two days ago and I think most of us felt that though we got a breathing space, it doesn't mean that there has been a defusing of the situation in any real sense. Naturally, we hope that we have got long enough to be able to get international agreement on the problems that we are facing including as I say not only the keeping-open of the Straits of Tiran but also, if we can secure this, a return of adequate United Nations peace-keeping forces.

Question No. 5:

Sir, are there any British or Israeli ships in the neighbourhood to test the open-ness of the Straits in the near future?

Answer:

I've been away from base now for more than 24 hours and I am not completely au fait with shipping movements. I would doubt it. I don't know the position of Israeli ships.

Question No. 6:

Mr. Wilson. Is there a danger with the Middle East situation, Viet Nam, your domestic political problems, that the issues in Rhodesia will be forgotten?

No. They're never forgotten. We review that situation very, very frequently and of course keep in touch with our other Commonwealth colleagues about it. But the course on which

. . . Britain

Britain, the Commonwealth and the United Nations are set, this is quite clear and determined and I think everybody knows what it is. As is well known, we made a very, very serious effort by discussions on H.M.S. Tiger to get a settlement that would be acceptable to the regime and which would have provided an honourable way out while still in full accordance with the principles we had laid down. But after two days of negotiations, it looked as though we had a settlement, but the thing was over-thrown by the extremists to whom Mr. Smith had to report.

Question No. 7:

Mr. Wilson, before you left London you said we may have a few weeks or even a month or two. Does it mean that in your opinion Israel is willing to wait that long for the international community to open the Straits of Tiran?

Answer:

I think the way I said it . . . this is of course one of the things that can't be clear in print. I said we may have. I think the word was very much may but the whole context of what I was saying was that we may have only a day or two. And as I kept on repeating, time is not on our side. It's got to be used.

Question No. 8:

Well sir, if the United Nations Emergency Force gave the United Nations ten years of peace in which to find a political settlement, and not even the beginnings of it was found, what hope is there of finding anything on a quick basis now?

Answer:

Well, I think that's very fair. But of course what we are trying to do first is to get rid of the crisis atmosphere, I mean to avert a far greater crisis even than we have got.

. . . That's

That's the first thing. I hope this time we shall all have the wisdom to use any lowering of tension, if we can get it, to try and get some more permanent solution. Certainly the United Nations' presence - here and in our own House of Commons. I have paid tribute to, above all, Canada's part in that - that was one of the major factors keeping the temperature down in averting a crisis for ten years. That's another reason why I very much agree with Prime Minister Pearson, and indeed I think the whole of our Parliament does, that we need an adequate United Nations presence and this time I think we must insist that it functions on both sides of the frontier.

Question No. 9:

Well sir, does your own government's involvement in Southern Arabia militate against your effective action in dealing with these powers?

Answer:

No, I don't think it does at all. I agree that the two problems are connected obviously; some of the pressures, some of the atmospheres that have suddenly built up in the main Middle East crisis are the same that have built up in Aden but of course we have announced that we are withdrawing from South Arabia in 1968 and discussions are going on now about the way this can be done in the most effective and orderly manner. But directly, I don't think the two are connected.

Question No. 10:

Sir, you said that if we could get the United Nations back, it should be on both sides of the frontier. I think we would all agree with that. But how are you going to get it in there? Israel didn't agree to have it before; perhaps she won't now; perhaps Nasser won't let it come back. Is the U.N. going to force its presence there?

. . . Answer:

Answer:

This is a problem. As I say, we are now in a position where many people have made very strong commitments about what they are going to do and what they won't do. And the sum total of those commitments does not lead to a solution. It leads to a very dangerous situation. This is why we have got to use our patient efforts. And when I say "our", I don't mean Britain. I mean all of us in the United Nations and in other ways, to get a sum total of personal commitments and national commitments that does add up to a solution. I quite agree with you on everything that has been said. You wouldn't get them both sides of the frontier. But equally of course when everything has been said, you won't get peace.

Question No. 11:

Have all our British arms shipments to the Middle East been finished now?

Answer:

We never in fact, even in what I might call in normal peace time, say anything about British arm shipments anywhere, so I don't want to create a precedent by answering that question in a rather more tense situation.

Question No. 12:

Sir, you said that other steps might have to be taken if a solution had not been found through the United Nations. Would you care to perhaps highlight what some of those steps might be?

Answer:

I can only tell you what some of those steps are and not what other steps might be. As is well known, we are discussing with other maritime powers the issuing of a clear declaration about the status of the Straits of Tiran as an international water-way guaranteeing freedom of passage to shipping engaged on innocent occasions, innocent

. . . pursuits

pursuits, and of course this is in effect a reiteration of the statement made separately by practically all of the maritime powers when this matter was discussed in the United Nations General Assembly in March 1957. And that is the next step obviously. If that and the United Nations' discussions are not successful, we may have to consider other steps and we naturally are beginning to think about what those steps might have to be.

Question No. 13:

Sir, if the United Nations does not appear to be making any progress would you seek a meeting of the four great powers?

Answer:

We have made clear our full support of President de Gaulle's proposal last week that there should be contact between the four great powers and, if thought desirable, a meeting of the four great powers. We feel as I think he does that such an approach should be under the aegis of the United Nations. Perhaps the best thing would be for the four to be in touch through their permanent representatives at the United Nations and if any further meeting at any other level were necessary, that could be worked out. But up to now of course, it is well known we haven't received - and when I say we, I mean those who support this idea - in particular the President of France, haven't received the green light that is necessary for such a meeting to take place.

Question No. 14:

Mr. Prime Minister, if a solution cannot be found in the context of the United Nations, what future do you see for the United Nations?

Answer:

I foresee that some of us who are great believers in the

. . . United

United Nations, none more than Canada with their great record not only at New York but in all the sacrifices and hardships they've put up with in areas far away from New York - the desert and elsewhere.- I think all of us are going to have a pretty hard job of work to do to restore the authority of the United Nations. I believe that last week's events were a pretty serious blow to the United Nations - that is why it is doubly urgent, if we can, to get a solution through the United Nations now. But I think it would be unduly optimistic to say that it is just around the corner.

Question No. 15:

Is the re-opening of the Straits of Tiran worth the risk of a collision with the Soviet Union?

Answer:

I don't think the question is that of re-opening the Straits of Tiran. The Straits of Tiran are open. There has been a statement that they will be closed, but so far they have not been closed and I think it is slightly prejudicial to the situation for us to look at it as though it's the problem of a closed strait that has got to be forced open. But having said that, I think that the Soviet Union are as anxious as any country to avoid steps on anybody's part that could lead to the threat of a major world conflagration. I said that in the House of Commons two days ago. Our Foreign Secretarywas in Moscow last week and while he was quite clear about the standpoint of the Soviet Union on the main issues of the dispute, he was also quite clear, and we fully accept their sincerity, that they want to see restraint used and they don't want to see a dangerous flare-up in the Middle East.

. . . Question No. 16

Question No. 16:

Sir, hasn't Mr. Nasser said that the Straits are closed?

And have any ships gone through to prove that they are open?

Answer:

A number of ships have gone through but as I said earlier, statements have been made on both sides and of course it is not a simple two-sided situation. There are very many countries involved now in the whole Middle-Eastern question. A number of things have been said which if they are all taken at their face value, if they're all insisted on, add up to a very, very grave situation indeed. They are mutually incompatible, and also mutually incompatible with peace. Statements made on both sides - on all sides. What we have got to do now is to try and lower the temperature and get a viable solution - but a viable solution must include freedom of passage through the Straits.

Question No. 17:

Do you think the original decision to pull the U.N. force out of the Gaza strip should have been made by the Security Council?

Answer:

Do I think it should have been made by the Security Council? Was that the question? I think certainly the decision to take them out without full consultation with all concerned was an unfortunate and precipitate decision certainly; since the original arrangement was made under the aegis of the Assembly, I would have thought that there was a strong case for saying it should have required consultation with the Assembly. It's arguable that the Security Council, yes, because of course it could have been fairly said that to pull them out would be a threat

. . . to peace

to peace and I don't think anyone looking back over the last 10 days would deny that a threat to peace has resulted or at least has followed.

Question No. 18:

I wonder if we could get off the tense world situation and now and if I could ask you, after the summit meeting of the Six in Rome on Monday and Tuesday of this week, are you more or less optimistic about your application to enter the Common Market?

Answer:

Well, I think the decision of the summit meeting was that our application will be considered at the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the community in the next few days. That I think is the place where we can begin to judge what the immediate prospects are. I did say a couple of weeks ago in relation to this that we were not in a mood to take no for an answer and of course we are continuing our discussions with all the governments of the Six and as is well known, I'm visiting Paris myself in two weeks time. I might be in a better position to answer the question then. But whether I would answer it is another matter.

Question No. 19:

Going to the trouble spots, sir, in your view what does the situation or how much bearance does the situation in Viet Nam have on the Middle Eastern situation?

Answer:

I think one of the dangers here is that because of the imminence of the crisis and the critical nature of the situation in the Middle East, there might be a temptation to feel that other crises and other very serious situations

. . . are less

are less important - less urgent and certainly that can be said of Viet Nam - if this Middle Eastern crisis hadn't flared up, we would all have been probably talking about Viet Nam here this morning; and certainly in my talks with the Prime Minister, my talks with the President, Viet Nam would have played a leading part just indeed as it will and is bound to do. As to the bearing one on the other, well everyone is free to form their own views about the motivation of international statesmen in this matter, as to whether some thought they saw a chance of causing trouble somewhere. I am not sure that it is profitable to speculate too far about that, but as to the bearing as to what is done, certainly I think that it would be extremely serious if we said that the Middle East is all that matters and we can turn our back on this very, very desperate situation in the Far East.

Question No. 20:

Are you concerned, Sir, about the future of Hong Kong, the status of Hong Kong?

Answer:

I am concerned and have been concerned with the state of order in Hong Kong. In the last few days, there have been troubles, pretty obviously whipped up, and there have been some very false statements made about these troubles. In fact I think the restraint and firmness shown by the police, by the Governor, by the whole civil administration has led to the very anxious situation there being calmed down a little. It could always flare up again, these things do if they are capable of being whipped up; and none of these things of course affect the status of Hong Kong. This is civil disorder carefully fomented but

. . . I think

I think there is now a little breathing space there in which the people of Hong Kong can decide whether they want to have the Bank of China blaring out propaganda through loudspeakers all day to be countered by the civil administration playing cheerful Chinese music to drown it. The decibels got to be high and confused. It also gives everyone time now, I think at their leisure, to consider and study the thoughts of Chairman Mao Tse Tung, which have been much read in this situation; and perhaps those thoughts of his which enjoin upon all his followers the need for courtesy and respect for others - perhaps they could be studied too.

Question No. 21:

Mr. Wilson, how long are you going to be able to retain that colony in the face of public Chinese displeasure and in the face of a world that doesn't particularly like colonies any longer?

Answer:

I don't regard the events of the last few days in Hong Kong which, as I say, were rather unruly mob acts much sensationalized outside - I don't mean in the western press but I mean for example in China.- I don't regard that as in any way representing Chinese opinion on the future of Hong Kong, serious Chinese opinion or public opinion about colonies. We are, Her Majesty's Government, indeed our predecessors, are not colonialists. There are many people who feel in China as well as the rest of the world that Hong Kong is a useful trading link between China and the rest of the world. Could I just say on the question of colonies, I find a very interesting sort of philosophy growing up not least among some of our friends in the United Nations. They are very anxious that Britain

. . . de-colonializes

de-colonializes and so are we, but when we try to do it in a very serious way, for example in Aden, the most serious impediments are put in our way and we are perhaps more attacked for de-colonializing than we would be if we stayed there. We have no intention of staying there. That's Aden I'm talking about.

Question No. 22:

Do you expect to get French support eventually for your three-point plan in the Middle East and if not do you think the West can act effectively without French support?

Answer:

I haven't read this three-point plan of yours - you are attributing to me - there are many ideas and suggestions being put forward. We are of course in close touch with the President of France who has very, very keen interests and concern with the problems of this area and we have given full support to his proposal for the four-power meeting.

Question No. 23:

The editor of the New Statesman and Nation this week referred to Britain as a mangy and pretentious old lion. Do you think this is a widespread feeling and does it inhibit British efforts to bring an influence on world affairs?

Answer:

I never when I am abroad make attacks on other politicians, still less would I think of making attacks on editors. One of the deep deprivations of coming to Canada which, in every way of course has been very enjoyable, is that I haven't been able to see the New Statesman this week; but since I rarely see it anyway I shall no doubt survive.

. . . Question No. 24:

Question No. 24:

A final question, sir, and I am afraid I must also refer to the New Statesman. The issue of May 26th, which I believe you did see, has on facing pages, one statement by J.B. Priestley that Sir Francis Chichester has restored the ancient glories of Britain, and on the opposite page, a statement to the effect that so he made a great voyage, Britain still has a bad balance of payments, it still has a prices and incomes problem. Where do you stand on the question of Sir Francis Chichester?

Answer:

I think it's a very good question. I think he has done a tremendous thing and certainly it has given everybody a lift. I don't think he set out with the idea of solving our balance of payments problems. I don't think he probably had much time in those critical four months to work out a prices and incomes policy better than the one that the two sides of industry and the British government have worked out. And certainly it is something very gratifying what has been done but I don't think, as I say, he set out to solve these problems. With regard to the balance of payments situation that you have referred to, the bad balance of payments situation, it isn't bad. We are in surplus. And I think it will be found when we are able to publish the figures, the latest figures, for our quarterly balance of payments that we have now moved from the desperate critical gap of £800,000,000 and more in 1964 into a position of paying our way and in surplus. Now I don't need to tell you that not every country in the world is in surplus on its balance of payments; indeed how could they be? For a time, it looked as if they were

. . . all going

all going to be in deficit but I couldn't quite see who they were in deficit with unless it was outer space or somebody but certainly they can't all be in surplus at the same time. We are - many others are not - and I believe this has been a pretty remarkable achievement on the part of the British people. Sir Francis hasn't directly contributed to it but shall we say that the spirit he showed was to a high degree symbolic of the rather quieter spirit that was shown by the British people in achieving a surplus on our balance of payments.

fils

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat.A

IMMEDIATE RABAT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 216 10 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

My immediately preceding telegram [Statement by U.A.R. Embassy]

We should avoid replying to items one, two, three, eight and nine which are not our concern. We have previously dealt with ten and eleven and can do so again. Please telegraph replies on items four, five, six, eleven and twelve.

Mr. Holliday Sent 1756Z/10 June 1967

Recd. 1800Z/10 June 1967

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE RABAT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 215 10 June 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

' The U.A.R. Embassy in Rabat has circulated the following statement.

Begins:-

The American and British Government have denied their complicity with Israel and their participation with her in her treacherous aggression on the Arab nation. We and all Arabs have established, with specific proof, Britain's and America's collusion with their Zionist Agent which was created for serving their Colonial purposes. The following is the main conclusive proof which establishes this treacherous complicity.

1. Levy Eshkol's statement in the Knesset last Wednesday, May 29th in which the Israeli Premier announced his expectation that America and Britain would take action outside the United Nations for the lifting of the Egyptian blockade on the Gulf of Aqaba.

2. The declaration of Aba Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister in Orly in France on May 27th last, on his return from Washington when he said according to Israeli broadcasts that the American Government had confirmed to him without leaving room for any other interpretation that they supported Israel in any actions she might undertake to open the Gulf of Aqaba.

3. A previous statement by Aba Eban that he had come to an agreement with America for measures to be taken outside UNO.

4 The visits of George Thomson the British Minister of State and Harold Wilson the Premier to Washington where they had discussions with leading responsible Americans. It has now become clear that the real purpose of these discussions was to prepare the details of the treacherous complicity and conspiracy with Israel.

5 Harold Wilson declared upon arrival in America that a solution ought to be found within 48 hours: and in fact the Israel attack was made within the time specified by Mr. Wilson.

6 The extreme enthusiasm of the British and Americans in their absolute support of Israel at the onset of the crisis, which subsequently was suddenly reduced, when each of these States announced adoption of a neutral attitude. Such an abatement of enthusiasm no doubt conceals the planned conspiracy between the two States and Israel their lackey

7. America's and Britain's manoeuvres to group the naval States together.

/8. America's

8 America's attempt by means of her Foreign Minister Dean Rusk to avoid specifying who was responsible for the commencement of the aggression although the report of M'. Thant, the UNO Secretary General clearly confirmed that it was Israel who was responsible for the opening of hostilities

9 The stationing of American aircraft carriers near the Israeli coasts and the departure of a large number of American planes from the American air base in Libya for Israel.

10. The American aircraft King Hussein himself had seen on the radar and the Anglo American air cover seen by the Egyptian lines over Israel as well as the participation of British aircraft of the Canberra type which bore distinctive British markings in the air raids on the Egyptian lines

11 The confession of the Israeli pilot who was captured in the morning of 6 June over Keneitra in Syria that British and American planes had participated in the battle, and that 17 British bombers had arrived with their pilots before the Israeli hostilities He said that these took part in bombing UAR airports and Jordan and Syria.

12 The collusion was also confirmed by the fact that some planes which attacked the Canal Zone bore no markings at all: and by the fact that the maps found on the Israeli pilots whose planes had been brought down by Arab fire were copies of those found at the British War Office. Some of them were taken from air photographs snapped by American espionage planes.

13 The above clearly establishes and confirms Anglo American complicity with Israel which was created by Anglo-American Colonialism as a front post for it in the heart of the Arab motherland.

See also my immediately following telegram

Mr. Holliday

Sent 1630Z 10 June
Recd 1707Z 10 June

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

MR. PALLISER

Ref. our telephone conversation last night, you know that the Prime Minister saw telegram 215 from Kobat, before he left for Chequers.

His comment on the telegram was to the effect that the U.A.R. Statement was a distortion of the truth. Mr. Kauffman joined us as the Prime Minister was reading paragraph 5, and on this paragraph the Prime Minister has asked that we find out all that he said publicly on the Middle East during his Washington trip. (I attach copies of the Press Conferences in Washington and Ottawa and have sidelined those Answers relating to the Middle East situation. The respective passages marked X and Y on both papers contain the only references to 'one or two days').

The Prime Minister also said that it was now imperative that we take the initiative in setting up our own tribunal to investigate these allegations of complicity.

I rang the Foreign Office Resident Clerk ref. telegram 216 and as far as he knew no action had been taken at midnight. He warned me about a further debate of the U.N. Security Council to investigate allegations of Israeli attacks on Damascus. I attach pertinent telegrams.

Could we also speak please?

11/6.

June 11, 1967.

Duty Clerk.
11/vi

SECRET

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 631 11 June 1967

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 631 of 11 June
Repeated for information to Washington.

Your telegrams Nos. 1628 and 1629 to Moscow: Middle East.

I am depressed to see that your proposals for playing a part in the long-term Middle Eastern settlement assume conditions which however much they may have seemed relevant to the 1947/48 Palestine settlement are, I submit, quite irrelevant to to-day.

2. I had assumed that it was Her Majesty's Government's policy to "get out of the cross-fire of Arab politics" and to pursue an orderly disengagement from the Middle East while seeking to safeguard our interests. Israel's victory over the Arabs offers an unlooked for opportunity to Her Majesty's Government to adapt their Middle East policies to present conditions. We are always complaining of being "on the hook" in this area and we now have a chance to get off it.

3. We should frankly recognize (and this has been clearly brought out during the recent Arab-Israel conflict) that we no longer have the material power or the influence on our own to enforce a policy of our own choosing in the Middle East. We should, therefore, eschew any invitations to take the lead in controversial disputes between the two parties as, e.g. over the Straits of Tiran.

4. We should also recognize that if great Power interests are allowed to weigh too heavily in a settlement, the Arabs will once again fail to face up to the realities of the situation and to their responsibilities. One of the greatest dangers to peace in the Middle East over the past twenty years was Arab "illusions de grandeur" (encouraged by outside Powers in their own interests). If in their present situation of defeated States the Arabs are again rescued from the results of their own stupidity in their negotiations with Israel, the rotten foundations on which peace in the Middle East has so far rested, will not be cleared away. Another Arab-Israel war, in ten or twenty years' time, will be in the making. Next time nuclear weapons might well be used.

5. Two main themes might inform our thinking as we seek to help plan a stable future and to protect British interests in the Middle East:

(i) Our interests are no longer exclusively British - they are increasingly part of the wider world, and particularly European interests (cf. paragraph 4 of your telegram No.1628).

(ii) We should avoid taking a prominent part in any settlement between the combatants. We should, however, support through

the United Nations any Arab-Israel peace arranged between the two parties.

6. To take a lead would merely perpetuate our present unsatisfactory posture. Indeed the whole idea of "a deal fixed up between those Powers which have the most influence" with the countries in dispute smacks dreadfully of 19th century diplomacy, which carried on to the carve-up of the Ottoman Empire after the 1914-18 War, that Arab historians reproach Her Majesty's Government for. For this Arab leaders and politicians continue to vilify us. Can we not now take this unique opportunity to reduce our commitments to suit our means?

7. As regards your specific questions (paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 1059). I think the Arabs might agree to (a), (b) and (e). (d) is surely something on which the Israelis will stand out for on their interpretation of International Law. (f), see 7(f) below. (g) does not depend on the acquiescence of the recipients only, but also on the arms sellers. (h) appears to have nothing to do with an Arab/Israel settlement, to be a British interest possibly conflicting with Israel's security.

8. (Paragraph 6 of your telegram under reference). I agree with (a). I do not see the Jews ever agreeing to (c) and perhaps only to derisory adjustments under (b), especially in view of recent Ministerial statements reported from Jerusalem. On (d) I would expect them to hold on to as much as possible as bargaining counters and not to evacuate (i) the Latrun Salient (ii) the area round Tulkarm, (iii) the Syrian heights dominating their Kibutzim, (iv) Sharm Al Sheikh. They might go along with (e) provided their other points were met. On refugees (f) once the Arabs have conceded the existence of the State of Israel they might be induced by offers of very substantial compensation to cooperate over the integration of the refugees in their countries - the world should at least try to shame the Arabs into doing so instead of allowing them to retain the refugees as pawns for their own political ends. (g) would depend on Israel's other demands being met and an acknowledgement and guarantees of her right to exist.

9. To sum up:

(i) Britain is offered an unforeseen opportunity to adjust her policies in the Middle East and her commitments to accord more with her resources.

(ii) In this process Britain should seek to safeguard her interests by widening the basis of their protection (consultation and cooperation with other interested Powers).

(iii) The Arabs must be brought (but not by us) through direct negotiation with Israel (perhaps under the Secretary-General's auspices) to acknowledge that Israel is here to stay.

(iv) We should not be a party to nor encourage others to the economic support of Nasser who has done more in the last week to damage Western interests in the Middle East than any other Arab.

(v) We might do worse than to sit in this particular dance out.

10. I have just seen Bahrain telegram No. 405 to you and endorse the recommendations in paragraph 4.

Foreign Office pass Immediate Washington 107.

Mr. Adams

Sent 2055Z/11 June
Received 2302Z/11 June

[Repeated as requested]

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Cypher/OTP

IMMEDIATE TRIPOLI TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 430 11 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 430 of 11 June.
Repeated for information to: Troops Cyrenaica (for Wakefield)

Your telegram No. 469 [also to Amman No. 1085]: Soviet intentions in the Middle East.

In Libya the Government and business community dislike and fear the Russians and Nasser equally and have certainly not changed their opinion. But the man in the street, the young and Opposition intellectuals are more steeped than ever in Radio Cairo propaganda after three weeks incessant listening, although here there has been some disarray as reported in my telegram No. 415. We hear today that despite Russian attempt to recover ground by prompt condemnation of Israel on Syrian front and efforts to associate Bloc countries in anti-Israel campaign disillusionment at Russian let-down of Egyptians over unconditional cease-fire and failure to provide military aid remains general and profound.

2. Problem in Libya is almost exactly that described in Bahrain telegram No. 405 to you except that we are fortunate in the staunchness of our friends in high places and at all levels in the administration who continue to believe what we say. The rising tension we all felt on 10 June is already somewhat eased in Tripoli.

3. The Libyan Government and all our friends here are under the same pressure as described by Bahrain and the grip of the Egyptian propaganda and subversive machine is as dangerous here as anywhere. The consideration urged on me by friends here on 4 June and reported in my telegram No. 430 have lost none of their force. It is as seen from Libya now of the utmost importance that we should find means of correcting the pro-Israel image we have acquired however unjustly during the past fortnight. In Radio and Press we need to seize any opportunity to proclaim support for legitimate Arab positions particularly where the return of territory and a settlement for Palestinian refugees is concerned and loudly condemn the Israelis if they appear to merit it. (They who after all won the war might show understanding for our difficulties vis-à-vis Arab opinion which, as explained in telegram under reference and in Bahrain's last paragraph, are markedly greater than those of the United States.) It is essentially by the public presentation of our position to Arabs that we must first try to recover our lost ground even though [gp. undec] feel it right to be more friendly to the Israelis. We are after all heavily engaged in political warfare and under severe attack. If we are not to suffer severe long-term damage to our interests here we must not allow the Russians to recapture exclusive championship of the Arab cause.

Foreign Office please repeat as necessary and pass Immediate to Ministry of Defence for Troops Cyrenaica.

Mr. Sarell

Sent 1340Z 11 June
Recd. 1545Z 11 June

[Repeated as requested]

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Canadian

CONFIDENTIAL

June 11, 1967

The Prime Minister saw last night Rabat Telegram No. 215 of June 10 containing the text of a statement circulated there by the U.A.R. Embassy about the "big lie". He commented that this statement was a complete distortion of the truth, particularly in its references to his own alleged remarks in North America; and he said that it was now imperative that we should take the initiative in setting up our own tribunal to investigate these allegations of complicity.

I was not present when he made these remarks and I will seek some clarification from him about the suggestion what we should set up our own tribunal. But as regards point 5 in the U.A.R. statement reported by Rabat and since I see that in their telegram No. 216 they asked for telegraphic guidance on items 4,5, and 6, I am enclosing (in case you have not already got them) transcripts of the Prime Minister's Press Conferences of June 2 in Ottawa and Washington. You will see that in Ottawa he said in particular "The time that we have, if we have a day or two or a few days, must be used" to solve the question of freedom of passage as well as other Middle Eastern problems; and in Washington when this remark was quoted at him somewhat out of context and incorrectly he said:

"I didn't say one or two days, I said it looked as though we might have only one or two days. I have said all the week that it looks as though perhaps we are fortunate, we have a little more breathing space than looked likely perhaps last weekend, which was a very critical time, but as I said, time is not on our side. Whether we have a week or more or only a day or two, we have to use every minute of that time to try and avoid the crises which may result."

In short the U.A.R. statement misquotes and exploits out of context what the Prime Minister actually said. But this is of course entirely consistent with the "big lie" technique.

AW

D. Day, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister

As you wish Sir!

Have written to the
Prime to U.A.R. Ambassa-
dor to see a Robert-
son later this
afternoon.

Could we have a
word please, about
what you want by
"setting up our own
Tribunal"?

RW
11/6

FLASH

GYPHER

CYPHER CAT A

F L A S H TUNIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 134 11 JUNE 1967

N BAG

"SOGR" THT

TGMMJ

CONFIDENTIAL

MY TELS 127 & 128= BOURGUIBA /S MESSAGE.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND DE GAULLE HAVE BOTH REPLIED POLITELY IF NON COMMITTALLY TO PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA'S MESSAGE.

I RECOMMEND THAT IF POSSIBLE I SHOULD BE AUTHORISED TO PRESENT WITH ALL SPEED A

SIMILAR MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER.

I AM SURE THAT BOURGUIBA WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH A SHORT REPLY(WHICH COULD BE PUBLISHED AS THE OTHERS HAVE BEEN) SYMPATHISING WITH HIS PREOCCUPATIONS, SAYING THAT H M G SHARE HIS VIEW THAT THE CEASE FIRE SHOULD BE MADE EFFECTIVE ON ALL FRONTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND EMPHASISING THAT THEY ARE DOING EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO THIS END.

2. PRESIDENT S AMOUR PROPRE WAS WOUNDED BY OUR

[illegible] PRESIDENT AND RESIDENTS WHICH

/2.

~~H M G SHARE HIS VIEW THAT THE CEASE FIRE SHOULD BE MADE~~
~~EFFECTIVE ON ALL FRONTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND EMPHASISING~~
~~T THEY ARE DOING EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO THIS END.~~

2. PRESIDENT S AMOUR PROPRE WAS WOUNDED BY OUR
ADVICE TO TOURISTS AND RESIDENTS WHICH
DESPITE MY ASSURANCES
TO THE CONTRARY HE REGARDED IT AS A LACK OF CONFIDENCE
IN HIM PERONALLY AND AN EARLY REPLY WOULD HELP TO CALM
THINGS DOWN.

HOOPER

11152 11 JUNE 1967
1200Z 11 JUNE 1967

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister.

Bourguiba's message.

As you will see, H.B.J. and the Cambodian Force replied promptly: and we showed by telegram how your reply soon. The situation in Tunisia is worsening and the Tunisian Government will be under pressure to withdraw. Ec. The worst would be publicity in Britain and France that we were a cause of the trouble. The Duty Clerk has a copy of the appeal.

11/6.

TELEGRAM TO TUNIS

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH

CYPHER

Agreed.

Your telegram No. 134

You should take the earliest opportunity to deliver the following reply from the Prime Minister to President Bourguiba:-

"Many thanks for your message. I fully share your concern that the tragic fighting in the Middle East should have continued after the clear call of the Security Council on all parties concerned to cease fire. Her Majesty's Government have given their full support to the efforts of the Security Council to bring the fighting to an end and I am glad to say that our latest information is that the cease-fire arranged by General Bull is being observed. We shall certainly not hesitate to condemn any violations of it.

2. Throughout the present crisis we have used all our influence, both publicly at the United Nations and, as appropriate, in private to urge restraint on all concerned. You may be assured that we shall continue to do this. I hope that you will be able to use your great personal influence in the same direction.

3. Her Majesty's Ambassador has told me your view that the allegations of British and American intervention in the fighting on behalf of Israel were simply a prefabricated excuse for military defeat. I whole-heartedly share this view. But the fact is that these malicious lies are causing damage to British interests and to the friendly

relations between Britain and the Arab states which I am sure you desire as warmly as we do. (I and) my colleagues are doing all in our power to make clear publicly that there is no foundation of truth whatsoever in these stories. We have, as you know, offered the fullest facilities to the United Nations to demonstrate the falsity of the charges. But as long as this lie continues to circulate it can only exacerbate the already explosive situation in the Middle East. I hope you will do everything in your power to counteract these allegations. I need not say that if you could see your way to denouncing them publicly this would be a characteristically courageous contribution to the restoration of peace and sanity in this troubled area.

June 11, 1967

Subject

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No. T169/67

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO TUNIS

TELNO. 193 11 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.
YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 134.
YOU SHOULD TAKE THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO DELIVER
THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA

QUOTE. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE. I FULLY SHARE YOUR CONCERN THAT THE TRAGIC FIGHTING IN THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED AFTER THE CLEAR CALL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON ALL PARTIES CONCERNED TO CEASE FIRE. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAVE GIVEN THEIR FULL SUPPORT TO THE EFFORTS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO AN END AND I AM GLAD TO SAY THAT OUR LATEST INFORMATION IS THAT THE CEASE-FIRE ARRANGED BY GENERAL BULL IS BEING OBSERVED. WE SHALL CERTAINLY NOT HESITATE TO CONDEMN ANY VIOLATIONS OF IT.
2. THROUGHOUT THE PRESENT CRISIS WE HAVE USED ALL OUR INFLUENCE, BOTH PUBLICLY AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND, AS APPROPRIATE, IN PRIVATE TO URGE RESTRAINT ON ALL CONCERNED. YOU MAY BE ASSURED THAT WE SHALL CONTINUE TO DO THIS. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO USE YOUR GREAT PERSONAL INFLUENCE IN THE SAME DIRECTION.
3. HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR HAS TOLD ME YOUR VIEW THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN THE FIGHTING ON BEHALF OF ISRAEL WERE SIMPLY A PREFABRICATED EXCUSE FOR MILITARY DEFEAT. I WHOLE-HEARTEDLY SHARE THIS VIEW. BUT THE FACT IS THAT THESE MALICIOUS LIES ARE CAUSING DAMAGE TO BRITISH INTERESTS AND TO THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE ARAB STATES WHICH I AM SURE YOU DESIRE AS WARMLY AS WE DO. MY COLLEAGUES AND I ARE DOING ALL IN OUR POWER TO MAKE CLEAR PUBLICLY THAT THERE IS NO FOUNDATION OF TRUTH WHATSOEVER IN

/THESE

THESE STORIES. WE HAVE, AS YOU KNOW, OFFERED THE FULLEST FACILITIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS TO DEMONSTRATE THE FALSITY OF THE CHARGES. BUT AS LONG AS THIS LIE CONTINUES TO CIRCULATE IT CAN ONLY EXACERBATE THE ALREADY EXPLOSIVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I HOPE YOU WILL DO EVERYTHING IN YOUR POWER TO CONTERACT THESE ALLEGATIONS. I NEED NOT SAY THAT IF YOU COULD SEE YOUR WAY TO DENOUNCING THEM PUBLICLY THIS WOULD BE A CHARACTERISTICALLY COURAGEOUS CONTRIBUTION TO THE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND SANITY IN THIS TROUBLED AREA. UNQUOTE.

SOSFA SENT 2150/11 JUNE

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PPPPP

Subject

सत्यमेव जयते

PRIME MINISTER'S

No.134/AHC/67 PERSONAL TELEGRAM

SERIAL No T 168/67

INDIA HOUSE,
ALDWYCH,
LONDON, W.C.2.
June 11, 1967

Dear Mr Prime Minister,

I have the honour to transmit to you the following message from the Prime Minister of India which I have just received:-

COPIED TO

C.O.
F.O.
S/S Defence.
Sir B. Trend.

" My colleagues in the Government of India and I have watched with growing anxiety and concern the recent turn of events in West Asia. Situated as we are geographically, the conflict in West Asia affects our vital interests in many ways. Consequently, the maintenance of peace in this entire region is of paramount importance to us.

From the first signs of the gathering war clouds, we made strenuous efforts in the Security Council to prevent an aggravation of the situation. In our judgment, U Thant's efforts and the recommendations he made in his report provided a reasonable basis for action by the Security Council. Subsequent events, however, rendered these efforts nugatory.

With the outbreak of actual fighting, one could only strive for the earliest possible quenching of the flames of war. We feel that it was just and proper not only that there should be a cease fire, but that the status quo prevailing immediately prior to the outbreak of war should be restored. I am sure you will agree that no one should be allowed to retain what is acquired by war. The linking of the cease fire with the withdrawal of all armed forces would be in accord with the principles which the Security Council had evolved in the past. I hope that the sincerity of our purpose will be understood.

While we are naturally relieved that cessation of hostilities has taken place, we still remain deeply concerned about the prospects of a just and durable peace in West Asia. Naturally, the United Kingdom as a great power and you as its wise and far-seeing leader have a great contribution to make in laying a sound foundation for peace in this area. It is our firm belief that such a foundation would be weak and unstable unless it is held together by the aspirations, the faith and hopes of the millions who live in West Asia. We in India are deeply interested in this as we cannot remain unaffected by the instability, turmoil, conflicts and wars in that area.

INDIRA GANDHI"

...../2

I remain,

Yours very sincerely,

Dwarkanath Chatterjee

(D. N. Chatterjee)

The Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson, O. B. E., M. P.
Prime Minister,
No. 10, Downing Street,
London, S. W. 1.

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT +A+.

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1311 11 JUNE 1967.

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1311 OF 11 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

YRTELS 2741 AND 2742, 1628 TO MOSCOW AND 6234 TO WASHINGTON.

MIDDLE EAST.

THE PROPOSALS IN YRTEL 2741 HAVE NOW BEEN PARTLY OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. I NOW HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS.

2...YOU WILL REALISE FROM RECENT REPORTS HOW BLEAK THE OUTLOOK IS HERE. THE RUSSIANS WILL DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO WIN BACK ARAB OPINION BY DEMANDING CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL AND INSISTING THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO KEEP THE ''FRUITS OF AGGRESSION''. LAST NIGHT FEDORENKO AND TARABANOV (BULGARIA) AND THE SPOKESMEN OF SYRIA, JORDAN AND THE U A R WERE ALL VERY BITTER, RUDE AND VIOLENT. THEIR ATTACKS WERE PARTICULARLY DIRECTED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES (IT IS NOTICEABLE THAT THE RUSSIANS AND THE ARABS WHILE OFTEN ATTACKING ''IMPERIALIST WESTERN POWERS'' NOW USUALLY LEAVE OUT DIRECT REFERENCE TO THE BRITISH BUT I VERY MUCH DOUBT IF THIS WILL LAST).

3...FOR THE PRESENT I FEAR THAT THERE IS NO HOPE OF USING THE UNITED NATIONS AS A FORUM OR CENTRE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS ABOUT THE FUTURE. FEDORENKO YESTERDAY REFUSED EVEN TO SPEAK TO GOLDBERG (SAYING THAT IF THERE HAD TO BE ANY COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE TWO DELEGATIONS THEIR DEPUTIES SHOULD MEET).

4...WHAT WE CAN HOPE TO DO HERE IS TO PROVIDE A BRIDGE FOR CONSULTATION WITH ARAB DELEGATES (WITH WHOM I AM STILL ON GOOD PERSONAL TERMS). MORE IMPORTANT STILL IS TO KEEP IN STEP WITH THE FRENCH, AND SEYDOUX HAS RECENTLY GONE OUT OF HIS WAY TO SHOW HOW ANXIOUS HE IS TO WORK WITH US. AMBASSADOR HILMI (SECOND IN COMMAND OF THE U A R DELEGATION) TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT HE THOUGHT THAT WHILE THE U S AND THE U S S R ARE DEADLOCKED IN PARTISAN DISPUTE FRANCE AND BRITAIN WORKING TOGETHER SHOULD BE MUCH MORE FREE

/ TO TAKE

SECRET

TO TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE LINE.

5...THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION IS WHAT WE SHOULD SAY AND DO ON THE QUESTIONS OF CONDEMNATION AND WITHDRAWAL, AND ON THESE ISSUES IT IS IMPORTANT I THINK IN OUR OWN INTERESTS NOT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE ACTING AS DEFENDERS OF THE ISRAELIS.

6...I WOULD NOT SUGGEST THAT ANY GENERAL CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL AS THE AGGRESSOR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BUT I THINK THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO OPPOSE A CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL'S ACTION IN VIOLATING THE CEASE-FIRE BY BOMBING NEAR DAMASCUS AND BY OCCUPYING A SECTION OF SOUTHERN SYRIA AFTER HAVING ACCEPTED THE CEASE-FIRE (AND AFTER HAVING DENIED IN THE COUNCIL BOTH BOMBING OF DAMASCUS OR OCCUPATION OF QUNEITRA).

7...SUBJECT TO FURTHER EVIDENCE I THINK MYSELF THAT WE SHOULD FRANKLY AND STRONLY CONDEMN BOTH WHAT WAS DONE IN SYRIA BY THE ISRAELIS AND THE SHELLING OF ISRAELI VILLAGES BY THE SYRIANS FROM THE SYRIAN HEIGHTS. SEYDOUX SUGGESTED LAST NIGHT THAT IF WE HAD TO VOTE AT ONCE WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO CONDEMN THE ACTIONS REPORTED IN GENERAL BULL'S REPORT WHICH HAD JUST BEEN RECEIVED (SEE MYTEL 1297). I HAVE ALREADY SAID (SEE MY STATEMENT IN THE COUNCIL ON JUNE 1Ø) THAT WE CONDEMN ANY AND EVERY BREACH OF THE CEASE-FIRE. TO LEAVE IT AT THAT GENERAL STATEMENT IN THE LIGHT OF THE KNOWLEDGE WE NOW HAVE AND THUS TO SUGGEST THAT THE BREACHES BY SYRIA AND ISRAEL COULD BE PUT ON A PAR WOULD BE REGARDED BY THE ARABS (RIGHTLY I THINK) AS CLEAR INDICATION OF OUR PRO-ISRAEL PARTIALITY.

8...WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT DRAFT RESOLUTIONS WILL EMERGE (OTHER THAN THE AMERICAN TEXT IN MYTEL 1298) AND WE CAN CONSIDER HOW WE VOTE AFTER CONSULTATION WITH OUR FRIENDS (PARTICULARLY THE FRENCH) AND THEN REFER TO YOU AGAIN, BUT AS AND WHEN ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE FROM U N SOURCES IS AVAILABLE I SUGGEST THAT I SHOULD SPEAK IN STRONG CONDEMNATION OF EACH SPECIFIC BREACH WHICH IS CONFIRMED. SO MUCH FOR CONDEMNATION.

9...ON WITHDRAWAL, THE RUSSIANS WILL SUPPORT STRONGLY THE ARAB DEMAND FOR IMMEDIATE AND FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES BEHIND / THE ARMISTICE

THE ARMISTICE LINES. THIS IS AN ISSUE WHICH WE SHALL NOT BE ALLOWED TO DUCK. TO TALK OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL (YRTEL 2741 PARA 4) COULD GIVE RISE TO DANGEROUS SUSPICION THAT WE PLANNED TO LET THE ISRAELIS RETAIN SUBSTANTIAL TERRITORIAL GAINS. I DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN DEPART FROM THE PRINCIPLE THAT WE RESPECT AND SUPPORT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL STATES IN THE NEAR EAST AND I THINK THAT WE SHOULD DECLARE THAT WE STILL STAND BY THAT PRINCIPLE. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER THE ISRAELIS WILL NOT WITHDRAW TO THE OLD LINES FORTHWITH. WE SHALL THEREFORE HAVE TO LINK THE ACCEPTANCE OF WITHDRAWAL WITH THE QUESTION OF BY WHAT MEANS IT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED. THIS WILL BRING US ONTO THE QUESTION OF E.G. U N REPRESENTATION IN THE AREA (SEE PARAGRAPH 11 BELOW).

10..GENERALLY I SUGGEST THAT OUR MAIN ARGUMENT FOR THE PRESENT SHOULD BE TO REINFORCE WHAT I HAVE SAID ALREADY THAT THE TEST WE SHALL APPLY TO ALL STATEMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS IS THE TEST WHETHER THEY WILL HAVE THE EFFECT OF REDUCING TENSION (AND REDUCING SUFFERING TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION) AND MAKING IT MORE POSSIBLE TO WORK SPEEDILY FOR DISENGAGEMENT, WITHDRAWAL AND FULL AND JUST AND PERMANENT SETTLEMENT.

11..MEANWHILE WE SHOULD BE CONSIDERING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THE QUESTION OF U N REPRESENTATION IN THE AREA. GENERAL BULL MAY NEED REINFORCEMENT FOR UNTSO. IN THE PRESENT MOOD OF THE COUNCIL I THINK HE COULD PROBABLY GET ANYTHING HE WANTED, AND I SHALL DISCUSS WITH RALPH BUNCHE WHETHER WE MIGHT NOT AT ONCE TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT POSITION TO GET A SUBSTANTIAL REINFORCEMENT. IT HAS ALSO BEEN SUGGESTED (PRIVATELY BY SEYDOUX) THAT SPINELLI MIGHT GO TO THE AREA IF ONLY TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR A U N REPRESENTATIVE CARRYING MORE WEIGHT. ANOTHER SUGGESTION IS THAT EITHER THE SWISS AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON (SCHNYDER) OR THE SWISS AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW (LINDT) WHO HAVE BOTH HAD EXPERIENCE IN THE U N HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES MIGHT BE USED. THE POSSIBILITY OF FINDING A MEDIATOR (SUCH AS ERLANDER OF SWEDEN OR AIKEN OF IRELAND) IS A SUBJECT WHICH MIGHT I SUGGEST BE URGENTLY CONSIDERED AT THE

/ HIGHEST

HIGHEST LEVEL WITH PARIS AND MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON IN THAT ORDER. THE OTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT THEMSELVES PLAY A LEADING MEDIATING ROLE (A FRENCH TASHKENT). RECENT STATEMENTS FROM PARIS SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THIS MIGHT APPEAL TO THE FRENCH WHO ARE PERHAPS IN THE BEST POSITION TO INFLUENCE BOTH ISRAEL AND THE ARABS.

12..THESE THEN ARE MY SUGGESTIONS. FIRST THAT WE SHOULD TAKE A CLEARLY IMPARTIAL LINE IN THE VERY BAD-TEMPERED DEBATES TO BE EXPECTED HERE (KEEPING IN STEP WITH THE FRENCH). SECOND, THAT WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO RESTORE COMMUNICATION WITH THE ARABS THROUGH THEIR DELEGATIONS HERE AND SHOW CONCERN FOR THEIR INTERESTS AND RIGHTS. THIRD, THAT WE SHOULD SUPPORT THE REINFORCEMENT OF UNTSO. FOURTH, THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO GET SOME NEW U N POLITICAL PRESENCE IN THE AREA. FIFTH, THAT WE SHOULD WORK WITH THE OTHER MAIN POWERS TO GET AGREEMENT ON A HIGH-LEVEL MEDIATOR. THE MEDIATOR MIGHT NOT ADDRESS HIMSELF IMMEDIATELY TO THE PROBLEM OF A SETTLEMENT: HE MIGHT FIRST HAVE TO CONSIDER THE MACHINERY FOR NEGOTIATING IT.

13..I THINK WE CAN TAKE IT THAT THE RUSSIANS AND THE ARABS ARE GOING TO ENGAGE IN A NON-STOP OFFENSIVE IN THE COUNCIL ON THE CONDEMNATION AND WITHDRAWAL ISSUES SO THE SOONER WE CAN GET SOMETHING PRACTICAL MOVING IN THE NEAR EAST THE BETTER.

14..MAY I ALSO SAY (WITH REFERENCE TO YRTEL 1628 TO MOSCOW) THAT WE HERE FEEL THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE KNOWN TO BE BACKING ANY PACKAGE DEAL. ANY DEAL WHICH HAS ANY PRACTICAL CHANCE OF BEING ACCEPTED AND ENFORCED WOULD BE REGARDED BY THE ARABS AS A VICTORY FOR ISRAEL AGGRESSION, AND WE CANNOT FORESEE NOW WHAT MIGHT BE EVENTUALLY ''SALEABLE''. FOR US TO FLOAT ANY IDEA OF A PACKAGE DEAL HERE NOW, PARTICULARLY IF IT INCLUDED ANY PROPOSAL FOR TRANSFER OF TERRITORY FROM THE U A R, JORDAN OR SYRIA, WOULD DO OUR INTERESTS GREAT HARM. ON THE SUEZ CANAL, WHILE WE DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO GET IT OPEN, I FEEL, FOR SOMEWHAT THE SAME REASONS, THAT PUBLIC STATEMENTS FROM US WILL NOT

/ HELP AT

H

HELP AT THIS STAGE.
15..SINCE WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO AVOID SPEAKING IN THE COUNCIL SOON I SHALL OF COURSE WELCOME YOUR GUIDANCE ON ALL THIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
LORD CARADON.

SENT AT Ø300Z/12 JUNE 1967.
RECD AT Ø301Z/12 JUNE 1967.

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EOS.

SSSSS

Middle East file

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY NICOSIA TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Tel. No. 507 12 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 507 of 12 June.
Repeated for information to HQ CBFNE 153, UKMIS New York and Washington.

My telegram 494.

Accusations of United Kingdom involvement.

When American Ambassador also pressed Cyprus Government to make statement that bases have not been used in any way in Arab/Israeli conflict. Foreign Minister used fact he awaited our answer to his request for explanation of flights out of bases on 5-8 June (my telegram No. 490) as excuse for not making statement.

2. I have discussed situation with CBFNE and despite length of list he is fully prepared to provide explanation of all flights. I think it would be advantageous to give explanation when ready to Archbishop personally and suggest that best method would be for me to take CBFNE to him to present and explain it. I do not expect this to induce Archbishop to make any really helpful public statement but it will remove excuse that he had tried to examine matter impartially and not received our cooperation.

3. I adhere to view that it is Archbishop's main aim to secure right in times of crisis to have Cyprus observer in bases. Grateful for confirmation you accept that we should not encourage this. Grateful also for any other guidance.

Commonwealth Office pass UKMIS New York 108, Washington 98.

Sir N. Costar

Sent 1039Z/12 June
Recd. 1120Z/12 June

[Repeated as requested]

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M.E.W. & U.N. Dept.

XXXXX

CONFIDENTIAL

En Clair

PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno 631 12 June, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No.631 of 12 June, Repeated for information to Ottawa (for DEA) and Nairobi (for SpecRep).

Middle East.

The text was released on 10 June of two messages from President Nyerere to President Nasser.

(a) The first message begins:

My Dear Brother, In your hour of tribulation I want to assure you of my respect and unyielding friendship. I do understand the heaviness of your big and noble heart. You have told your people the truth about Egypt's great setback. You have nobly accepted full responsibility. You have offered to step down in leadership of your country. But with one voice the people of Egypt have said no. Your people need you and your people want you. I am adding a brotherly voice to that of the people of Egypt. Please, Dear Brother, stay on and continue serving your people. Justice will one day be done, for the Arab people too have rights.

Ends.

(b) The second message begins:

My Dear Brother, in this hour of jubilation by the Imperialists, I want to join the people of Egypt in their rejoicing at the happy news that you have agreed to continue in their service.

Ends.

2. The Secretary General of Nuta, Mr. Kamaliza, has sent a message to the President of the U.A.R. Federation of Labour, Mr. Zhmed Fahim, which reads as follows:

Begins:

In the name of National Union of Tanganyika workers please convey to the workers and Government of U.A.R. our deepest concern over the tripartite imperialist conspiracy against the Arab people. The workers of Tanzania strongly condemn Israeli aggression and urge all progressive Governments to support the just struggle of the Arab people for self determination. Amazed at the naked betrayal of some Socialist States in our struggle against imperialism and Neo-Colonialism Africa can only rely on herself. We fully support President Nasser's leadership and urge complete unity of the people of the U.A.R. behind him for the defeat of aggression and world imperialism.

Ends.

Commonwealth Office please pass Ottawa (for DEA) 221 and Nairobi (for SpecRep) 185.

Mr. Wilson
CO/FO/WH DISTRIBUTION
M.E.W. & U.N.D.

Sent Untimed 12 June
Recd 1138Z/12 June

fib.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO U.K. MISSION NEW YROK

TELNO. 2798 12 JUNE 1967 (MR. THOMSON'S OFFICE)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 2798 OF 12 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 1311: MIDDLE EAST.

I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR FULL AND CONSTRUCTIVE COMMENTS.

2. I AGREE WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE LIKELY TO MAKE AS MUCH USE AS THEY CAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A FIELD FOR PROPAGANDA ON BEHALF OF THE ARABS SO THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT WE CAN MAKE MUCH USE OF THE COUNCIL AT PRESENT AS A FORUM FOR CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATION. ON THE OTHER HAND WE MUST OBVIOUSLY KEEP THE FIGHT GOING IN THE COUNCIL PARTLY BECAUSE WE MUST COUNTER RUSSIAN MOVES THERE AND PARTLY BECAUSE THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS HAVE SHOWN THAT GENERAL BULL'S ORGANISATION, HOWEVER IMPERFECT, IS THE ONLY MACHINERY AT PRESENT AVAILABLE FOR HANDLING TRUCE OBSERVANCE AND DISENGAGEMENT PROBLEMS. INDEED WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK THROUGH UNTSO AS YOU SUGGEST.

3. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS I AGREE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN PARA. 12 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE WITH THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS.

(A) YOU SHOULD CONTINUE AS YOU HAVE DONE ALREADY TO SPEAK IN STRONG CONDEMNATION OF ANY SPECIFIC BREACH OF THE CEASE FIRE WHEN IT HAS BEEN CONFIRMED. THE RESOLUTION CONTAINED IN NEW YORK TELNO 1315 WAS FULLY IN LINE WITH THIS POLICY.

(B) I AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH M. SEYDOUX ALTHOUGH YOU WILL SEE FROM VARIOUS PARIS TELEGRAMS THAT HE IS MORE INCLINED TO BE COOPERATIVE THAN THE FRENCH GOVT. IN GENERAL.

(C) I WELCOME ANY STEPS THAT YOU CAN TAKE TO PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN YOUR EXCELLENT PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS. THIS IS OF GREAT VALUE.

/ (D) WE.....

CONFIDENTIAL

(D) WE STRONGLY SUPPORT YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING UNTSO, FOR PRESSING FOR A NEW U.N. POLITICAL PRESENCE IN THE AREA AND FOR GETTING AGREEMENT FOR A HIGH LEVEL MEDIATOR. I HOPE YOU WILL TAKE THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY OF TALKING TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND RALPH BUNCHE ABOUT THESE MATTERS. (HAD YOU THOUGHT OF RE-ENLISTING GALO PLACA? WHAT ABOUT THE MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER WHOM YOU MENTIONED TO GEORGE THOMSON?).

4. WHEN THE RUSSIANS RETURN TO THE CHARGE OF WITHDRAWAL I THINK THAT THE ONLY POSSIBLE LINE WHICH YOU CAN TAKE IS THAT SUGGESTED IN PARA. 1Ø OF YOUR TELEGRAM. OF COURSE THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT GOING TO AGREE TO WITHDRAW EXCEPT AS PART OF A GENERAL SETTLEMENT. THEREFORE, FOR THE PRESENT, YOU MUST CONTINUE TO SAY THAT STATEMENTS OR RESOLUTIONS ABOUT WITHDRAWAL MUST BE JUDGED ON WHETHER THEY WILL BE HELPFUL TOWARDS AN IMMEDIATE DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES AND LOWERING OF THE TENSION AND LATER TOWARDS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A SATISFACTORY GENERAL SETTLEMENT.

5. WE ARE URGENTLY LOOKING INTO THE QUESTION OF SWITCHING OUR CONTRIBUTION TO UNEF TO UNRA AND WILL TELEGRAPH FURTHER (YOUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH HAYMAN)

SOSFA SENT 1705Z 12 JUNE

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S E C R E T

Cypher/Cat. A

PRIORITY RIO DE JANEIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 276 12 June 1967

S E C R E T

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 276 of 12 June Repeated for information to Washington and UKMission New York.

Middle East.

Following is substance of confidential conversation today with my Israeli colleague. As reported in my telegram number 245 Ambassador Divon is in close touch with his government: and is currently receiving direct messages from General Dayan, who is a personal friend. So, at risk of repetition, I believe his statements to be worth reporting. Thus:

2. Israel will 'not' give up the Old City of Jerusalem. National, historical and religious pressures preclude this. She will, however, guarantee freedom of all religions there, and would accept some sort of inter-faith supervision. She intends now to establish her permanent national capital there.

3. Israel will only give up Sharm El Sheikh against foolproof international guarantee of freedom of Gulf of Aqaba.

4. On the Syrian frontier Israel is ready eventually to withdraw, but only against stable guarantees of demilitarisation. She has suffered too much from bombardment by heavy Syrian batteries in hills overlooking frontier. Her immediate purpose of last 48 hours was to eliminate these (even at cost of some infringement of cease-fire: (UKMission New York telegram No. 1304 paragraph 6.))

5. In Gaza Strip Israel would much like to push Egypt's northern limit further back from Tel Aviv: but appreciates difficulty presented by predominantly Arab population and danger of creating new refugee problem.

6. In Sinai she will retain her present positions until she gets some solid assurance of freedom of Suez Canal. But she will not move last few miles right on to Canal itself: or take Ismailia, Qantara, Suez, Port Said, even though these are now wide open.

7. Israel would be ready to consider idea of tripartite confederation (Israel, Trans-Jordan, Is-Jordan) now being floated as eventual solution by among others, Brazilian Government. This would incorporate customs union, etc: and would have merit of built-in solution of refugee problem.

/8.

8. For immediate purposes, however, Israel is only prepared to talk direct with individual countries concerned i.e. Syria, Jordan, U.A.R. She could only lose at any conference with massed Arab powers supported by Communist states.

F.O. pass Washington 23 and UKMission New York 23.

Sir J. Russell

Sent 1535Z/13 June 1967
Recd 1555Z/13 June 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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C.O. M.E.W. & U.N. Dept.

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1313 12 JUNE 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO1313 OF 12 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV OTTAWA COPENHAGEN RIO DE JANEIRO BUENOS AIRES ADDIS ABABA NEW DELHI AND TOKYO AND SAVING TO AMMAN JEDDA AND CAIRO.

MYTEL 1303:

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL.

THE COUNCIL WAS SUMMONED INTO EMERGENCY SESSION AT 10.30 P M ON 11 JUNE ON THE REQUEST OF SYRIA, WHO COMPLAINED OF ISRAELI ARMOURED TROOP AND HELICOPTER MOVEMENTS IN BREACH OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT IN THE VICINITY OF RAFID, WHICH HAD BEEN OCCUPIED AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE: THE ISRAELIS HAD PREVENTED U N OBSERVERS FROM REACHING THE AREA.

2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MADE A REPORT TO THE COUNCIL BASED ON THREE SHORT REPORTS FROM GENERAL BULL. THESE STATED THAT U N OBSERVATION TEAMS PROCEEDING TOWARDS RAFID WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING MOBILE OBSERVATION UNITS IN THE QUNEITRA AREA HAD BEEN HELD UP AT RAFID BY ISRAELI TROOPS, AND THAT U N TEAMS HAD OBSERVED TWO OR THREE ISRAELI TANKS IN FRONT OF JOUKADA AND A COLUMN OF TANKS HEADING IN AN EASTERLY AND SOUTHERLY DIRECTION. GENERAL BULL'S REPORTS ALSO STATED THAT ON BEING INFORMED OF THE SYRIAN COMPLAINT THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD REPLIED THAT THEIR INFORMATION AFTER ENQUIRY WAS THAT THE FRONT WAS QUIET AND THAT NO ADVANCE WAS BEING MADE. COMMENTING ON THE REPORTS, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THAT THE KEY POINT WAS WHETHER THE ISRAELI FORCES HAD BEEN IN THE RAFID AREA BEFORE THE CEASE-FIRE ON 10 JUNE, AND HE POINTED OUT THAT THE U.N. OBSERVERS HAD NOT ARRIVED UNTIL 11 JUNE.

3. TOMEH (SYRIA) THEN SET OUT THE SYRIAN COMPLAINT IN A SHORT AND RESTRAINED STATEMENT. HE URGED THAT THE COMPLAINT WAS BORNE OUT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT AND REMINDED THE

/ COUNCIL

COUNCIL THAT PREVIOUS COMPLAINTS WHICH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD DENIED HAD SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN FOUND TO BE TRUE. THE NEW ADVANCE NOW BEING MADE BY THE ISRAELI FORCES WAS IMPORTANT SINCE IT APPEARED TO BE AIMED AT ESTABLISHING CONTROL OF IMPORTANT TRIBUTARIES OF THE RIVER JORDAN. THE COUNCIL SHOULD ACT URGENTLY TO STOP THE ISRAELI INVASION: TO CONDEMN ISRAEL: AND TO CALL UPON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW. TOMEH ASKED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD DIRECT ITSELF IN THE FIRST INSTANCE SPECIFICALLY TO THE PARTICULAR COMPLAINT WHICH HAD CAUSED HIM TO ASK FOR THE COUNCIL TO MEET.

4. RAFAEL (ISRAEL) SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME MOVEMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES, BUT THESE HAD BEEN WITHIN THE TRUCE LINES AND THERE HAD BEEN NO ADVANCE. THERE WAS NO FIRING OR FIGHTING WHATSOEVER. THE U.N. CONTROL CENTRE AT QUNEITRA HAD BEEN RE-OPENED AND WAS OPERATING. WITH REFERENCE TO A SYRIAN COMPLAINT THAT A SYRIAN LIAISON OFFICER WITH THE U.N. HAD BEEN ARRESTED, HE SAID THAT A NUMBER OF SYRIAN OFFICERS HAD BEEN APPREHENDED BUT HAD BEEN RELEASED. ISRAEL WAS PROVIDING FULL FACILITIES TO THE U.N. OBSERVERS.

5. FEDORENKO (USSR) SUPPORTED THE SYRIAN COMPLAINT. THE ISRAELIS WERE MAKING A MOCKERY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT PROVIDED IRREFUTABLE EVIDENCE OF ISRAELI OBSTRUCTION OF THE U.N. OBSERVERS. THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD IMMEDIATELY ADOPT DECISIVE MEASURES TO COMPEL ISRAELI COMPLIANCE WITH ITS RESOLUTIONS. HE AGAIN URGED THE COUNCIL TO TAKE UP THE SOVIET RESOLUTION CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT S/7951 OF 8 JUNE.

6. I THEN SPOKE (TEXT IN M.I.F.T.).

7. KEITA (MALI) SAID THAT THE COUNCIL'S FAILURE TO ACT AMOUNTED TO TACIT COMPLICITY IN ISRAEL'S AGGRESSION. HE DEMANDED THAT ISRAEL SHOULD BE CONDEMNED FOR THEIR VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE. EL-KONY (UAR) ALSO SUPPORTED THE SYRIAN COMPLAINT, FOLLOWED BY TARABANOV (BULGARIA).

8. IGNATIEFF (CANADA) AND SEYDOUX (FRANCE) BOTH URGED THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPLETE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR THE U.N. OBSERVER TEAMS:

THEY SUPPORTED THE RETURN TO UNTSO OF GOVERNMENT HOUSE IN

/ JERUSALEM

JERUSALEM. SEYDOUX ALSO SAID THAT IT WAS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE, NOT ONLY IN THIS CASE BUT FOR THE FUTURE, TO ESTABLISH EXACTLY WHERE THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES WERE STATIONED AT THE TIME OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

9. GOLDBERG (USA) SAID THAT HE WOULD CONFINE HIS REMARKS TO THE SPECIFIC SYRIAN COMPLAINT BEFORE THE COUNCIL. THERE SHOULD BE NO FORWARD MOVEMENT OF ANY TROOPS. HE AGREED WITH SEYDOUX THAT THE KEY QUESTION WAS THE POSITION OF THE TROOPS AT THE TIME OF THE CEASE-FIRE. THERE WAS HOWEVER NO NEED FOR THE COUNCIL TO WAIT FOR CLARIFICATION OF THIS BEFORE MAKING CLEAR THAT ANY FORWARD MOVEMENT WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE COUNCIL. HE ALSO SUPPORTED THE NEED FOR FULL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR THE U.N. OBSERVERS. EVEN THOUGH THERE WERE OTHER WIDER ISSUES WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO TAKE UP, HE URGED THAT IT SHOULD DEAL AT ONCE WITH THE MATTER NOW RAISED BY SYRIA.

10. BAROODI (SAUDI ARABIA) THEN SPOKE IN FAMILIAR TERMS ABOUT WESTERN INTERVENTION IN ARAB AFFAIRS.

11. PARTHASARATHI (INDIA) REPEATED HIS EARLIER PROPOSALS FOR ACTION BY THE COUNCIL (MY TEL NO. 1282). IYALLA (NIGERIA) EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT BY BEING CALLED UPON REPEATEDLY TO DEAL WITH BREACHES OF THE CEASE-FIRE THE COUNCIL WAS BEING PREVENTED FROM MOVING ON TO MORE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS, IN PARTICULAR THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL. REFERRING TO STATEMENTS MADE EARLIER, IN WHICH THE TERM ''CEASE-FIRE LINE'' HAD BEEN USED, HE SAID THAT HIS DELEGATION COULD NOT ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF A CEASE-FIRE LINE. SO FAR AS THEY WERE CONCERNED, THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE MOVEMENT OF TROOPS WAS IN THE DIRECTION OF A RETURN TO THE ARMISTICE LINES. (I SUPPORTED IYALLA ON THIS POINT AND EXPLAINED THAT IN USING THE TERM ''CEASE-FIRE LINE'' IN MY PREVIOUS STATEMENT, I HAD NOT INTENDED TO IMPLY ANY DEPARTURE FROM THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT AS ARRANGED BY GENERAL BULL AND ACCEPTED BY BOTH PARTIES.)

/ 12. AFTER

12. AFTER A SHORT STATEMENT BY RUDA (ARGENTINA), AND FURTHER STATEMENTS FROM TOMEH AND RAFAEL, IN WHICH BOTH MAINTAINED THEIR PREVIOUS POSITIONS (TOMEH ALSO TOOK UP AND STRESSED THE POINT MADE BY IYALLA WITH REGARD TO A ''CEASE-FIRE LINE''), THE COUNCIL TOOK A SHORT RECESS ON MY PROPOSAL FOR CONSULTATIONS.

FO PASS MOSCOW NO. 156, PARIS NO. 159, TEL AVIV NO. 166, COPENHAGEN NO. 83, RIO DE JANEIRO NO. 37, BUENOS AIRES NO. 31, ADDIS ABABA NO. 29, NEW DELHI NO. 45 AND TOKYO NO. 31 AND SAVING TO AMMAN NO. 61, JEDDA NO. 40, AND CAIRO NO. 75.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0925Z 12 JUNE 1967
RECD AT 0926Z 12 JUNE 1967

[NOT REPEATED TO CAIRO PENDING DEPARTMENTAL DECISION. REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1314 12 JUNE

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1314 OF 12 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV
OTTAWA COPENHAGEN RIO DE JANEIRO BUENOS AIRES ADDIS ABABA
NEW DELHI TOKYO AND SAVING TO AMMAN JEDDA AND CAIRO.

M.I.P.T.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY STATEMENT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TONIGHT, 11/12 JUNE:-

QUOTE.

I THINK IT IS CLEAR TO ALL OF US THAT TONIGHT WE MEET TO DEAL WITH A SPECIFIC AND LIMITED PROBLEM. I AM SURE THAT WE ARE ALL VERY CONSCIOUS THAT WE HAVE AHEAD OF US TASKS OF ENORMOUS MAGNITUDE, VERY GREAT DIFFICULTY, AND DANGER INDEED TOO.

BUT WE WOULD ALL RECOGNISE THAT WE CANNOT HOPE TO MAKE PROGRESS IN DEALING WITH THOSE VAST PROBLEMS HERE AND NOW. INDEED, AS I UNDERSTAND THE STATEMENT OF THE DISTINGUISHED AMBASSADOR OF SYRIA, HE IS DIRECTING OUR ATTENTION TO A SPECIFIC REPORT WHICH HAS REACHED HIM FROM HIS GOVERNMENT TODAY AND ON WHICH HE WISHES US TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION. AND AS I UNDERSTAND HIS REQUEST, HE WISHES US TO DEAL WITH THIS AND THIS ALONE TONIGHT.

WE SHALL HAVE TO TURN OUR ATTENTION TOMORROW, OR WHENEVER WE MEET AGAIN, TO OTHER QUESTIONS OF FAR GREATER CONSEQUENCE. BUT WE NEED DEAL TONIGHT - AND DEAL AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE - WITH A SPECIFIC DEMAND, AND I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WELL THAT WE SHOULD LIMIT OUR ATTENTION TO THE IMMEDIATE REQUEST WHICH HAS BEEN PUT TO US.

I WOULD GO ON TO SAY THAT I DO NOT FOR ONE MOMENT DOUBT

/THE IMPORTANCE

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MATTER WHICH HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO US TONIGHT. WE HAVE WORKED FOR A WEEK FOR A CEASE-FIRE. WE HOPE THAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED IT. ANYTHING THAT JEOPARDISED THAT CEASE-FIRE WOULD BE A MATTER OF THE UTMOST GRAVITY. I FOR ONE, AND I AM SURE THAT I SPEAK FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THIS COUNCIL, WOULD BE PREPARED TO COME HERE AT ANY TIME OF THE DAY OR NIGHT TO TAKE ACTION TO ENSURE THAT WHAT WE HAVE DONE IS NOT FRUSTRATED OR FLOUTED.

NOW WE COME TO THE ACTUAL REPORT WHICH HAS BEEN MADE TO US TONIGHT WHICH COULD, I ENTIRELY AGREE, BE MOST SERIOUS. IF THE SUGGESTION WERE THAT UNDER COVER OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND FOLLOWING THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT THERE HAD BEEN AN ADVANCE TO SHEIKH MASKINE AND DARA AND THE YARMUK, THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN A QUESTION WHICH WOULD REQUIRE IMMEDIATE AND DRASTIC ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE MUST NOTE WHAT THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL HAS TOLD US THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO ADVANCE BEYOND THE CEASE-FIRE LINE AND WE MUST ALSO NOTE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, FROM HIS OBSERVERS ON THE SPOT, HAS TOLD US WHAT HE CAN TELL US FOR THE MOMENT WHICH DOES NOT GO FURTHER THAN THE REPORT WHICH WE HAVE IN FRONT OF US.

NOW IT IS AT THE MOMENT IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD, I IMAGINE, ABOUT DAWN. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, I SUPPOSE, TO EXPECT ANY FURTHER REPORT BEFORE WE CONCLUDE OUR MEETING TONIGHT AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO BE EXPECTED TO GIVE US ANY FURTHER ACCOUNT WHILE WE ARE STILL MEETING. THEREFORE I SUGGEST WHAT WE CAN DO AND WHAT WE MUST DO IS TO MAKE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TONIGHT, NOW, THAT WE INSIST THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO BREACH WHATSOVER OF THE CEASE-FIRE. WE MAKE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR - AS WE HAVE BEFORE, BUT I THINK THAT WE SHOULD RE-STATE IT - THAT IF THERE WERE ANY BREACH WE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD TAKE THE MOST SERIOUS AND GRAVE VIEW OF ANY BREACH OF ANY KIND AND THAT WE WOULD NOT TOLERATE ANY ADVANCE BEYOND THE POINTS THAT WERE

/SET DOWN

SET DOWN IN THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WERE MADE BY GENERAL BULL ON OUR BEHALF. I THINK WE SHOULD MAKE THAT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR AND THAT THAT COMMUNICATION SHOULD GO TO THOSE CONCERNED IMMEDIATELY.

I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY OF JOINING THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF FRANCE AND OTHERS IN EXPRESSING OUR ADMIRATION FOR THE WORK WHICH IS BEING DONE BY GENERAL BULL IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF CONFUSION AND DANGER AND THE SPEED WITH WHICH HE AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE SPOT HAVE ACTED AND THE DETERMINED ATTEMPT THEY HAVE MADE, BOTH DAY AND NIGHT, TO REPORT TO THIS COUNCIL THE FACTS OF THE SITUATION. I WOULD HOPE THAT ALL OF US SHARE IN A SENSE OF PRIDE THAT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED NATIONS NOT ONLY HAVE ACHIEVED A CEASE-FIRE BUT HAVE QUICKLY TAKEN STEPS TO ENSURE THAT IT IS CARRIED OUT.

I BELIEVE THAT IN DEALING WITH THIS SINGLE AND SPECIFIC AND HIGHLY IMPORTANT MATTER WE SHOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY AND, SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS, SIR, AND THOSE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, I BELIEVE THAT IF WERE PERMITTED A SHORT SUSPENSION, HERE IS AN OCCASION WHERE WE COULD UNANIMOUSLY AND BY CONSENSUS COME TO CONCLUSIONS WHICH WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR AND ABSOLUTELY DEFINITE AND WHICH COULD BE COMMUNICATED - THIS SEEMS TO ME VERY IMPORTANT - TO GENERAL BULL AND TO THE PARTIES CONCERNED IMMEDIATELY, AS DAWN APPROACHES OVER MOUNT HERMON.

I WOULD OF COURSE NOT WISH TO PREVENT OTHER SPEECHES IF THEY ARE TO BE MADE, BUT I THINK THAT ACTION IS MOST IMPORTANT, AND I BELIEVE THAT IF WE AGREE ON A SHORT SUSPENSION WE MIGHT

/BE ABLE

BE ABLE TO TAKE THE ACTION REQUIRED IMMEDIATELY AND COMMUNICATE IT AT ONCE TO ALL CONCERNED. THAT IS MY SUGGESTION, SIR, AND I THANK YOU.
UNQUOTE.
FO PASS MOSCOW NO. 157, PARIS 160, TEL AVIV 167, COPENHAGEN 84, RIO DE JANEIRO NO. 38, BUENOS AIRES NO. 32, ADDIS ABABA NO. 30, NEW DELHI NO. 46 AND TOKYO NO. 32 AND SAVING TO AMMAN NO. 62, JEDDA NO. 41 AND CAIRO NO. 76.

LORD CARADON

SENT 121040Z
RECD 121042Z

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[REPETITION TO CAIRO REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1315 12 JUNE

UNCLASSIFIED
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1315 OF 12 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV OTTAWA COPENHAGEN RIO DE JANEIRO BUENOS AIRES ADDIS ABABA NEW DELHI AND TOKYO AND SAVING TO AMMAN JEDDA AND CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1313.

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL.

ON RESUMING AFTER ITS RECESS, THE COUNCIL ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTION UNANIMOUSLY WITHOUT FURTHER DEBATE, AND THEN ADJOURNED TO A TIME TO BE FIXED AFTER FURTHER CONSULTATIONS BY THE PRESIDENT :-

QUOTE.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
TAKING NOTE OF THE ORAL REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, MADE AT THE 1354TH, 1355TH, 1356TH AND 1357TH MEETINGS AND THE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION SUPPLIED IN DOCUMENT S/7903 AND ADDENDA,

1. CONDEMNS ANY AND ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE;

2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS INVESTIGATIONS AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE;

3. AFFIRMS THAT ITS DEMAND FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND DISCONTINUANCE OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES INCLUDES A PROHIBITION OF ANY FORWARD MILITARY MOVEMENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE CEASE-FIRE;

4. CALLS FOR THE PROMPT RETURN TO THE CEASE-FIRE POSITIONS OF ANY TROOPS WHICH MAY HAVE MOVED FORWARD SUBSEQUENT TO 1630 GMT

/JUNE 10

JUNE 10:

5. CALLS FOR FULL COOPERATION WITH THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UNTSO AND THE OBSERVERS IN IMPLEMENTING THE CEASE-FIRE, INCLUDING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES. UNQUOTE.

FO PASS MOSCOW NO. 158, PARIS NO. 161, TEL AVIV NO. 168, COPENHAGEN NO. 85, RIO DE JANEIR NO. 39, BUENOS AIRES NO. 33, ADDIS ABABA NO. 31, NEW DELHI NO. 47, TOKYO NO. 33 AND SAVING TO AMMAN NO. 63, JEDDA NO. 42, AND CAIRO NO. 77.

LORD CARADON

SENT 121015Z
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[REPEATED AS REQUESTED] [EXCEPT CAIRO REFERRED TO EXAMINERS]

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3A

Foreign Office
S.W.1

12 June, 1967.

Dear Michael,

I thought that you might like to have, for your own personal information, the enclosed copy of a paper on the Middle East situation prepared by the Planning Staff before the weekend.

...

This paper does not yet have any official or Ministerial authority. It does, however, give an indication of the way in which thoughts are being developed. If this paper is passed around in No. 10, I hope you will stress its present tentative nature.

Yours ever,

Derek.

A.M. Palliser, Esq., C.M.G.,
10 Downing Street.

SECRET

Registry No.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified

DRAFT POLICY PAPER

To:—

Type 1 +

From

J.A. Thomson
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

Planning staff

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

The Middle East Crisis

Out of the conflict a new Middle Eastern Settlement will emerge. We must see that it is better than the old and that it suits our interests.

2. This time we should try to deal with the root of the trouble and not only its symptoms. It will not be easy but for the time being the balance of power in the Middle East has tilted back in our favour and we must use the occasion. We must aim at a reasonable balance both within the Middle East and between the world powers interested in the Middle East.

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British Interests

3. Apart from the general interest of a stable balance of power and of peaceful development, our specific interests in the Middle East are:-

(a) to maintain friendly relations and to trade freely with both Israel and the Arab countries;

(b) to secure an end to the propaganda vilification;

(c) to get oil at a reasonable price through the maintenance of British and U.S. investments in the area;

(d) to keep open international waterways, especially the Canal;

(e) to preserve our overflying facilities;

(f) to facilitate our withdrawal in stable conditions from Aden and South Arabia;

(g) to create favourable conditions for the carrying out of our policy of gradual withdrawal from the Persian Gulf;

(h) to secure that our actions do not involve harmful consequential effects, e.g. on the strength of sterling, on the prospects of our joining the European ~~Economic~~ Communities or on the development of better East-West relations.

4. We cannot secure all our interests single-handed. In protecting our direct interests, e.g. the flow of oil, it may often be best to act bilaterally with the Arab countries concerned. But in the Arab/Israeli dispute, where our interests are less directly involved, we need to work through and with the powers which have the principal influence. These are the Israelis and the Americans on the one hand and the Egyptians and the Russians on the other. In working for

/such

such a settlement we should make as much use as possible of the United Nations. It can provide a useful cover for negotiations. It can also provide machinery for registering agreements in a face-saving way. It will be easier both to protect our direct interests and to bring about a satisfactory *modus videndi* between Israel and the Arabs if we can split the unity of the Arab front. Our relations with Nasser are bound to be poor for some time to come and if he should fall from power this would be an advantage. But we should try to improve our relations with the Arab countries where our main interests lie, especially in the Gulf.

5. The action needed to improve our relations with the Gulf States in particular and to get oil flowing again is already in hand. What follows mainly deals with the Arab/Israel dispute. It describes briefly the main elements which will have to be put together to form a new Middle-Eastern settlement. It is based on the assumption that Israel has won a considerable military victory. It recognises that neither the Israelis nor the Arabs will be in a mood to make concessions. But it also recognises that the Americans, Russians, French and ourselves have a limited common interest in securing a more stable balance in the Middle East, and that this is most likely to be achieved by means of a deal between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

6. The best time to achieve this will be while Israel is so much in the ~~centre~~ ascendant and before the whole problem has got enmeshed in United Nations resolutions. As Cuba showed, the Russians will be under the maximum pressure

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when the situation on the ground is evolving against them. We know they have already been using some pressure with the Egyptians and they still have leverage since they are continuing to supply arms. The sooner we can get into negotiations the more chance there is of the Russians using their influence with the Arabs in the ways we want. By being parties to a settlement they can hope to save their protégés and their own prestige from even more ignominious descent. Once the situation has quietened down the Russians will become bolder and less ready to make concessions.

7. Accordingly the Americans should try to make a deal with the Russians in the very near future, covering the main elements of an Arab/Israel settlement. Provided we do not allow ourselves to be pushed into the lead we can play an important part in this by trying to guide both sides into making the right deal at the right time.

8. At the same time we should make it plain that we are ready for Four Power consultations, especially in a U.N. context. We should suggest to the French that we should concert policies to ensure that a Middle Eastern settlement is not imposed by the super powers over the heads of Europe. But in fact Four Power consultation will probably not be very effective. When it comes to the point the French may prefer to stand aloof; and anything that smacked of Four Power dictation would be highly unpopular in the Middle East.

Arab-Israel Relations

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Arab-Israel Relations

9. The Arabs will not genuinely accept the right of Israel to exist. But they might be got to agree not to claim belligerent rights against her. This could perhaps be formalised in the context of a U.N. Resolution.

Territorial Adjustments

10. Their territorial gains are the Israelis' strongest bargaining cards. The present boundaries invite incidents. There would be advantage in adjusting them to allow the Israelis to retain the commanding strategic positions they have seized on their boundaries. In exchange the Israelis should restore, particularly to Jordan, the agricultural lands separated from the villages situated on the Arab side of the line. It is probably unrealistic, but if the Israelis were allowed to acquire the island of Tiran this would automatically make the Straits an international waterway. If it could be shown that under Western pressure Israel was forced to disgorge all the rest of the territory she had seized this could enhance our bargaining position with the Arab countries.

Jerusalem

11. The Israelis will be particularly reluctant to give up the Old City. It is, however, almost as important for religious reasons to Islam as to Israel. The alternatives would be to restore the status quo ante or to make the Old City, together with part of the New City, an open city under U.N. control. The latter would be preferable, particularly if the Jordanians got a substantial quid pro quo,

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perhaps in frontier rectifications.

The Straits of Tiran

12. At the minimum the Israelis will insist upon the 1957 arrangements for the Straits of Tiran. They may try to hold on to Sharm ash-Shaikh, but this is strategically unrealistic once the Egyptian forces have been rebuilt. An Israeli outpost in the island of Tiran would be more sensible strategically. The best solution would probably be a Straits of Tiran Convention on the lines of the Montreux Convention but this is likely to be too ambitious. An alternative would be an agreement endorsed by some U.N. procedure. If this is unobtainable it may be that we shall have to return to the 1957 arrangements or something like them.

The Suez Canal

13. The Israelis may demand free passage for their goods and/or ships through the Suez Canal. Apart from damage to the Egyptian amour propre this would be no hurt to the Arabs. It would involve the dropping of Arab belligerent rights against Israel, however difficult this may be.

Control of Frontiers

14. The main thing here is that Arab Governments should prevent infiltrations. They are likely to have the will to do this in the aftermath of defeat. But in the long term some effective U.N. presence will help. It would be sensible to have it both on the Arab and the Israel side of the border. This would be more acceptable to the Israelis if there were border rectifications which benefited them strategically. Such rectifications would in themselves go a good way to discourage Arab

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infiltration.

Refugees

15. This might be the most important longer term element in a settlement. The Israelis cannot reasonably be expected to take back 1.2 million refugees. But if Israel offered the refugees the choice of either waiting to be gradually reabsorbed into Israel or of a generous and immediate compensation for those who chose not to return but to settle in the Arab countries, it seems likely that few would choose to return. The money would have to be put up internationally, mainly by the United States. There would be serious presentational difficulties but if these could be overcome the Arabs could claim that the Israelis had been compelled to right an old wrong while at the same time the Arab countries would have all the advantages of the large sums of money, probably upwards of $100 million, paid in compensation to the refugees. Despite this it would be difficult to get the Arab countries to accept the refugees and to feel that such a deal was not a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. As for the Israelis, it would get a damaging incubus off their backs at little cost to themselves.

Economic Arrangements

16. Some Arab countries, particularly Jordan and Egypt, will be in need of economic assistance. This may give the Russians a big opportunity. It would be against our interests if the present situation led to a consolidation and even enlargement of their standing in the Arab world. If the refugee deal mentioned above were

/successful

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successful this in itself would bring a large financial benefit to the Arab countries, especially Jordan. It would be of some benefit to Egypt but would go nowhere near offsetting the concessions which it is envisaged above that the Egyptians might be required to make. Something substantial has to be provided for the U.A.R. The most important and effective things that can be done would be to rescue her from imminent bankruptcy and to provide her with food. The former can probably be done through the agency of the I.M.F. and the latter by a renewal of American P.L. 480 aid. There is expected to be a shortfall of 2 million tons in Egyptian grain requirements this year. It is possible that if a donors' club were established to administer the 4½ million tons of food aid agreed in the Kennedy Round a substantial proportion of this might be allocated to Egypt by the donors ~~this~~ (i.e. in effect America, Canada, Australia, the E.E.C. and Britain).

Role for the United Nations

17. Where we can we should work through the United Nations. Recent events have demonstrated its ineffectiveness and damaged its reputation. We should therefore not miss opportunities to restore faith in its ability to contribute to peace in the Middle East. Moreover it still has an important role to play, although we must recognise that most of the important negotiation may take place outside its auspices. It can nevertheless provide a useful cover for negotiation; and it can provide face-saving machinery for recording agreements which the parties might not bring themselves to conclude bilaterally.

/Sales

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Sale of Arms

18. There would be advantage in an international agreement to limit the sale of arms to Israel and the Arab countries. This has long been an Israel objective and has been resisted by the Russians. In the new circumstances it might be possible to reach agreement to limit the sale of arms in the Middle East. It would be difficult to police this but it would be such a general advantage if there could be four power cooperation in working such an agreement that it is well worth trying. No precise quotas could easily be laid down but it might be agreed that all arms sales should be discussed quadripartitely.

The Yemen and South Arabia

19. We should try to get it agreed that Egyptian forces left the Yemen forthwith. Egyptian face could be saved by an Egyptian-Saudi agreement on the future government of the Yemen. This would go a long way to reduce our difficulties in South Arabia.

Russian Concerns

20. None of the foregoing suggestions damage Russian national interests. On the other hand, the proposals do require the Russians to forego opportunities of making trouble for the West. Depending on how they are presented the Russians may think they are detrimental to Soviet prestige. They may also be attacked by the Chinese for collusion with the West. These difficulties will certainly make it hard to reach an

/understanding

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understanding with the Russians but if the right opportunity is seized (paragraphs 6-7 above) the Russians may well conclude that on balance their interests will best be served by an immediate undertaking to use pressure on the Arabs to reach deals of the sort suggested.

American Concerns

21. The Americans in effect guarantee Israel so it is much in their interests to promote understandings which increase Israeli security and reduce the opportunities for the Russians to pose as champions of the Arabs. The Americans would be required under the foregoing suggestions to bear the brunt of the financial costs but these are not enormous and given the importance of the cause in American domestic politics and President Johnson's need to avoid military intervention in another part of the world, it is reasonable to think that the U.S. Administration might get Congressional authority for the expenditures. The U.S. will probably in any event have to consider seriously supplying some grain to Egypt either for humanitarian reasons or to prevent the Russians from acquiring a stranglehold on Cairo. Accordingly the foregoing proposal for economic and food assistance would probably not add much to the bill that America might have to face anyway.

British Policy

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British Policy

22. In the present fluid situation our policy will have to be adjusted as we proceed. We should have the following objectives:-

(a) Our first priority must be to secure our interests and promote a satisfactory long term settlement. We must take vigorous diplomatic and propaganda action to protect our oil and investment interests in the Arab countries. In doing this we may want to consult others concerned but for the most part we should act independently. We are already active with the Kuwaitis, the Bahrainis, the Iraqis and others to ensure that our oil supplies, our investments and our communications are restored where they have been interrupted.

(b) Secondly, we should try to show the Arabs that we are impartial in the Arab-Israel dispute. But for the time being we cannot expect to achieve much success in this. In particular our relations with Nasser are bound to be poor for some time to come. We must try to split the Arab united front and improve our relations with the Arab countries where our main interests lie, especially in the Gulf.

(c) Our substantial interests are less directly involved in the details of the Arab-Israel dispute. The essence of a deal on this dispute must be fixed up between those powers which have the most influence with Israel on the one hand and with Egypt on the other, namely the United States and the Soviet Union.

/Our

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Our best course will be to work for the sort of settlement we want by trying to guide each of them in the right direction. The U.S. values the contribution we can make and this gives us influence but we must not allow ourselves to be pushed into the lead since any settlement will certainly be very unpopular with many of the Arabs and if we were seen to be the chief protagonist this could damage our substantive interests.

(d) We should make it plain that we are ready for Four Power consultations, especially in a U.N. context. We should suggest to the French that we should concert policies to ensure that a Middle Eastern settlement is not imposed by the super powers over the heads of Europe. But in fact Four Power consultation will probably not be very effective. When it comes to the point the French may prefer to stand aloof and anything that smacked of Four Power dictation would be highly unpopular in the Middle East.

(e) We should make as much use as possible of the U.N. It can provide a useful cover for negotiations. It can also provide machinery for registering agreements in a face-saving way. But of course where our own interests are concerned we shall have to act largely bilaterally outside the U.N. and no doubt the essential American-Russian negotiations on the Arab-Israel question will also take place bilaterally.

(f) As to the Arab-Israel dispute, we should urge the Americans at once to do a

/deal

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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deal with the Russians on some points of substance as well as on future action in and by the U.N.

(g) In exchange for a cease fire and a stand-still the Russians should undertake to get the Arabs to meet as many as possible of the following points:-

(i) to forego their claims to a state of belligerence, including the end of the boycott;

(ii) to acquiesce in limited territorial adjustments;

(iii) to accept that most of Jerusalem should be an Open City under U.N. control;

(iv) to accept that the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal should be open to the shipping of all nations including Israel;

(v) to cooperate in the establishment of an effective U.N. presence on both sides of the Israeli borders, with perhaps the presence in the area of a high ranking representative of U Thant;

(vi) to agree to a deal on refugees;

(vii) to acquiesce in an arms limitation agreement;

(viii) to withdraw Egyptian troops from the Yemen.

(h) The Americans, for their part, ideally should get the Israelis to:-

(i) halt and stop the fighting;

(ii) acquiesce in limited territorial adjustments;

(iii) accept that part of new

Jerusalem should be joined with the old in an Open City under U.N. control;

(iv) evacuate their other territorial gains;

(v) cooperate in the establishment of a U.N. military presence on both sides of the Israeli borders, with perhaps the presence in the area of a high ranking representative of U Thant;

(vi) agree to a deal on refugees;

(vii) acquiesce in an arms limitation agreement.

(i) At the same time the Americans (no doubt with some assistance from other developed countries) should be prepared to bear the brunt of financing the deal on refugees and the arrangements for economic and food assistance which will probably have to form part of the package.

23. This would come close to the ideal settlement. We cannot expect to achieve all of it but until we get into negotiations it is impossible to say which parts of it are likely to be feasible. The bargaining position of the West is probably at its maximum now. The sooner we can get into negotiations the more chance there is of the Russians using their influence with the Arabs in the ways we want.

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1325 12 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1325 OF 12 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW,
PARIS, OTTAWA AND COPENHAGEN.

MIDDLE EAST.

THERE ARE REPORTS HERE THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE CONSULTING ARAB AMBASSADORS IN MOSCOW ON WHETHER THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE AGENDA OF THE PRESENT SPECIAL SESSION. ALTHOUGH THE SUBSTANTIAL BUSINESS OF THE SESSION WAS COMPLETED SOME WEEKS AGO, ITS TECHNICAL CLOSING SESSION WAS DELAYED UNTIL TOMORROW BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTY IN CONSTITUTING THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAN COUNCIL WHICH HAS TO BE DONE AT THIS SESSION. ALTERNATIVELY THE RUSSIANS COULD PROPOSE TOMORROW THE CONVENING OF A SEPARATE SPECIAL SESSION ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. IF THEY DO THIS WITH ARAB SUPPORT WE SHOULD CERTAINLY NOT TAKE THE LEAD IN OPPOSING THEM. OUR VIEWS WOULD IN ANY CASE CARRY LITTLE WEIGHT AND THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN GIVING THEM THE PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE OF PLACING US IN OPPOSITION TO THE ARABS. WE COULD THEREFORE SAY THAT IF THERE IS SUFFICIENT SUPPORT AMONG OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY WE WOULD GO ALONG WITH THE IDEA.

3. IF THE RUSSIANS DECIDE TO RAISE THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE ASSEMBLY TOMORROW THEY MAY USE THE OCCASION FOR ANOTHER MAJOR ATTACK ON WESTERN POLICY. I DOUBT IF THEY WILL DO THIS TOMORROW BUT IF THEY DO I MAY NEED TO REPLY ON THE LINES OF WHAT I HAVE ALREADY SAID IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

F.O. PASS TEL AVIV 169, MOSCOW 160, PARIS 162, COPENHAGEN 86.
LORD CARADON

SENT 13/0012
RECD 13/0223

[REPETITION TO TEL AVIV, MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION. REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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CYPHER CAT/A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 1328 12 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1328 OF 12 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.
YOUR TELNO. 2798: MIDDLE EAST.
I AM VERY GRATEFUL.
2. AT THE SAME TIME I MUST SAY AT ONCE THAT I AM GREATLY CONCERNED ON THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL. I CERTAINLY DO NOT THINK THAT WE CAN GET AWAY WITH A VAGUE STATEMENT ON THE BASIS OF PARAGRAPH 10 OF MY TELNO. 1311 ALONE. IT IS OBVIOUSLY ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD TAKE UP A CLEAR AND DEFENDABLE POSITION ON THIS ISSUE SINCE THIS WILL BE THE MAIN BATTLE GROUND OF THE COMING COUNCIL DEBATE.
3. I THINK MYSELF THAT WE SHOULD STATE PLAINLY THAT WE ARE IN FAVOUR OF WITHDRAWAL. CERTAINLY TO TALK OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD DO US THE GREATEST HARM HERE AND, I IMAGINE, IN EVERY ARAB COUNTRY. WE AND THE AMERICANS HAVE SAID THAT WE RESPECT AND SUPPORT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL STATES IN THE NEAR EAST AND I DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN GO BACK ON THAT NOW. IN THESE DAYS WE SURELY CANNOT DEFEND ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY CONQUEST.
4. HAVING SAID FROM THE START THAT WE ARE IN FAVOUR OF WITHDRAWAL WE CAN GO ON TO SAY THAT THE METHODS AND TIMIMG OF DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL AND HOW THEY CAN BEST BE ACHIEVED ARE MATTERS WHICH MUST BE URGENTLY CONSIDERED. THEY ARE QUESTIONS TO BE DEALT WITH IN NEGOTIATION WITH THE PARTIES. WE CAN THEN SAY THAT WE THINK THAT THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE U.N. SHOULD BE (AS IT HAS BEEN ELSEWHERE, FOR INSTANCE IN KASHMIR) BY PROVIDING NEUTRAL AND IMPARTIAL U.N. REPRESENTATIVES TO ASSIST IN ACHIEVING THE WITHDRAWAL AND A JUST AND LASTING PEACE. WE CAN THEN GO ON TO TALK ABOUT THE PART TO BE PLAYED BY UNTSO, AND A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AND ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF A HIGH LEVEL MEDIATOR.

/5.

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UKMISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1328 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

5. WE DO NOT NOW EXPECT TO HAVE TO SPEAK IN THE COUNCIL ON MAIN ISSUES FOR A DAY OR TWO AND I HOPE TOMORROW TO PUT DOWN THE WORDING OF A PASSAGE ON THIS QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL WHICH I SHALL SEND TO YOU AS SOON AS I CAN. BUT THERE IS CLEARLY AN ESSENTIAL POINT OF POLICY AND PRINCIPLE INVOLVED. THE ISRAELIS THEMSELVES SAID AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR CAMPAIGN THAT THEY HAD NO AIM OF TERRITORIAL CONQUEST. IT SEEMS TO ME CLEAR THAT WE MUST SAY NOTHING WHICH COULD POSSIBLY BE REGARDED AS AN ADMISSION FROM US THAT THEY ARE ENTITLED TO KEEP WHAT THEY HAVE WON BY FORCE OF ARMS.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT Ø111/13Z
RECD AT Ø145/13

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EN CLAIR & BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

GUIDANCE 138 12 JUNE, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ARAB COUNTRIES

THE PRESENT POSITION IS AS FOLLOWS:-

SYRIA

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS HAVE BEEN SEVERED BY THE SYRIAN GOVT AND OUR EMBASSY IN DAMASCUS HAS BEEN CLOSED.

IRAQ

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WERE SEVERED BY THE IRAQI GOVT ON 8 JUNE. AMBASSADOR AND CONSUL IN BAGHDAD AND CONSUL-GENERAL IN BASRA WERE REQUIRED TO LEAVE WITHIN 48 HOURS. THE REMAINDER OF EMBASSY STAFF WILL HAVE LEFT BY 15 JUNE.

SUDAN

SUDANESE GOVT HAVE INFORMED BRITISH GOVT OF THEIR INTENTION TO SEVER RELATIONS.

LEBANON

AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN AT THE LEBANESE GOVT'S REQUEST BUT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN BROKEN.

2. WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA OR U.A.R. SINCE DECEMBER 1965.

U.A.R. GOVT HAVE ASKED FOR REDUCTIONS TO BE MADE IN OUR RESIDUAL STAFF ATTACHED TO CANADIAN EMBASSY.

SOSFA/CROSEC SENT 0214Z 13 JUNE

/BY TELEGRAPH

BY TELEGRAPH:

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IMMEDIATE BONN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 902

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

12 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 902 OF 12 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 895. MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

MINISTER HAS SINCE SPOKEN TO THE UNDER-SECRETARY CONCERNED (BOEKER) WE THOUGHT IT BEST NOT TO PUT FORWARD THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 6234 TO WASHINGTON, EVEN ON A PERSONAL BASIS, IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY IMPRESSION OF A NEW U.K. INITIATIVE. BOEKER WAS HOWEVER READY TO EXPLAIN PRESENT GERMAN THINKING ON THE FOLLOWING LINES.

2. THEY WOULD WELCOME AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.S.R. ON THE ELEMENTS OF A LONGTERM SETTLEMENT. THEY DO NOT HOWEVER BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL COOPERATE IN THIS: WHILE THE LATTER NO DOUBT WANT TO AVOID THE RISK OF A DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE UNITED STATES THEY PROBABLY SEE ADVANTAGE TO THEMSELVES IN KEEPING THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION UNSTABLE.

3. THE BEST HOPE IN THE GERMAN VIEW IS THAT ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES SHOULD WORK OUT SOME SETTLEMENT AMONGST THEMSELVES. THEY THINK THAT THE COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE MIDDLE EAST CAN BEST HELP BY URGING THIS COURSE RATHER THAN BY INTERVENING DIRECTLY AND SPONSORING PROPOSALS WHICH ARE BOUND TO BE OBJECTIONABLE TO ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. THE GERMANS ADMIT THE DIFFICULTIES AND ARE NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT ANYTHING CAN BE ACHIEVED QUICKLY. THEY DO NOT EXPECT THE ARABS TO AGREE AT ONCE TO FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, BUT DO NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS LEADING IN TIME TO A MORE FORMAL AGREEMENT.

4. THEY HAVE NO CLEAR IDEA ABOUT THE TERMS OF ANY SETTLEMENT, ASSUMING THAT ONE COULD BE REACHED. THEY FEEL HOWEVER THAT THE ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP IS FOR THE ARABS TO ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AND TO END THE STATE OF WAR, AND THAT THIS WOULD BE A NECESS ARY CONSEQUENCE OF ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THEM AND ISRAEL. PROVIDED THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOW MODERATION - AND THEY ACCEPT THAT THE TOUGH LINE REPRESENTED BY DAYAN MAY PREVAIL OVER THE MODERATE LINE

/ ADVOCATED.....

ADVOCATED BY EBAN - THEY SEE SOME CHANCE OF THE ARABS BEING READY TO ACCEPT THIS ESSENTIAL POINT.

5. ON OTHER ISSUES, THE GERMAN VIEW IS AS FOLLOWS:
(A) THEY HOPE THE ISRAELIS CAN BE INDUCED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORY THEY HAVE OCCUPIED, ALTHOUGH THEY EXPECT THEM TO RETAIN JERUSALEM AND SOME STRATEGIC POINTS IN JORDAN. THERE WILL BE STRONG PRESSURE IN ISRAEL AGAINST GIVING UP ANY TERRITOTY THEY HAVE WON, BUT THIS SHOULD NOT PREVAIL AGAINST THE ADVANTAGE TO ISRAEL OF A SETTLEMENT WITH THE ARABS.
(B) AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI PENINSULA WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON GUARANTEES ABOUT FREE PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND THE SUEZ CANAL. THESE MIGHT TAKE THE FORM OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON THE MODEL OF THE MONTREUX CONVENTION. IN THE CASE OF TIRAN, JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA AS WELL AS ISRAEL HAVE AN INTEREST IN FREE PASSAGE BEING GUARANTEED.
(C) THEY WOULD FAVOUR ANY FEASIBLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE HOLY PLACES IN JERUSALEM AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE. THIS SHOULD BE WELCOME TO THE ARABS AND DIFFICULT FOR THE ISRAELIS TO RESIST.
(D) THEY ARE VERY DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE ISRAELIS AGREEING TO THE RETURN OF ANY OF THE REFUGEES, BOTH FOR SECURITY REASONS AND BECAUSE THE FASTER GROWTH RATE OF THE ARABS AND THE SLOWER RATE OF JEWISH IMMIGRATION COULD IN A FAIRLY SHORT TIME DRASTICALLY ALTER THE DEMOGRAPHIC POSITION IN ISRAEL. THEY DO NOT EXCLUDE ISRAELI ASSISTANCE IN SETTLING THE REFUGEES IN ARAB COUNTRIES. THERE WAS SOME TALK IN ISRAEL BEFORE THE CRISIS BLEW-UP OF AN ISRAEL-JORDAN FEDERATION. ALTHOUGH IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THIS IS NO DOUBT HIGHLY UNREALISTIC, THE ISRAELIS HAVE A LASTING INTEREST IN KEEPING JORDAN STABLE.

6. IN SHORT, THE GERMAN IDEAS ABOUT A SETTLEMENT, AS GIVEN TO US BY BOEKER, ARE SIMILAR ON A NUMBER OF POINTS TO THOSE GIVEN IN YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 6234 TO WASHINGTON. THE GERMANS FEEL HOWEVER THAT OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES TO REACH AGREEMENT THEMSELVES, RATHER THAN BY DIRECT INTERVENTION

/ FROM.....

CONFIDENTIAL

BONN TELEGRAM NO. 902 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

-3-

FROM OUTSIDE (THIS IS OF COURSE IN LINE WITH THEIR STRONG DESIRE NOT TO GET INVOLVED). THEY ACCEPT THAT WE SHALL ALL HAVE TO USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED IN FAVOUR OF MODERATION, AND THAT ISSUES MAY SOON ARISE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR ELSEWHERE, E.G. SOVIET DEMANDS FOR IMMEDIATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, ON WHICH IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE WESTERN POWERS TO AVOID ADOPTING A PUBLIC POSITION. THEY HOPE HOWEVER THAT THIS POINT CAN BE DEFERRED FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND THAT MEANWHILE WE SHOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE IT IS FOR THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED TO SEEK AGREEMENT AMONGST THEMSELVES.

F O PASS WASHINGTON 209.

SIR FRANK ROBERTS

SENT AT 1843 12 JUNE
RECD AT 1843 12 JUNE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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En Clair

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 578 12 June 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No 578 of 12 June Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Cairo Amman, JIG Cyprus.

Middle East Situation.

Following are excerpts from speech made this afternoon in the Knesset by Israel Prime Minister

When the State of Israel was born 19 years ago, the Arab armies tried to strangle it at birth When the State successfully resisted them, armistice agreements were signed In these agreements it was expressly stated, in the clearest terms, that their purpose was to serve as a transitional stage on the road to peace. And indeed, that was the attitude which Israel adopted towards them. However, in the course of the years we found that our neighbours regarded these agreements as an expedient for gaining time in order to prepare for renewed aggression, with the aim of destroying Israel.

The United Nations chose to ignore this attitude on the part of the Arabs. The United Nations Charter obligates member States not to use force or the threat of force, and to solve disputes by peaceful means. Yet the United Nations refrained from condemning Arab hostility towards Israel. Thus, for 19 years, this unique situation unparalleled in the international relations, persisted To the nations of the world I want to say, be under no illusion that the State of Israel is prepared to return to the situation that reigned up to a week ago. The State of Israel arose and continued to exist as a matter of right, and this nation has been compelled to fight and fight again for that right. Alone we fought for existence and our security, we are entitled to determine what are the true and vital interests of our country and how they shall be secured. The position that existed up till now shall never again return. The land of Israel shall no longer be a No Man s Land wide open to acts of sabotage and murder.

A new situation has been created, which can serve as a starting-point in direct negotiations for a peace settlement with the Arab countries. The historic contribution which the people of the world, headed by the Great Powers, can make towards the establishment of peace in our area is clear and unmistakeable.

They must address their demands, not to Israel, which has sought peace since she came into being, but to the Arab States, which have turned the Middle East into a focus of tension and a

/hotbed

hotbed of ceaseless hatred during the past two decades The international community is faced not only with a moral test, but also with a test of its political sagacity The sooner the arms race in the area is ended, the sooner steps are taken to bring peace nearer in the Middle East, the greater, perhaps will be the contribution to the relaxation of general international tension

2 Full text to Foreign Office only follows by bag

Foreign Office pass UKMIS New York 109 Damascus 78, JIG Cyprus 119

Mr Hadow Sent 1815Z/12 June
Received 2000Z/12 June

[Repeated as requested]

[Copies sent to D.C.C. for repetition to JIG Cyprus]

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 633 12 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to foreign office telegram No. 633 of 12 June Repeated for information to Washington, UKMis New York, Tel Aviv, Bahrain Residency, Jedda, Kuwait and Beirut.

Your telegram No. 1077: King Hussein.

I had half an hour with King Hussein today. His mood was relaxed and fairly realistic. After I had expressed British admiration for the gallant performance of the Jordan Arab Army and for His Majesty's own bearing during this difficult and dangerous period he said that grave mistakes had been made. The Arabs had hopelessly miscalculated the strength of the Israelis and events had proved Jordan wrong to have counted on Egyptian air cover. He would never be able to understand how the Egyptians had failed to get their air force into the air. The result had been disastrous for Jordan.

2. I commented that the Western powers too had suffered serious loss as a result of the hostilities. We had believed - and still believed - that a stable and prosperous Jordan was a good influence in the area but it had failed to prevent an Arab/Israeli war. Moreover we found it particularly painful that the fictitious report of Anglo-American air support for Israel, which had caused us such serious damage, had had its roots in Jordan.

3. The King then took me through a number of reports (of which you have been already informed : my telegram No. 637[s.c] to you) which appeared to him to lend some credence to the story. I assured His Majesty that each of these was being investigated and could undoubtedly be shown to be false. What we really needed was a clear denial of the story from someone like himself whose words would carry weight. He commented that a full investigation was required and that nothing would be covered up on his side. He had no interest in perpetuating a lie and if mistakes had been made they should be admitted. He added that he had a complete record of the radar plots covering the days before fighting began and he was considering making this available to the United Nations.

4. Turning to the future King Hussein said that it was time for a fresh look at the problems of the area and that as a first step he was trying to persuade the Arab leaders to agree to meet urgently to work out a common line of action. I urged him to try to instil some realism into such a meeting, if it took place. He appeared to believe that the Arabs must try to save themselves this time, which I encouraged by saying that facts must be faced and it was no good trying to

/get

get the great powers to roll the Israelis back or to make some other arrangement which would break down sooner or later with further fighting in the area. He said repeatedly that the Arabs must determine their own future and that facts would be faced, (although I doubt that he has a clear idea of what these are) but he added that the help of the great powers would also be needed. I think what he had in mind is action e.g. through the United Nations to compel Israelis to withdraw from a part at least of their newly-occupied territory. He is fearful lest, by allowing recent Israeli conquests to go unchallenged Israelis "rights" may come to be recognised internationally where (in his view) they do not exist. This is rather how he sees the Straits of Tiran issue.

5. Beyond this his thinking did not yet go very far. He said he had already received a Soviet offer to re-equip his forces. He did not want to accept it and although he realised it was rather soon to ask he would like to know our attitude towards further supplies of military equipment to Jordan. I said I should ask for instructions but I thought personally Jordan might help us first by killing the air support story.

6. Turning to the local military situation King Hussein said he feared the Israelis might see the fact that the Iraqis have not formally accepted the cease-fire as an excuse to attack the 2 Iraqi brigades here. He had just received a message from the Iraqis to say that they were regarded as part of the Jordanian Army and covered therefore by the Jordanian acceptance of the cease-fire. He did not much like this and was trying to play safe by keeping them behind the Jordanian forces to avoid the risk of their clashing with the Israelis.

F.O. pass Immediate Washington 110, UKMis New York 54, Tel Aviv 107, Bahrain 80, Jedda 72, Kuwait 34, Beirut 200.

Mr. Adams

Sent 1915Z/12 June 1967
Recd 2100Z/12 June 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING, WHITEHALL, LONDON, S.W.1

TELEPHONE WHITEHALL 7022

CONFIDENTIAL

12th June 1967

Dear Derek.

On Saturday, 10th June, the Defence Secretary met Mr. Harry Macpherson, a member of the staff of the White House and a close adviser of President Johnson. Mr. Macpherson said that he had a meeting with Mr. Eshkol on Friday, 9th June. At this meeting, he formed the impression that the minimum Israeli peace requirements would be the de-militarisation of the west bank of the Jordan, and Sinai. Mr. Macpherson also said that he believed that Mr. Eshkol's own position was very insecure owing to strong Army pressure.

2. Before visiting Israel, Mr. Macpherson had been in Saigon. He said that the military position in Vietnam was now satisfactory from the US point of view but that the political position there gave continuing grounds for disquiet. I am sending a copy of this letter to Michael Palliser at No.10.

Yours sincerely

(R.M. HASTIE-SMITH)

Derek Day, Esq.

File

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Cypher/Cat.A

IMMEDIATE TUNIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 143 12 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No. 193: Message from Prime Minister to President.

I delivered message today to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who expressed gratification and said he would transmit it to President immediately. We agreed to publish fact that there has been a reply but of course not, repeat not its substance.

2. Bourguiba Junior said that he would discuss matter with his father but felt pretty sure what his reaction would be. Tunisian Government fully appreciated strength of Her Majesty's Government's feeling about the "big lie" and shared their apprehensions about its consequences. The President had told me what he thought about it and he had said exactly the same not only to my United States colleague (this known to be true) but to the French and Soviet Ambassadors and Arab representatives. He would continue to do what he could, but was likely to feel that though opportunities for a public statement might arise later on, to make one now would probably weaken his influence with other Arab governments whose own position was precarious. At present he could best serve our common interests by continuing to work in the background. I pointed out that even in Tunisian Government did not feel able at present to supplement the good work they were doing with other Arab governments for which we were grateful, by a public statement, they could at least ensure that their own information media did not give currency to these stories.

3. This is very much what I expected and I doubt whether reply will be modified as a result of discussion with President himself. I am discussing with my United States colleague how we can best put over our case for ourselves. But opportunities are limited as Press and information media, always tightly controlled, are even more so now.

Mr. Hooper

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Document No. 4

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE IN LUXEMBOURG AT 9 a.m. ON 13 JUNE, 1967

Top Copy on For. Policy Jun '67

Middle East

5. *Herr Brandt* said he felt it to be most important that we should not give any party in the case the impression that a body like NATO was going to impose anything on them. In answer to a question as to what he thought the Russians were up to, Herr Brandt said that he imagined that they were now quarrelling amongst themselves about what had happened. On the other hand, even though Egypt had proved a failure, the Russians had proved themselves to be more of a Mediterranean Power than they had ever been before. He then referred to the recent report that the Russians had asked for a special meeting of the Assembly. *Mr. Brown* said that he thought they would get a two-thirds majority, and granted the ineffectiveness of the Security Council he thought there might be merit in transferring things to the Assembly.

Extract from.

Document No. 3

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, THE DANISH PRIME MINISTER AND THE CANADIAN SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AT DINNER AT THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE IN LUXEMBOURG ON 12 JUNE, 1967

Middle East

Mr. Brown was host at a working party at the British Embassy for the senior members of the Canadian and Danish delegations. Discussion was entirely on the Middle East.

2. Mr. Brown said he must be frank and admitted that we had been disappointed at the unforthcoming attitude taken up by the Canadian and Danish Governments on our plan for a Maritime Declaration. If this had gathered more support it might have been enough to persuade the Israelis not to go to war. We had taken an initiative on the Maritime Declaration because we thought it was right to stand up for the principle of freedom of navigation and we had done so despite the knowledge that our motive would be misinterpreted by the Arab countries in which we had such great economic interests. We were now paying the price in burnt Embassies, broken diplomatic relations and the cutting off of oil supplies. We could not help feeling that other countries who should have supported us had failed to do so.

3. *M. Krag* protested that Denmark had not refused to sign the Maritime Declaration. The plan had not been put to them until the morning of Saturday, the 3rd of June: they had sent an emissary to Oslo to discuss the question with the Norwegians on the Sunday and the war had broken out on Monday morning. They had therefore not got to the stage of giving us a reply. He did not, however, claim that they would have replied positively if the war had not started.

4. *Mr. Martin* admitted that we had some right to feel disappointed. What we had done had been courageous but he thought it had also been unwise. Canada had not seen its way to acting outside the United Nations.

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5. *Mr. Brown* said he had only gone into this past history because he thought we were again approaching a time when nations would have to stand up and be counted. The war had exacerbated old problems and created a host of new ones. We could not long delay taking up a public position on them.

6. *M. Krag* said that since the Israelis had won the war the initiative for a peace settlement lay with them. Their position seemed to be that they would insist on negotiating direct with the Arabs. We could all wait to see how this developed. *Mr. Brown* pointed out that there seemed no chance at all that the Arabs would agree to direct negotiations. *M. Krag* said that in that case the only way he saw of getting the Israelis to give up their recent conquests was by offering them some kind of international guarantees.

7. *Mr. Martin* also argued that this was not the time for us all to do anything and that we could afford to wait a bit to see how things went. Meanwhile we could try to strengthen the United Nations presence in the area.

8. *Mr. Brown* said that this was all very well for Canada, but the Western European countries could not afford to sit back while their oil supplies remained interrupted. To us the urgent problem seemed to be to build up our forces with the Arab countries, not Nasser but the oil producers, sufficiently to get oil moving again. We could afford to wait a little before taking action but we could not afford to wait any longer before planning action. Mr. Brown thought this was the main aspect of the problem to which we should now be turning our minds.

9. *M. Krag* said that Denmark had only six months' supplies of oil. She normally imported one-third of her oil in the form of crude and two-thirds as products from the United Kingdom and elsewhere. This was a worrying position, but he could not believe that the oil producers would maintain their boycott for very long.

10. *Mr. Brown* said he very much hoped he (M. Krag) was right in this but we could not be too sure. It was not only a matter of what attitude the Arab Governments would take up but what attitude their public opinion might force upon them. Most of the present stoppages were due not so much to governmental instructions as to strikes by the oil workers and dock workers.

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STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MR. GEORGE THOMSON IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON 13 JUNE, 1967

With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to make a statement on the latest situation in the Middle East.

The main development in the Arab/Israel conflict since the Foreign Secretary's Statement in the House has been the achievement of a ceasefire on the Syrian front. The ceasefire is now being generally maintained. Today we have heard that the Soviet Government intend to ask for the Middle East to be discussed at the Special Assembly of the United Nations.

It was to me encouraging that General Odd Bull of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation, played a key part in arranging the final and effective ceasefire and that the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation observers are now in position on both sides of the ceasefire line. This Government and indeed the House as a whole have throughout the crisis repeatedly said that a United Nations presence on both sides of the borders is an essential factor in any long term settlement. I hope it will become a key factor of all the border arrangements.

As an immediate step towards making the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation as effective as possible

/during

during the present critical period, I hope that General Bull will be able to return to the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation Headquarters in Jerusalem.

I now turn to some specific points on which the House would like to have information. The first is the question of British Subjects in the area. As the Foreign Secretary told the House in an earlier Statement, emergency evacuation arrangements have been put into operation wherever the situation on the ground warranted it. British Subjects have been evacuated overland from Syria into Turkey and from Iraq into Iran.

Over 300 British Subjects were evacuated in American aircraft on Sunday morning from Amman to Tehran, where they were picked up by British aircraft to complete their journey to this country. I would like to express our gratitude to the United States Government for their generous assistance in this operation. I am glad to report that as far as we know in all these cases the evacuation has been completed without any loss of life. Evacuation arrangements for British Subjects in Egypt are in hand and over 300 were due to leave Alexandria this morning.

/The Suez Canal

The Suez Canal remains closed to navigation. The Canal Authority has said that the Canal is obstructed by small vessels sunk by Israeli action, but the Israel authorities h ve denied taking any such action. The position seems to be that some vessels are sunk in the waterway.

Four British cargo ships are in the Great Bitter Lake in the Canal, together with several ships of other nationalities. We are in close touch with the owners concerned and they in turn have had some limited radio contact with the ships themselves. Some food supplies are running short but we understand it is possible to obtain fresh supplies locally.

We have asked the Canadian Government, who act for us in the absence of diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic, to enquire urgently of the U.A.R. authorities what the prospects are for the early departure of the four ships and also to give the crews whatever help they can.

As regards oil, exports from Arab countries are still stopped or restricted. The re-adjustment of existing supplies and the high level of stocks in many importing countries (including the United Kingdom) provide a breathing space during which it is hoped the tensions which led to the supply interruptions will ease and more normal conditions return. It has been made clear to the Governments concerned that the allegations of British and American intervention, which were the immediate cause of the supply interruptions, are completely without

foundations./

foundations. In the meantime the main importing countries and the other countries associated with them in the Organisation for European Co-operation and Development are at this moment consulting together on the supply question.

We are naturally very concerned about the human suffering emerging in the aftermath of the fighting. We are acutely disturbed about the danger of a new refugee problem being superimposed on the existing one. This is in our view a practical matter of human importance which concerns the whole international community, and to which the United Nations Organisation should address itself urgently.

Meanwhile we have information that large numbers of refugees have already crossed to the East Bank of the River Jordan. It seems plain that a relief problem of major proportions is building up. The voluntary organisations in this country are considering what they can do. Her Majesty's Government have agreed to make financial provision for emergency relief in Jordan and we are urgently looking to see what we can provide from British Government stocks in Cyprus as a first step.

So much for the present. We must now look to the future. There is clearly going to be a long process of negotiations and bargaining ahead before the shape of a settlement emerges. It is our hope that the United Nations will be able to play a vigorous and realistic part in this process. Certainly the United Kingdom delegation will do its utmost to contribute to achieving that outcome.

[THE PRIME MINISTER.]
Committee makes it clear that there has been no change in the practice. The article was, as I said in the House originally, highly sensationalised. On the second day it referred to Big Brother methods of interception of cables and all the rest of it. Whether Big Brother or not, it is clear from the Radcliffe Committee, as I told the House originally, that there has been no change in the methods as operated by the previous Conservative Government and, indeed, by every Government for a number of years. I think that on behalf of the previous Conservative Government and myself I should refute the suggestion that it is done on Big Brother lines.

Mr. Carlisle: The Prime Miniser says that it is proposed to publish a White Paper setting out the facts and reasons why the Government believed, and still believe, that there was a breach of D Notice procedure. Were all those facts and grounds of belief set before the Radcliffe Committee when it apparently rejected that statement?

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. The Government gave evidence to the Committee. When I say the Government, I mean the individuals concerned in these events. So did more than one newspaper —a number of newspapers concerned. But—and this was the point from which we started—any Government have overriding responsibility for security here. It is the Government's view that this whole incident has had a very serious effect on security. We are concerned to minimise the effects on security and that is why we have gone into these questions so fully.

Certainly, if the situation were left where it is today by the Radcliffe Report it would be impossible to operate a satisfactory security system in this country. That is why we disagree with the Report in this important finding.

Mr. Heath: Is the Prime Minister aware that whatever issues may be raised by the Report, and that he himself is raising in the White Paper, the central issue remains that he accused the *Daily Express* and its executives of a deliberate breach of the D Notice convention and that the Radcliffe Committee, formed by the Prime Minister at the highest level, has rejected that accusation?

This is a question of the Prime Minister's own standing in the matter and a question of misleading the House and making an accusation against a newspaper. If the Government will give time for the debate, it is this central issue on which the debate must centre.

The Prime Minister: Certainly, the debate will centre on this, and I shall deal with this matter in the debate. But I do not accept that it is the only or, indeed, the central issue. The central issue of this whole question is the Government's responsibility for security and how this can be secured with full regard to the freedom of the Press and the danger done by this. The right hon. Gentleman and I and one or two of my right hon. Friends, alone in the House, have seen the Report and so we have this advantage or disadvantage compared with other hon. Members. The right hon. Gentleman has seen the whole very difficult argument before the Committee reached its ultimate conclusions. It is a conclusion which, for reasons which I have stated and will state more fully in the debate, we cannot accept.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I think that we shall be debating this when we have all seen the Report.

MIDDLE EAST

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. George Thomson): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to make a statement on the latest situation in the Middle East.

The main development in the Arab/Israel conflict since the Foreign Secretary's Statement in the House has been the achievement of a cease-fire on the Syrian front. The cease-fire is now being generally maintained. Today, we have heard that the Soviet Government intend to ask for the Middle East to be discussed at the Special Assembly of the United Nations.

It was to me encouraging that General Odd Bull, of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation, played a key part in arranging the final and effective cease-fire and that the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation observers are now in position on both sides of

the cease-fire line. This Government and indeed the House as a whole have expressed the view that, wherever there has been a United Nations presence on both sides of the borders, it has greatly helped in preventing conflict. I hope that this will become a key factor of all the border arrangements.

As an effective step towards making the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation as effective as possible during the present critical period, I hope that General Bull will be able to return to the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation headquarters in Jerusalem.

I now turn to some specific points on which the House, I know, would like to have some information. The first is the question of British subjects in the area. As the Foreign Secretary told the House in an earlier statement, emergency evacuation arrangements have been put into operation wherever the situation on the ground warranted it. British subjects have been evacuated overland from Syria into Turkey and from Iraq into Iran.

Over 300 British subjects were evacuated in American aircraft on Sunday morning from Amman to Tehran, where they were picked up by British aircraft to complete their journey to this country. I would like to express our gratitude to the United States Government for their generous assistance in this operation. I am glad to report that, as far as we know, in all these cases the evacution has been completed without any loss of life. Evacuation arrangements for British subjects in Egypt are in hand and over 300 left Alexandria this morning.

The Suez Canal remains closed to navigation. The Canal Authority has said that the canal is obstructed by small vessels sunk by Israeli action, but the Israeli authorities have denied taking any such action. The position seems to be in any case, that some vessels are sunk in the waterway.

Four British cargo ships are in the Great Bitter Lake in the canal, together with several ships of other nationalities. We are in close touch with the owners concerned and they, in turn, have had some limited radio contact with the ships themselves. Some food supplies are running short, but we understand that it is possible to obtain fresh supplies locally.

We have asked the Canadian Government who act for us in the absence of diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic, to inquire urgently of the U.A.R. authorities what the prospects are for the early departure of the four ships and also to give the crews whatever help they can.

As regards oil, exports from Arab countries are still stopped or restricted. The readjustment of existing supplies and the high level of stocks in many importing countries including the United Kingdom, provided a breathing space during which it is hoped that the tensions which led to the supply interruptions will ease and more normal conditions will return.

It has been made clear to the Governments concerned that the allegations of British and American intervention, which were the immediate cause of the supply interruptions, are completely without foundations. In the meantime, the main importing countries and the other countries associated with them in the O.E.C.D. are at this moment consulting together on the supply question.

We are, naturally, very concerned about the human suffering emerging in the aftermath of the fighting. We are acutely disturbed about the danger of a new refugee problem being superimposed on the existing one. This is, in our view, a practical matter of human importance which concerns the whole international community, and to which the United Nations organisation should address itself urgently.

Meanwhile, we have information that large number of refugees have already crossed to the east bank of the River Jordan. It seems plain that a relief problem of major proportions is building up. The voluntary organisations in this country are considering what they can do. Her Majesty's Government have agreed to make financial provision for emergency relief in Jordan and we are urgently considering what we can provide from British Government stocks in Cyprus as a first step.

So much for the present. We must now look to the future. There will clearly be a long process of negotiations and bargaining ahead before the shape of a settlement emerges. It is our hope that the United Nations will be able to play

[MR. THOMSON.]

a vigorous and realistic part in this process. Certainly, the United Kingdom delegation to the United Nations will do its utmost to contribute to achieving that outcome.

Lord Balniel: I welcome the right hon. Gentleman's statement about the situation and the news that the cease-fire is being maintained and that, apparently the interests of British subjects in the area are being effectively cared for.

First, as it is likely that the Egyptian story of British participation in the war will be perpetuated to the detriment of long-term British interests, what steps are the Government taking to implement their offer that an impartial body should inspect the British aircraft carriers in the area, so as to make it clear to the world that this story is not correct?

Second, as the right hon. Gentleman says that the Suez Canal is closed to navigation, and as four British ships are apparently marooned in the Great Bitter Lake, is there any indication that the Egyptians intend to open the canal to navigation? If not, what steps are the maritime nations thinking of taking to open this important international highway?

Third, would the right hon. Gentleman agree that probably the most constructive step which the United Nations can take in contributing to the long-term stability of the area lies in trying to solve the refugee problem rather than in imposing any international settlement of the territorial disputes?

Mr. Thomson: With regard to the lies which were put out by Cairo Radio about British and American involvement in the fighting, Her Majesty's Government are using every available resource to try to pin that lie down. In particular, of course, we are working hard with those countries in the Arab world with which we have always had good and friendly relations to convince them that they have been misled in this matter. We are, of course, pursuing this with the United Nations and, in consultation with the United States, discussing what is the most effective way to get a proper United Nations investigation of these malicious and utterly unfounded charges.

With regard to the reopening of the Suez Canal, the most urgent matter is to concentrate on getting the stranded ships moving, but we are, of course, in consultation with other countries about the general question of maritime passage through the canal.

Finally, I made some mention of the refugee problem in my statement, which I hope will reassure the noble Lord that Her Majesty's Government feel that the most urgent matter for the international community to apply itself to is to use the United Nations not for power politics, as seems to be the temptation on the part of the Soviet Union, but to tackle the problems of human suffering in this region in the aftermath of war.

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: I welcome what my right hon. Friend said about a contribution to the maintenance of the refugees' immediate relief. Will he propose the setting up of an international fund of sufficient size to enable the refugee problem to be liquidated by the settlement of these refugees in other countries where they can find profitable jobs?

Mr. Thomson: We should bear in mind that, next to the United States, Her Majesty's Government have always been the biggest contributor to the U.N.R.R.A. operation. Naturally, we are anxious to ensure that the existing refugee problem is not greatly enlarged by the present events in the Middle East. In looking at the best means of dealing with the problem of the aftermath of war, I shall, of course, bear in mind my right hon. Friend's suggestion.

Mr. Ian Lloyd: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the House will be greatly relieved to hear that the Government are at last taking seriously the plight of the five ships in the Great Bitter Lake? Are they now seriously considering any contingency planning to deal with all the eventualities which may arise before the ships emerge from the canal, which may well be two weeks?

Mr. Thomson: We are taking every possible step to ensure the welfare of the people on these ships and their swiftest possible passage out of the canal. I cannot, of course, accept the hon. Gentleman's use of the phrase "at last". This matter has been the subject of urgent attention from the moment the problem arose.

Mr. Shinwell: In view of the allegation about British intervention on the side of the State of Israel, made by the United Arab Republic and by some representatives of the other Arab States, has any inquiry been made into the statement which has appeared in several newspapers, and which apparently emanates from the State of Israel, that, during hostilities in Syria, several Russian Army officers were captured, which seems to indicate Russian intervention on the other side of the fence? Have the Government made any inquiries about this?

Mr. Thomson: I have seen the newspaper reports and the photographs. However, in the absence of diplomatic relations in the country concerned, there is no direct confirmation of what happened on the Syrian side.

Mr. Heath: In view of the importance of this inquiry, may I press the right hon. Gentleman further? Did Lord Caradon make this offer to the Security Council? If not, when was the offer of an independent inquiry made? If the United Nations is not prepared to undertake it, could not Her Majesty's Government arrange it directly with the countries concerned? And if individual Governments do not send representatives could not the Government make these observations available to the world's Press so that they may judge for themselves?

Mr. Thomson: The offer was first made in the United Nations at the moment, almost immediately, after the lie was originally broadcast. What we are now actively considering must be an effective way to propose a United Nations inquiry. The important thing, as the right hon. Gentleman said, is to nail the lie; and we would not rule out any particular means of making it plain to as many countries in the world as possible that this was a quite unfounded allegation.

Mr. Heath: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the urgency of this matter—that it is a week since it was first broadcast over Middle Eastern radios? Still to be trying to arrange something is surely not the way of nailing the lie.

Mr. Thomson: The Leader of the Opposition is less than just in this case to the constant efforts that have been made day by day by every means at our disposal to make sure that the truth is known throughout the world.

Mr. Park: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that any lasting settlement of the Middle Eastern crisis can be brought about only under the auspices of the United Nations and that it will not come as a result of harsh and humiliating terms being offered by the victor to the vanquished, which can only have the effect of renewing antagonisms?

Mr. Thomson: If my hon. Friend studies my statement he will find that in my closing sentences I directed my remarks to that point.

Mr. Tapsell: Would the right hon. Gentleman tell the House whether Her Majesty's Government are taking any initiative to bring the Israeli and Arab Governments to the conference table? May I repeat a question which I put to his right hon. Friend a week ago: that if the Security Council is not united in its approach to this problem would not it be wise to find a suitable small neutral country which is prepared to take the chair at the conference table?

Mr. Thomson: We have not forgotten the hon. Gentleman's suggestion in that respect. However, I think that the first thing is to see what can be done in the Security Council and through the United Nations machinery.

Perhaps I should remind the House that this problem, as far as Britain is concerned, is not simply one related to the Arab-Israel conflict, but is related to the Middle East as a whole. Our most direct interests and responsibilities lie not in the area of the Arab-Israel conflict, but in Southern Arabia and the Gulf. We must remember this.

Mr. James Davidson: Although the right hon. Gentleman partly answered this question, will he give the view of Her Majesty's Government on the prospect of direct negotiations between the Israeli and Arab nations? Do the Government support the view that the Israelis should maintain the present cease-fire lines pending the outcome of a final settlement?

Mr. Thomson: I do not think that one can look too far into the future in considering this question at the moment. It

[MR. THOMSON.]
is a very early stage at which to speculate. I said that, in the first place, we must work through the United Nations. I also believe that we must see what happens there during the next day or two.

Mr. Michael Foot: While I am extremely grateful for my right hon. Friend's statement about the part which the United Nations has played, or has helped to play, in the securing of a cease-fire, and in helping the refugees, may I ask whether he would reply more specifically to the question about the frontiers? Does he not agree that the question of the frontiers which are to prevail between the State of Israel and the Arab States is not one to be settled solely by the countries directly concerned, but by the whole international community, remembering that otherwise the whole basis of the United Nations will be undermined?

Mr. Thomson: I am sorry if I failed to explain myself sufficiently clearly. I thought that I had laid great emphasis on our belief that progress in this matter should be made through the United Nations. Clearly, as my hon. Friend says, the question of the frontiers—of withdrawal from land gained by, for example, military conquest—is central to this problem.

Sir A. V. Harvey: Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that while the Suez Canal is closed aid to the refugees and other Arab countries may be delayed? Has he seen the latest reports from Egypt, that the canal may be closed for two to six months? What steps can Her Majesty's Government take, either in the United Nations or elsewhere, to get the canal opened, remembering that we are informed that only two or three vessels are sunk in the canal and would have to be removed to reopen it, as Egypt was obliged to do under international law? What are the Government doing? Are they treating this as a matter of urgency?

Mr. Thomson: I assure the hon. Gentleman and the House that the question of opening the canal and freeing the British ships, as well as the ships of many other nationalities, is being treated by us and other countries with the greatest urgency.

Mr. Colin Jackson: Can my right hon. Friend give any further information about the refugees on the west bank of the Jordan? There seems to be a conflict of evidence, some of it that 100,000 refugees have gone east across the Jordan and some of it that the Israeli local authorities had asked them to stay? Would Her Majesty's Government consider raising this subject in the Security Council with a view to getting United Nations' observers there on the spot?

Mr. Thomson: It is impossible to give any accurate estimate of the numbers of refugees leaving the west bank of the Jordan for the east bank. People are too busy in the present situation to count heads accurately. I hope that my statement made it clear that we were intending to approach this problem through the United Nations.

Mr. Hogg: The House will have read that thousands of soldiers are walking across the desert without water at this present hour. Will the right hon. Gentleman impress on the victors the desirability that they should not, if possible, be allowed to die of thirst?

Mr. Thomson: Everybody who read the stories and have seen some of the pictures of the destruction must have been moved by this as one of the most heart-rending examples of the aftermath of war. I understand that the International Red Cross is operating in the area and I hope that it can do something to help. I certainly endorse the right hon. and learned Gentleman's appeal.

Mr. Orme: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that if a permanent peace is to be achieved in the Middle East—a peace acceptable to both the Israeli and the Arab States—we do not want to see a further escalation of the refugee problem? What specific steps do Her Majesty's Government intend to take to raise this matter, along with the other problems involved, in the United Nations, the only place where I and many of my hon. Friends agree this matter can be resolved?

Mr. Thomson: The main immediate step is to give some help, and this we are doing by sending emergency supplies. After that, it is a matter for discussion in the United Nations.

Mr. Maude: Whatever form of United Nations presence is ultimately established on the frontiers or cease-fire lines, will the Government do everything in their power to ensure that it cannot be removed except by the Assembly or Security Council and not by the Secretary General at the request of only one side?

Mr. Thomson: The hon. Gentleman has raised one of the very important problems and terms of any final settlement in this conflict. Clearly, that final settlement is a long way ahead yet and it would be rash for me to speculate at this moment about exactly what form it might take.

Mr. Abse: In view of the fact that the intervention of all outside parties in the Middle East has hitherto been so disastrous, and the basic cause of the trouble has been the non-recognition of Israel by the Arab States, will my right hon. Friend bear in mind the folly and dangers of attempting to impose a peace if there is not, as a preliminary, a recognition of the State of Israel at the negotiating table by all the Arab States?

Mr. Thomson: I do not believe that this is a matter which can be isolated or divorced from the international community as a whole. They have a legitimate interest in what sort of settlement emerges here, though, naturally, the first responsibility lies on the immediate contestants.

Sir J. Langford-Holt: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware, in respect of the allegation about British intervention, that there are people throughout the world who still believe it and that nothing he has said in answer to questions today gives us any comfort? Is he aware that what is required now is something urgently to be done by Her Majesty's Government? Otherwise, if this goes on for another week, it will be easy for people who started this lie to say that we have had time to destroy the evidence?

Mr. Thomson: I assure the House that everything possible is being done, with the greatest possible urgency. However, it should be remembered that a lie like this is easily put out but is difficult to erase. With all diffidence to the hon. Gentleman, may I say that it would be easier to erase this lie if there was not an historic precedent which was not a lie.

Sir B. Janner: Will my right hon. Friend be realistic in this matter? Is not he aware that time after time the Israeli Government have asked the Arabs to come to the conference table? Is he not aware that these two peoples, who understand the mentality of each other, would be able to settle the differences between themselves rather than by the imposition of any outside influences, which have let them down very badly in the past? Will he please direct his attention towards a settlement between the Arabs and Israelis at a peace conference of their own, so that there will be no misunderstanding in future?

Mr. Thomson: I admire my hon. Friend's optimism in this matter, but I am afraid that one of the things which has made this an intractable international problem has been the difficulty of getting the two sides round the conference table to discuss peace constructively between each other. It is, therefore, legitimate to believe that the United Nations has a rôle to play in dealing with this problem.

Sir R. Cary: In view of the comforting remarks that have been made about the high level of oil stocks as distinct from supplies, will the right hon. Gentleman deny the suggestion made in the newspapers this morning that we will be under petrol rationing within six weeks?

Mr. Thomson: That is primarily a question for my right hon. Friend the Minister of Power. I have certainly seen no evidence to support that particular story in the Press.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order. We must move on.

QUESTIONS TO MINISTERS

Earl of Dalkeith: On a point of order. In view of the relevance of Question No. 65 to the Minister's statement on the Middle East, may we have an answer to it now?

Mr. Speaker: I have had no request from the Minister to answer the noble Lord's Question.

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YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1328.
MIDDLE EAST.
I RECOGNISE THE FORCE OF WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT WITHDRAWAL. WHEN THIS IS RAISED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A MAJOR ISSUE BY THE SOVIET UNION AND BY THE ARABS WE MUST CERTAINLY AVOID TAKING UP ANY POSITION IN WHICH WE CAN BE ACCUSED OF SUPPORTING THE ISRAELIS AGAINST THE ARABS. I ALSO AGREE THAT THE RENEWAL IN DUE COURSE OF OUR FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES MAY WELL BE CONDITIONED BY THE ATTITUDE THAT WE TAKE OVER WITHDRAWAL. MOREOVER IT LOOKS MORE AND MORE AS IF THE RESUMPTION OF OIL SUPPLIES AND THE REOPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL WILL BE USED AS BARGAINING COUNTERS BY THE ARABS ON THE OTHER SIDE.
2. FOR ALL THESE REASONS I AGREE THAT THE FORMULA YOU SUGGEST IN PARA 4. OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE IS RIGHT. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING A DRAFT OF WHAT YOU INTEND TO SAY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
3. I ASSUME THAT IN ALL THIS YOU ARE KEEPING IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH GOLDBERG. (SEE ALSO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 2000)
4. YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1325. I AGREE WITH THE LINE YOU PROPOSE TO TAKE IF THE RUSSIANS DECIDE TO RAISE THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY.

SOSFA SENT 1432Z/13 JUNE

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SECRET

13 June, 1967.

Dear Michael, Sir Leslie Rowan has seen this and I have approved it. D 14/6

You asked Peter Hayman this evening to provide you with an up-to-date account of the various developments which have taken place in the United Nations today over the Middle East crisis.

The sequence of events so far as moves by the Soviet Union are concerned was as follows:

(a) The Soviet Union has requested the Secretary General to call for an emergency meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. The Secretary General has informed all Members of the United Nations of this request by telegram.

(b) The Soviet Union also requested the President of the Security Council to call a meeting of the Security Council at 8.00 p.m. tonight (3.00 p.m. New York time to consider an item entitled "The cessation of military action by Israel and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from those parts of the territories of the U.A.R., Jordan and Syria which they had seized as a result of aggression". The letter ends with a statement that this was a matter that "brooked no delay".

(c) The Soviet representative is tabling in the Security Council a resolution based, in broadly similar terms, on the Russian resolution still before the Security Council. This brands Israel as an aggressor and calls for a withdrawal /of

NEW YORK TO F.O. T.1276 copy attached at A

A. M. Palliser, Esq., CMG,
10 Downing Street.

SECRET

of her forces to the Armistice lines.

NEW YORK TOF.O. 1275 attached at B

Meanwhile, the United States delegation is proposing to table in the Security Council a resolution similar to the resolution which they tabled which calls for full consideration of the whole problem by the United Nations; the use of a U.N. mediator and full discussion of the whole problem leading up to a general settlement.

After reference to the Secretary of State and discussion with Lord Caradon in New York it has been agreed that Lord Caradon should not speak on the resolutions before the Security Council, but should refer back for instructions in the light of discussion. He thinks that there will be the same wrangle which has taken place in the Security Council on previous occasions between the Russian resolution and the American resolution. Neither will command sufficient votes to pass and he expects the Security Council proceedings to continue tomorrow.

It is possible that the Russians may try and force a vote on their resolution in order to claim that there has been a deadlock in the Security Council which under U.N. procedure could justify an emergency meeting of the General Assembly. All the evidence points to the Russians putting full pressure on the Members of the United Nations to agree to the calling of a special session of the Assembly.

If there is a sudden demand for a vote on the Russian resolution Lord Caradon will press hard for an adjournment to enable him to refer back for instructions. In the very unlikely event of there being no time

/for

for this he would feel that he would have to abstain. This was also the Secretary of State's view.

Before the question of a Russian request for a special meeting of the General Assembly arose Lord Caradon had asked for our views on the line that he should take on the question of withdrawal in general. New York telegram No. 1328 sets out his views. In Foreign Office telegram No. 2828, which was approved by Mr. Thomson, we have said that the line suggested by Lord Caradon in paragraph 4 of his telegram seems to be the right one, but we asked for a draft of what Lord Caradon intended to say when eventually he spoke in the Council. Lord Caradon told Peter Hayman on the telephone tonight that he took full note of these instructions and would be sending us over night for consideration the draft of what he might say in due course. I think that Mr. Thomson reported in general terms to the Cabinet about the proposal made by Lord Caradon on the subject of withdrawal.

NEW. Y. TO F.O. No. 1328 of C and) F.O. to N. York T. 2828

I should finally report by way of a postscript that according to our latest information the Russian aircraft due at 9.30 at Prestwick tomorrow morning en route for New York is not expected until the day after tomorrow or perhaps the day after that. This argues that the Russians are contemplating some delay in their move to press for a special session of the General Assembly.

Yours sincerely,

) Derek) Ap_

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER:CAT 'A'

IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1331 13 JUNE

CONFIDENTIAL

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.

WE MUST AT THE SAME TIME TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING CAUSED TO CIVILIAN POPULATIONS AND TO PREVENT A REFUGEE PROBLEM EVEN MORE DISASTROUS THAN THAT WHICH WE KNEW BEFORE. THIS IS AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND I SAY NOW THAT MY GOVERNMENT PLEDGES THAT IT WILL TAKE A FULL SHARE IN AN INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM. WE STAND READY AT ONCE TO MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN OUR CONTRIBUTION TO UNRWA. MOREOVER, WE SHALL IN FUTURE DIVERT OUR CONTRIBUTION PREVIOUSLY MADE TO THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE TO THE TASK OF RELIEF AND REHABILITATION. WE HOPE THAT OTHER NATIONS WILL MATCH OUR ACTION, AND WE RECOMMEND THAT WHEN THE RESOLUTION PUT FORWARD BY ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND ETHIOPIA HAS BEEN PASSED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN COOPERATION WITH THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED AND THE UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES ALREADY ESTABLISHED, WILL, AS A MATTER OF SPECIAL URGENCY, SECURE FOR US A THOROUGH REPORT BOTH ON THE SITUATION AND THE NEED. THIS IS ANOTHER FIELD IN WHICH THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ACTION IS ALREADY PROVED AND IN WHICH WE CAN AND MUST ACT AT ONCE.

LORD CARADON

SENT 1540/13Z

RECD 1540/13Z

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Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Tel. No. 584 13 June, 1967

SECRET

My immediately preceding telegram.

Another aspect of this matter is, of course, that the Israelis are now in possession of much important military information which I understand we would like both from a national and a NATO point of view. Question of armour dealt with in my telegram No. DA/186 is one aspect. But today's press reports capture of an intact Russian missile site and of chemical warfare equipment.

2. These matters are at the moment being dealt with through the channels open to us here but if we are going to adopt the generally reserved position 'vis-à-vis' the Israelis which we seem to be, we are going to lose out in the general rush in which others seem to have less inhibition in joining.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1145Z/13 June
Recd. 1440Z/13 June

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File

EN CLAIR
FLASH UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 1335 13 JUNE 1967
UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1335 OF 13 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO LUXEMBOURG, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, PARIS OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN AND AMMAN.

MY TELNO.1276.
MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION CIRCULATED TODAY BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
NOTING THAT ISRAEL IN DEFIANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON THE CESSATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND A CEASE-FIRE (S/RES/233 OF 6 JUNE 1967, S/RES/234 OF 7 JUNE 1967 AND S/RES/235 OF 9 JUNE 1967) HAS SEIZED ADDITIONAL TERRITORY OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, JORDAN AND SYRIA.
NOTING THAT ALTHOUGH MILITARY ACTIVITIES HAVE NOW CEASED ISRAEL IS STILL OCCUPYING THE TERRITORY OF THESE COUNTRIES, THUS FAILING TO HALT ITS AGRESSION AND DEFYING THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALL PEACELOVING STATES,
CONSIDERING UNACCEPTABLE AND UNLAWFUL ISRAEL'S TERRITORIAL CLAIMS ON THE ARAB STATES,

/1.

1. VIGOROUSLY CONDEMNS ISRAEL'S AGGRESSIVE ACTIVITIES AND CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF PART OF THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, SYRIA AND JORDAN, REGARDING THIS AS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AND THE GROSSEST VIOLATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND GENERALLY RECOGNISED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:

2. DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL SHOULD IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY REMOVE ALL ITS TROOPS FROM THE TERRITORY OF THOSE STATES AND WITHDRAW THEM BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES AND SHOULD RESPECT THE STATUS OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONES, AS PRESCRIBED IN THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE LUXEMBOURG 1, MOSCOW 161, TEL AVIV 171, PARIS 163 AND ROUTINE TO COPENHAGEN 87 AND AMMAN 92.

LORD CARADON

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FLASH UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 1337 13 JUNE 1967

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1337 OF 13 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO LUXEMBOURG, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, PARIS, OTTAWA AND COPENHAGEN.

MY TELNO 1335 AND MOSCOW TELS NOS 1027 AND 1028: MIDDLE EAST. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER OF 13 JUNE FROM MR GROMYKO TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL CALLING FOR THE IMMEDIATE CONVENING OF AN EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHICH HAS BEEN CIRCULATED AS DOCUMENT A/6717:-

DESPITE THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S DECISIONS CONCERNING THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES, ISRAEL IS CONTINUING ITS PIRATICAL AGRESSION. IN FLAGRANT DEFIANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS FOR A CEASE-FIRE ADOPTED ON 6,7 AND 9 JUNE, ISRAEL HAS SEIZED FURTHER TERRITORIES BELONGING TO THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, JORDAN AND SYRIA.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 11 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, SHOULD CONSIDER THE SITUATION WHICH HAS ARISEN AND SHOULD ADOPT A DECISION DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT THE LIQUIDATION OF THE CONSEQQUENCES OF AGGRESSION AND THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CALLS FOR THE IMMEDIATE CONVENING OF AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR THESE PURPOSES. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROPOSES THAT AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION SHOULD BE CONVENED WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT REQUESTS YOU TO TAKE WHATEVER STEPS ARE NECESSARY FOR THE CONVENING OF SUCH A SESSION AND TO NOTIFY IT AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE OF THE EXACT DATE OF OPENING OF THE

/GENERAL

GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S SESSION. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD INFORM YOU THAT IT WILL SEND A DELEGATION INCLUDING LEADING STATESMEN OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

KINDLY REGARD THIS LETTER AS AN EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM WITHIN THE MEANING OF RULE 20 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AND CIRCULATE IT WITHOUT DELAY AS AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE LUXEMBOURG 2, TEL AVIV 172, MOSCOW 162, PARIS 164 AND ROUTINE TO COPENHAGEN 88.
LORD CARADON

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IMMEDIATE FROM UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1340 DATED 13 JUNE, 1967
UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1340 OF 13 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW WASHINGTON PARIS TEL AVIV OTTAWA COPENHAGEN RIO DE JANEIRO BUENOS AIRES ADDIS ABABA NEW DELHI TOKYO AND SAVING TO AMMAN JEDDA AND BEIRUT.
MY TELEGRAM NO 1332: MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

THE COUNCIL WAS AGAIN SUMMONED INTO EMERGENCY SESSION AT 3 P.M. ON THE REQUEST OF THE SOVIET UNION. IN A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT THE SOVIET DELEGATE HAD CALLED FOR THE COUNCIL'S CONSIDERATION OF AN ITEM ENTITLED ''CESSATION OF MILITARY ACTION BY ISRAEL AND WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THOSE PARTS OF THE TERRITORY OF THE U.A.R., JORDAN AND SYRIA WHICH THEY HAD SEIZED AS THE RESULT OF AGGRESSION''. FEDERENKO ALSO CIRCULATED A REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MY TELEGRAM NO 1335). ALSO BEFORE THE MEETING WERE THREE FURTHER REPORTS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF UNTSO.

2. FEDERENKO (USSR) EXPLAINING HIS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT, SAID THAT THE THREE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS PASSED SINCE THE WAR BEGAN HAD PROVED QUITE INADEQUATE BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAD ENCOURAGED ISRAEL TO DISREGARD THEM. IN THE MEANWHILE, ISRAEL HAD EXPANDED HER GAINS OF ARAB SOIL. BONN AS WELL AS THE PENTAGON HAD BEEN AMONGST ISRAEL'S BACKERS= THE MILITARISTS FROM THE RHINE HAD OSTENTATIOUSLY SENT ANTI-GAS EQUIPMENT TO ISRAEL DURING THE 5JUNE WAR. THE SOVIET UNION'S ATTITUDE, AND THAT OF OTHER SOCIALIST STATES, HADD BEEN CLEARLY DEFINED IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS. FURTHERMORE, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD BROKEN OFF RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD FOLLOWED SUIT.

3. THE RESOLUTIONS TAKEN SO FAR BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL WERE ONLY INITIAL AND PARTIAL MEASURES, WHICH WERE NOW TOTALLY INADEQUATE. ARABS WERE BEING FORCIBLY EVICTED FROM GAZA AND THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM. ESHKOL AND GENERAL DAYAN HAD MADE

/OMINOUS

OMINOUS STATEMENTS ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS. THE TIME WAS PAST FOR FURTHER REPORTS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, OR INVESTIGATIONS INTO WHETHER ISRAEL HAD COMMITTED AGGRESSION OR NOT. THE SOVIET REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION TOOK ACCOUNT OF CHANGES IN THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND OVER THE LAST EIGHT DAYS, AND HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHERE THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER WESTERN DELEGATIONS STOOD ON THE MAIN POINTS RAISED IN THE NEW DRAFT, VIZ. CONDEMNATION AND WITHDRAWAL. HE PROPOSED THAT HIS DRAFT BE PUT TO THE VOTE TODAY, WITHOUT ADO. IF THE COUNCIL CONCLUDED ITS MEETING WITHOUT A VOTE, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD SEE TO IT THAT THE UNITED NATIONS DID ITS DUTY IN OTHER WAYS, SO THAT THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER WERE NOT FRUSTRATED.

4. AL FARRA (JORDAN) REFERRED TO A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT (S/7975) IN WHICH HE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE PLIGHT OF THOUSANDS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES FROM UNWRA CAMPS ON THE WEST BANK OF THE JORDAN, WHO HAD BEEN FORCED TO LEAVE THEIR HOMES WITHIN TWO HOURS BY THE ISRAEL MILITARY AUTHORITIES. IT WAS REPORTED THAT SOME WOMEN REFUGEES HAD BEEN DROWNED WHILE CROSSING THE JORDAN IN COMPLIANCE WITH THESE BRUTAL ORDERS. WHAT WAS THE COUNCIL'S ATTITUDE TO THESE VAST HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS? HE HOPED THAT U THANT WOULD BE ABLE TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON THESE ENFORCED POPULATION MOVEMENTS, WHICH AMOUNTED TO GENOCIDE. IT WAS ALSO VITAL FOR THE COUNCIL TO CONDEMN ISRAELI AGGRESSION AND CALL FOR THE IMMEDIATE UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE AGGRESSORS. AL FARRA SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES DRAFT RESOLUTION (S/7952) DID NOT SAFEGUARD THE SIMPLE PRINCIPLES HE HAD OUTLINED= IT BLURRED THE ISSUES WITH A MASS OF VERBIAGE. HE CRITICIZED THE FREEDOM GIVEN TO ZIONIST AGITATORS IN THE UNITED STATES. HE CAST DOUBT ON THE PROMISES BY THE UNITED STATES TO PRESERVE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF MIDDLE EASTERN NATIONS. HE THEN QUOTED AT LENGTH FROM A NEWSWEEK ARTICLE WHICH PORTRAYED THE USS ''LIBERTY'' AS AN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING VESSEL, WHICH SOME ENTERPRISING ISRAELI GENERAL HAD ORDERED TO BE SUNK, TO GIVE THE ISRAELIS MORE SCOPE AT THE END OF THEIR INVASION. IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ADOPTED A DOUBLE STANDARD TOWARDS IT FRIENDS, AL FARRA CONCLUDED, IT COULD NOT EXPECT TO RETAIN THE SYMPATHY OF THE ARABS.

/5.

5. GOLDBERG (UNITED STATES) REVIEWED AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS MIDDLE EASTERN STATES SINCE THE ADMISSION OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN 1948. HE CONTRASTED AMERICAN EFFORTS TO WORK FOR PEACE IN THE REGION WITH THE DISRUPTION CAUSED BY SOVIET POLICIES. ON THE PRESENT CRISIS, HE DREW THE COUNCIL' ATTENTION TO REPORTS CIRCULATING IN SYRIA AND EGYPT DURING EARLY MAY CONCERNING AN ALLEGED ISRAELI BUILD-UP ON THE SYRIAN BORDER. THESE HAD MARKED THE REAL START OF THE CRISIS. YET NASSER HAD RECENTLY REVEALED THAT THE SOURCE OF THIS REPORT WAS A VISITING DELEGATION FROM MOSCOW. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, GOLDBERG SAID THE COUNCIL WAS FACED WITH TWO ALTERNATIVES. IF THE DRAFT SOVIET RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED AND THE CLOCK PUT BACK TO 4 JUNE, WITH A HEFTY CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL INTO THE BARGAIN, THIS WOULD BE A STRAIGHT PRESCRIPTION FOR RENEWED HOSTILITIES. THE AMERICAN DRAFT ON THE OTHER HAND, SOUGHT DEEPER SOLUTIONS., WITHDRAWAL IS NECESSARY BUT INSUFFICIENT. THERE WERE LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES ON BOTH SIDES. ON REFUGEES, THE UNITED STATES, AS PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTOR TO THE UNWRA BUDGET, URGED ALL CONCERNED, PARTICULARLY THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT, TO TREAT THE CIVILIAN POPULATIONS WELL AND PERMIT THEM TO STAY IN THEIR HOMES.

6. AL-BAROODI (SAUDI ARABIA) SPOKE NEXT, IN FAMILIAR TERMS, FOR OVER ONE HOUR.

7. KIDRON (ISRAEL) REBUTTED ALLEGATIONS BY PREVIOUS SPEAKERS INCLUDING THE NEWSWEEK VERSION OF THE ''LIBERTY'' TORPEDOEING HE SAID THAT THE CEASE-FIRE CALLED FOR BY THE COUNCIL WAS NOW IN FULL EFFECT WITH ALL ISRAEL'S NEIGHBOURS. BUT IRAQ, ALGERIA AND YEMEN HAD STILL NOT RESPONDED TO THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS AND KUWAIT HAD ACTUALLY REJECTED THEMM THESE FOUR COUNTRIES HAD TAKEN PART IN THE FIGHTING AGAINST ISRAEL. OBVIOUSLY THE CEASE-FIRE COULD NOT BE FULLY EFFECTIVE UNTIL ALL GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED INFORMED THE COUNCIL THAT THEY HAD CEASED HOSTILITIES. KIDRON THEN SPOKEN ABOUT THE REFUGEE PROBLEM (SEE MY TELEGRAM NO. 1341). CONCLUDING, HE REMINDED THE COUNCIL OF EBAN'S

PRINCIPLES FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT VIZ (I) RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL BY THE ARAB STATES= (II) DIRECT SOVEREIGN RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES= (III) PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES= (IV) GUARANTEED FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS. THERE COULD BE NO RETURN TO THE 'OLD SYSTEM' OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS, WHICH HAD CAUSED THREE WARS IN 19 YEARS. EBAN'S PRINCIPLES WERE COVERED IN THE CONSTRUCTIVE DRAFT AMERICAN RESOLUTION, WHEREAS THE REVISED SOVIET RESOLUTION WAS DESTRUCTIVE IN INTENT.

8. MESTIRI (TUNISIA) AND BEN HIMA (MOROCCO) THEN SPOKE ON THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. THE FORMER EXPATIATED ON THE DANGERS OF DELIBERATE EXPULSION BY THE ISRAELIS OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK OF JORDAN. THE ''NEW YORK TIMES'' HAD GIVEN A FIGURE OF 100,000 NEW REFUGEES. BEN HIMA SAID THAT MOROCCO WOULD BE REQUESTING THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICIALLY TO INSTRUCT THE APPROPRIATE SPECIALISTED AGENCIES TO GIVE ALL NECESSARY HELP TO THE MILLIONS OF NEW REFUGEES RENDERED HOMELESS BY ISRAELI AGGRESSION.

9. AT THIS POINT THE COUNCIL AGREED TO A SHORT RECESS.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW 163, PARIS 165 AND TEL AVIV 173 AND ROUTINE TO COPENHAGEN 89, RIO DE JANEIRO 40, BUENOS AIRES 34 ADDIS ABABA 32 NEW DELHI 48 TOKYO 34 AND SAVING TO AMMAN 64 JEDDA 43 AND BEIRUT 60.

LORD CARADON

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PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1341 13 JUNE 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1341 OF 13 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV AMMAN AND WASHINGTON.

MIDDLE EAST: REFUGEES.

FOLLOWING IS EXTRACT FROM A LETTER WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL ADDRESSED ON 13 JUNE TO THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL:

BEGINS:

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS SURE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WILL READILY RECOGNISE UNITED NATIONS INTEREST IN THE WELL BEING OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATIONS IN THE AREAS NOW UNDER ISRAEL MILITARY OCCUPATION, BOTH ON BROAD HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS AND BECAUSE OF THE LONG ESTABLISHED UNITED NATIONS CONCERN WITH THE PALESTINE REFUGEES AS REFLECTED IN UNRWA.

IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL COULD ASSURE THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE SAFETY AND WELL-BEING AND OF THE PROTECTION OF THE INTERESTS AND RIGHTS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATIONS IN THE AREAS NOW UNDER MILITARY OCCUPATION.

ENDS:

2...IN HIS REMARKS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS EVENING REBUTTING ALLEGATIONS ABOUT THE PLIGHT OF REFUGEES IN ISRAELI CONQUERED TERRITORY, KIDRON, (THE ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE STANDING IN FOR RAFAEL) SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS WELL SEIZED OF THE PROBLEM. AN EXODUS FROM THE WEST TO THE EAST BANK OF THE JORDAN HAD TAKEN PLACE, BUT THERE HAD BEEN ALSO A ''LARGE-SCALE RETURN MOVEMENT'' FROM EAST TO WEST. AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN UNRWA AND THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT WAS UNDER URGENT CONSIDERATION AND DISCUSSION, AND HE HOPED WOULD BE SIGNED SHORTLY.

3...KIDRON ADDED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT FULLY RESPECTED THE GENEVA

/CONVENTION

CONVENTION OF 1949 ON PRISONERS OF WAR. THEY WERE INTOUCH WITH THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, AND IT WAS HOPED THAT EXCHANGES OF PRISONERS OF WAR WOULD BE SPEEDILY EFFECTED.

F O PASS TEL AVIV 174 AND AMMAN 93.

LORD CARADON.

SENT Ø247Z 14.6.67
RECD Ø247Z 14.6.67

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IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1345 13 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1345 OF 13 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND LUXEMBOURG.

M I P T:

MIDDLE EAST.

A MEETING WAS HELD AT THE U S MISSION THIS MORNING ATTENDED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF DENMARK, ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CANADA, JAPAN AND OURSELVES.

2...THE MEETING AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE ENOUGH ABSTENTIONS TO PREVENT THE RUSSIAN RESOLUTION PASSING. THERE WAS ALSO SYMPATHY FOR THE IDEA THAT IT WAS TIME WE STOPPED BEING STAMPEDED TACTICALLY BY THE RUSSIANS AND THAT WE SHOULD ON THIS IMPORTANT MATTER SEEK AN ADJOURNMENT FOR TIME IN WHICH TO GET INSTRUCTIONS.

3...GOLDBERG SUGGESTED THE POSITION OF THOSE WHO ABSTAINED ON THE SOVIET RESOLUTION WOULD BE BETTER IF SOME ALTERNATIVE POSITIVE MOVE WERE SUGGESTED IN THE FORM OF A NEW RESOLUTION. IT WAS AGREED THAT IN FACT THE RUSSIANS COULD CLAIM VOTING PRIORITY FOR THEIR RESOLUTION AND THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE WORTH FIGHTING. GOLDBERG SAID THAT EVEN IF A NEW COUNTER RESOLUTION WERE NOT VOTED ON IT WOULD BE AS WELL TO TABLE IT, AND HE HOPED THAT NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS WOULD CONSULT ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A RESOLUTION. SUCH A RESOLUTION SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE APPOINTMENT OF A HIGH U N REPRESENTATIVE TO CONSIDER MODALITIES BOTH OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION AND OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL. HE HAD NO OBJECTIONS TO THE WORDS ''APPROPRIATE WITHDRAWAL''. THERE WAS LITTLE ENTHUSIASM AMONGST THE NON-PERMANENTS FOR TABLING A NEW RESOLUTION, AND GOLDBERG SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT AT LEAST THOSE AT THE MEETING WOULD BE ABLE TO STATE THEIR POSITION IN SUCH TERMS.

4...THE

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U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO.1345 TO FOREIGN OFFICE
2.

4...THE ARGENTINE REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS HE THOUGHT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT THE NEXT STAGE WAS WITHDRAWAL FOLLOWED BY NEGOTIATION BUT THAT SINCE NEGOTIATION SHOULD NOT BE CONDUCTED BY EITHER SIDE UNDER ''DURESS'', WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY GUARANTEES (ON E G THE OPENING OF THE GULF OF AQABA AND OF THE SUEZ CANAL) WHICH REMOVED ARAB THREAT OF ''DURESS''.HE ALSO WONDERED WHETHER IF THE U A R CLAIMED BELLIGERENT RIGHTS IN THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE SUEZ CANAL, THE ISRAELIS COULD NOT ALSO CLAIM THOSE RIGHTS FOR OCCUPATION OF TERRITORY. THE BRAZILIAN SAID THAT BEFORE TRYING TO PASS A RESOLUTION ON A MEDIATOR WE SHOULD TRY AND GET MORE COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT US AS BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND ARABS SEEMED AGAINST A MEDIATOR. GOLDBERG COUNTERED THAT WHEN BOTH SIDES FAILED TO AGREE THIS WAS EXACTLY WHEN THE U N HAD TO STEP IN.
5...IT WAS AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO OBJECT TO THE SOVIET CALL FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY.
6...RESIDENT CLERK PASS TO URE AT Ø73Ø A.M.
F O PASS IMMEDIATE LUXEMBOURG 4.
LORD CARADON

SENT Ø435Z 14.6.67
RECD Ø435Z 14.6.67

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

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CYPHER CAT

FLASH FROM UKMISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1348 13 JUNE, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1348 OF 13 JUNE

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO LUXEMBOURG AND WASHINGTON.

MIDDLE EAST

MIPT: FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED TEXT:

BEGINS.

I NOW TURN TO THE QUESTION OF DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL. FROM THE FIRST WE HAVE EMPHASISED HOW IMPORTANT IT IS THAT THESE PURPOSES MUST BE URGENTLY CONSIDERED. IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF THE AIM. CERTAINLY WE BELIEVE THAT WITHDRAWAL MUST TAKE PLACE. WE HAVE ALWAYS EMPHASISED THE NECESSITY TO RESPECT AND MAINTAIN THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL MEMBER STATES. WE HAVE NO DOUBT OR DISPUTE ABOUT THAT. THE QUESTION IS THE PRACTICAL QUESTION OF HOW DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL ARE TO BE ACHIEVED.

NON-ONE BELIEVES THAT EITHER CAN BE ACHIEVED MERELY BY PASSING A RESOLUTION HERE. WE KNOW THAT DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL CANNOT IN FACT AND IN PRACTICE BE SECURED WITHOUT DISCUSSION AND ACTION NOT IN NEW YORK BUT ON THE SPOT. WE KNOW, MOREOVER, FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE - IN KASHMIR FOR INSTANCE - HOW NECESSARY DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND CIVIL AUTHORITIES CONCERNED MUST BE.

I SUGGEST TO THE COUNCIL THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD GIVE OUR MINDS TO THE PRACTICAL PROBLEM INSTEAD OF ENGAGING IN AN EXERCISE IN PROPAGANDA.

HOW THEN CAN WE BEST WORK FOR DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL? GENERAL BULL AND THE UNITED NATIONS STAFF WORKING WITH HIM HAVE ALREADY MADE AN IMPORTANT START, AND CAN NO DOUBT PLAY A VERY USEFUL ROLE IN THE FUTURE TOO. I FULLY AGREE WITH THE DISTINGUISHED AMBASSADOR OF INDIA WHEN HE URGED THE STRENGTHENING OF UNITED NATIONS MACHINERY IN THE AREA.

/ I AGREE

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UK MISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1348 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

2.

I AGREE WITH HIM TOO THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD AT ONCE CONSIDER WHETHER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD DEPUTE A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, NOT ONLY TO HELP IN REDUCING TENSIONS BUT ALSO IN RESTORING PEACEFUL CONDITIONS.

THE DISTINGUISHED AMBASSADOR OF INDIA FURTHER PROPOSED THAT THIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD ALSO ENSURE THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. I AM NOT SURE THAT THIS TASK MIGHT NOT BE ENTRUSTED TO SOME OTHER REPRESENTATIVE OR TEAM OR ORGANISATION BUT, AS I HAVE SAID ALREADY, THERE SHOULD CERTAINLY BE NO DELAY.

I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD GO FURTHER AND BE CONSIDERING THE APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR WHO CAN AT ONCE UNDERTAKE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED SO THAT AN IMMEDIATE START CAN BE MADE IN SETTING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE.

IT IS ON THESE PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS THAT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE. MOREOVER IT IS MY CONVICTION THAT EVERY MEMBER OF THIS COUNCIL KNOWS VERY WELL THAT IT IS ONLY BY SUCH PRACTICAL ACTION THAT REAL ADVANCE CAN BE MADE.

ENDS.

2...RESIDENT CLERK PASS TO URE AT 7.30 A.M.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS FLASH TO LUXEMBURG NO 6.
LORD CARADON

SENT Ø412Z 14.6.67

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FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1349 13 JUNE 1967
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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1349 OF 13 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO LUXEMBOURG WASHINGTON PARIS OTTAWA AND COPENHAGEN.

MYTEL 1335:
REVISED SOVIET RESOLUTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST.
IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL GET MORE THAN SIX VOTES FOR THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION (U S S R, BULGARIA, INDIA, MALI, AND POSSIBLY ETHIOPIA AND NIGERIA).
2...I PRESUME THAT YOU WOULD WISH ME TO ABSTAIN. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION OF THIS BY 9.ØØ A.M. NEW YORK TIME WEDNESDAY MORNING.
3...RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE PASS TO URE 7.3Ø A.M.
F O PASS FLASH LUXEMBOURG 7, IMMEDIATE PARIS 166 AND ROUTINE COPENHAGEN 9Ø.
LORD CARADON.

SENT Ø42ØZ 14.6.67
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CYPHER CAT A
FLASH FROM UKMISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1350 DATED 13 JUNE, 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1350 OF 13 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO LUXEMBOURG, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV, OTTAWA AND COPENHAGEN.

MY TELEGRAM NO 1332: MIDDLE EAST.

IN ADDITION TO WRITING TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CALLING FOR THE IMMEDIATE CONVENING OF AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE MIDDLE EAST, THE RUSSIANS AT THE SAME TIME DEMANDED A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS AFTERNOON TO CONSIDER ''THE CESSATION OF MILITARY ACTION BY ISRAEL'' AND THE ''WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES FROM THOSE PARTS OF THE TERRITORY OF THE UAR, JORDAN AND SYRIA SEIZED AS A RESULT OF AGGRESSION''. WITH THEIR LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THEY ENCLOSED A REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MY TELEGRAM NO 1335). THESE DOCUMENTS WERE ONLY AVAILABLE JUST BEFORE THE COUNCIL MEETING.

2. THE OBVIOUS SOVIET AIM SEEMED TO BE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS DEADLOCKED ON THE ISRAEL-ARAB ISSUE AND THUS PROVIDE A PRETEXT FOR THEIR CALL FOR AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION. THERE WAS FURTHER APPARENT EVIDENCE OF THIS WHEN FEDERENKO (USSR) IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT IN THE COUNCIL, DEMANDED A VOTE ON HIS RESOLUTION TODAY. IN THE EVENT HE FAILED TO ACHIEVE A VOTE TODAY SINCE A MOTION TO ADJOURN WHICH I PUT TO THE COUNCIL AT ABOUT 9.00 P M WAS CARRIED BY 10 VOTES TO 3. FEDERENKO IMMEDIATELY DEMANDED ANOTHER MEETING WITHIN AN HOUR, BUT IT WAS EVENTUALLY INFORMALLY AGREED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD RECONVENE ONLY TO HEAR THE SPEAKERS APPEARING ON THE LIST AND WOULD NOT VOTE TONIGHT. THE COUNCIL ADJOURNED BEFORE MIDNIGHT.

/3. THE RUSSIANS

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3. THE RUSSIANS, IN THEIR LETTER TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CALLING FOR AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY, WERE VERY VAGUE ON THE PROCEDURE UNDER WHICH THEY WISH THE ASSEMBLY TO BE CALLED. THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION CAN BE CALLED IN 24 HOURS IS UNDER THE ''UNITING FOR PEACE'' PROCEDURE WHICH THEY HAVE THEMSELVES STRONGLY OPPOSED IN THE PAST AND THEY WERE CAREFUL NOT TO REFER TO IT IN THEIR LETTER. THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO RELY IN TERMS ON THE ''UNITING FOR PEACE'' PROCEDURE FACED THEM WITH THE DILEMMA THAT SPECIAL SESSIONS CAN NORMALLY ONLY BE CALLED UNDER RULE 10 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AFTER TEN DAYS' NOTICE.

4. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS SO FAR TAKEN NO ACTION ON THE SOVIET LETTER BEYOND CIRCULATING IT AS AN ASSEMBLY DOCUMENT. HE HAS TOLD THE RUSSIANS THAT HE WILL NOT CONSULT THE GENERAL MEMBERSHIP TO SEE WHETHER A MAJORITY AGREE TO THE SOVIET REQUEST UNTIL THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEEN PRESSED TO A VOTE AND HAS FAILED EITHER BECAUSE OF A VETO OR BECAUSE IT HAS NOT ACHIEVED THE REQUIRED MAJORITY. IF THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION IS PUT TO THE VOTE TOMORROW AND FAILS OF ADOPTION FOR EITHER OF THESE REASONS, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL IMMEDIATELY CONSULT THE GENERAL MEMBERSHIP ON THE SOVIET REQUEST FOR AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

5. THE RUSSIANS HAVE NO DOUBT CALCULATED THAT THEY HAVE LITTLE HOPE OF GETTING THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL ANY RESOLUTION WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY ENDORSES THE ARAB COMPLAINT OF AGGRESSION BY ISRAEL. THEY BELIEVE THAT ANY RESOLUTION FOR WHICH THEY COULD OBTAIN NINE VOTES WOULD HAVE TO HAVE IN IT CONSIDERABLE SUBSTANCE WHICH WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS. THEY HAVE THEREFORE DECIDED TO TRY TO SHIFT THE SCENE TO THE ASSEMBLY WHERE THEY MAY HOPE THAT THE ARABS WILL BE ABLE TO DRUM UP A RESPECTABLE NUMBER OF VOTES FOR A RESOLUTION ENDORSING THE ARAB CASE. THE REFERENCE IN GROMYKO'S LETTER TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WHICH REFERS TO THE SOVIET INTENTION TO SEND A DELEGATION ''INCLUDING LEADING STATESMEN'' TO THE SPECIAL SESSION SUGGESTS THAT THEY PLAN TO MAKE THE SESSION A FORUM FOR A MASSIVE SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORT IN FAVOUR OF THE ARABS.

5. NONE

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UKMISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1350 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

[yic]
5. NONE OF THIS DEMONSTRATES ANY INTEREST ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION IN ENGAGING IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION, AT LEAST HERE, IN A SEARCH FOR A REASONABLE SOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM, AND IT LOOKS AS THOUGH WE ARE IN FOR SOME WEEKS OF PRETTY NOISY AND VIOLENT DEBATE.

6. ALL THIS MAKES IT THE MORE IMPORTANT FOR US TO GET SOME STATEMENT OF OUR POLICY ON THE RECORD BEFORE THE SOVIET RESOLUTION IS VOTED ON IN THE COUNCIL. BY DOING SO WE SHALL BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE ARE CONSTRUCTIVE COURSES OF ACTION WHICH THE COUNC'L COULD PURSUE AND THUS HELP TO SHOW THE SOVIET MOVE FOR WHAT IT IS - A CYNICAL GAMBIT TO ALLOW THEM TO MAKE PROPGANDA TO PLEASE THE ARABS.

7. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE PASS TO URE AT 7.30 A M.
FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS FLASH TO LUXEMBOURG NO 8 IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW ,9 164, PARIS NO 167, ROUTINE TO TEL AVIV NO 176 AND COPENHAGEN NO 91.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0507Z 14.6.67
RECD 0507Z 14.6.67

[REPETITION TO TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NO.1352.
CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
13 JUNE 1967.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1352 OF 13 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TOO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN, RIO DE JANEIRO, BUENOS AIRES, ADDIS ABABA, NEW DELHI, TOKYO AND SAVING TO AMMAN, JEDDA AND BEIRUT.

MY TELNO. 1340: MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE.
WHEN THE COUNCIL HAD REASSEMBLED AFTER A BRIEF RECESS STATEMENTS WERE MADE ALONG ESTABLISHED LINES BY TARABANOV (BULGARIA) AND EL KONY (UAR).
2. FEDORENKO (USSR) THEN SPOKE AGAIN TO REPLY TO GOLDBERG. THE U.S. HAD REFUSED TO SUPPORT A DEMAND FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES AMD IT WAS THIS WHICH HAD CAUSED THE INITIAL DELAY IN OBTAINING AGREEMENT ON A CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION. THEY HAD ALSO SOUGHT TO MAKE WITHDRAWAL PART OF A PACKAGE DEAL AND WERE THEREBY ENCOURAGING AGGRESSION. THE COUNCIL SHOULD CONCLUDE ITS WORK TODAY AND VOTE UPON THE SOVIET RESOLUTION.
3. I THEN PROPOSED AN ADJOURNMENT UNTIL TOMORROW TO GIVE REPRESENTATIVES TIME TO CONSIDER THE REVISED SOVIET TEXT AND TO CONSULT THEIR GOVERNMENTS. THIS WAS CARRIED BY A VOTE BY 10 IN FAVOUR 3 AGAINST (USSR, BULGARIA AND MALI) AND 2 ABSTENTIONS(INDIA AND NIGERIA). HOWEVER, AFTER INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OUTSIDE THE COUNCIL IT WAS AGREED TO HEAR REMAINING SPEAKERS ON THE LIST AT ONCE AND THEN ADJOURN AGAIN WITHOUT VOTING ON ANY RESOLUTIONS.
4. THE COUNCIL THEN MET AGAIN AT 10.00 P.M. TOMEH (SYRIA) MADE A SPEECH ON PREDICTABLE LINES. THE U.N. WAS NOW A POWERLESS ONLOOKER OF AGRESSION WHICH WAS ENDORSED BY U.S. POLICY.

/5.

5. IGNATIEFF (CANADA) SAID THAT HIS COUNTRY WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE COUNCIL PROCEED IN STAGES. THAT PROGRESS SHOULD INCLUDE
(I) ARRANGEMENTS FOR DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES:
(II) AN AGREED APPROACH TO THE ''HUMAN PROBLEM'' OF REFUGEES AND OTHERS WHO HAD SUFFERED IN THE WAR:
(III) UNDERSTANDINGS GUARANTEEING THE VITAL INTERESTS OF ALL MIDDLE EASTERN STATES.
HE SAID THAT ANY PROPOSAL WHICH DEALT IN A BALANCED FASHION WITH THESE POINTS WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY CANADA. FURTHERMORE, HIS GOVERNMENT WANTED TO SEE A SUITABLY QUALIFIED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SENT TO THE AREA TO REPORT BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. SUCH AN EMISSARY WOULD COMPLEMENT THE GOOD WORK BEING DONE BY UNTSO ON THE GROUND. IGNATIEFF ENDED WITH A PLEA THAT THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL SHOULD CONCERT THEIR ACTIONS AND COOPERATE TO FIND POSITIVE SOLUTIONS. IT WAS IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS THAT HIS DELEGATION WOULD VOTE ON THE REVISED SOVIET DRAFT RESLOTION.
6. EL FARRA (JORDAN) REPEATED POINTS MADE IN HIS EARLIER STATEMENT INA RIGHT OF REPLY SPEECH TO GOLDBERG (U.S.). KEITA (MALI) SAID THAT THE LEAST THE COUNCIL COULD DO WAS TO VOTE UNANIMOUSLY FOR THE REVISED SOVIET DRAFT, AND DEMANDED THAT IT SHOULD BE PUT TO THE VOTE AT ONCE. GOLDBERG (U.S.) THEN REPLIED TO POINTS MADE BY FEDORENKO (USSR) EL KONY (UAR) AND OTHER ARAB SPEAKERS.

/7.

7. THE COUNCIL ADJOURNED UNTIL 11.ØØ AM TOMORROW.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE PARIS 168, MOSCOW 165, TEL AVIV 178.
ROUTINE TO COPENHAGEN 92, RIO DE JANEIRO 41, BUENOS AIRES 35,
ADDIS ABABA 33, NEW DELHI 49, TOKYO 35 AND SAVING TO AMMAN 65,
JEDDA 44 AND BEIRUT 61.
LORD CARADON

SENT Ø519Z 14 JUNE 1967.
RECD Ø520Z 14 JUNE 1967.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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PRIORITY COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO NEW DELHI

TELNO 1301 13 JUNE 1967 (SAD)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO NEW DELHI TELNO 1301 OF 13 JUNE RFI RAWALPINDI 700.

MIFT CONTAINS TEXT OF LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER FROM MRS GANDHI, TRANSMITTED BY HIGH COMMISSION ON 11 JUNE.

2. IT IS NOT CLEAR TO US WHAT THIS SOMEWHAT PLATITUDINOUS DOCUMENT IS MEANT TO ACHIEVE. SUBJECT TO YOUR COMMENTS, AND TO VIEWS OF FOREIGN OFFICE WHOM WE HAVE NOT YET CONSULTED, WE PROPOSE TO RECOMMEND SIMILARLY GENERALISED REPLY ON FOLLOWING LINES:-

(A) WE SHARE INDIAN CONCERN AND ARE DEEPLY ANXIOUS ABOUT THE FUTURE.

(B) THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN EXERTED IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND WE HAVE USED OUR INFLUENCE BOTH PUBLICLY AND IN PRIVATE TO URGE RESTRAINT ON ALL CONCERNED.

(C) OUR DIPLOMATIC CONSULTATIONS BEFORE HOSTILITIES BROKE OUT WERE MISREPRESENTED AS BEING PRO-ISRAEL WHEREAS OUR CHIEF CONCERN WAS TO AVOID WAR AND THE TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES.

(D) SINCE FIGHTING STARTED WE HAVE GIVEN FULL SUPPORT TO SECURITY COUNCIL EFFORTS TO END THE CONFLICT. WE SHALL GIVE WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT TO EFFORTS OF U.N. AND ITS REPRESENTATIVES IN THE AREA TO MAINTAIN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CEASE FIRE AND SHALL NOT HESITATE TO CONDEMN ANY VIOLATIONS OF IT.

(E) IT IS NOT YET AT ALL CLEAR HOW THE U.N. SHOULD PROCEED IN SEEKING LASTING PEACE AND MANY WEEKS OF ANXIOUS CONSULTATION LIE AHEAD. IT IS OUR HOPE HOWEVER THAT OUT OF THE SUFFERING AND STRIFE SOME NEW DURABLE SETTLEMENT MAY BE ACHIEVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES.

(F) ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN AT PAINS TO MAINTAIN TOTAL NEUTRALITY THROUGHOUT, NASSER'S BIG LIE HAS ALREADY DONE GREAT DAMAGE IN EXACERBATING THE ALREADY EXPLOSIVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND WE HOPE THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT WILL DO WHAT THEY CAN TO COUNTER THIS AND OTHER MALICIOUS STORIES.

CROSEC SENT 0258Z 14 JUNE 1967

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IMMEDIATE JEDDA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 404 13 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Middle East situation Anglo/Saudi relations.

I called on Umar Saqqaf Permanent Under-Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs today at my request owing to extreme pressure of work he could g ve me only a short time but hoped to have a longer discussion later

2 I asked to know Saudi Arabia s present position and then look at Britain s position in Saudi Arabia and her future.

3 Saqqaf said that Saudi Arabia s position in the present conflict has been of conforming to the uniform joint Arab support against the Israeli aggression and this was still her position. She has had friendship and good relations with the United Kingdom and the United States and wants this to continue but her doing so has placed her in a difficult position and subjected her to much Arab criticism because of United Kingdom/United States support of Israel particularly during the present crisis. He affirmed that "we" (meaning the Saudi Government) did not believe the story of British intervention but it is widely believed in the Arab world and in Saudi Arabia and the British attitude throughout the crisis has been on the side of Israel particularly noticeable has been our failure to condemn Israel as an aggressor a fact which is beyond dispute Nor has there been any other sign yet from Britain since the crisis began of support or help to or concern for the Arab world whereas all that we have done and said has seemed to the Arabs to lend support to Israel.

4 Despite this. Saudi Arabia has maintained her relations with us and not asked for the recall of the Ambassador at a time when so many others were breaking and she was subject to criticism on this account Saudi Arabia and Britain were friends and she wished to continue her friendly relationship with us and therefore looked to us for some sign of reciprocation and one which would help her in maintaining these relations in face of Arab criticisms. We could best do this by early condemnation of Israel as the aggressor: this was essential and justified. We should not call on the Arabs to accept humiliating conditions which they could not do such as recognising Israel and "coming to terms with Israel" and direct negotiations (In this context he quoted recent statements by the Prime Minister and Mr. Heath who had advocated these points.) If the peace settlement should be handled through an intermediary body i.e. the United Nations we should insist on Israel withdrawing to her previous frontiers. Achieving this would have the greatest possible effect in restoring our position. Also it was of cardinal importance not to let Israel retain possession of the new land she had now seized since this would confirm her in her policy that aggression pays and would encourage her even more towards the future aggression she undoubtedly contemplates. Other settlement terms could include some of those which had been suggested by Britain

/e.g

Jedda telegram No 404 to Foreign Office

a United Nations force on the borders separating both sides a settlement of the refugees (in Palestine as well as the return of those from the current conflict) and internationalisation of Jerusalem We must realise however. that the Arabs can never recognise Israel and that she will always be regarded as their enemy. He admitted that the Arabs had suffered a heavey defeat but even in their defeat they could not be forced to give this recognition.

5. In the short time available I recapitulated our position of not taking sides, non intervention during the hostilities endeavours to prevent the conflict starting. working for a solution through the United Nations and peace negotiations I strongly reaffirmed our wish and intention to continue to have good and friendly relations with Saudi Arabia as before and it was to reassure him on this point and to see how best our good relations could continue that had been the primary purpose of my meeting. I also expressed gratification at Saud Arabia s continued maintenance of relations and at all the courtesies and protection which we had received during the recent time of strain.

6 Saqqaf concluded by asking that I should convey as a formal request from his Government to my Government that Britain should now condemn Israel for her undoubted aggression and should ensure in the peace settlement that Israel was made to revert to her previous boundaries These were the two points of overriding importance If we could do this soon we could best and firmly restore our position in Saudi Arabia and the Arab world and the trust of the Arabs in us He pointed also to the danger of Russia who had suffered a severe reverse by her failure to support the Arabs If we now leave it to Russia to lead the way [gp. undec] peace settlement to exact terms against Israel she will re establish her former position and thus the Communist presence will revert even more strongly in the Arab world We must stop this in all our interests and should take the initiative ourselves

7 I am reporting separately on the oil situation but Saqqaf agreed that even if as is likely the ban on oil exports to Britain (and the United States) is finally confirmed it would be a gesture which Saudi Arabia felt obliged to take in conformity with Arab solidarity and would not affect diplomatic relations between us I pointed that the effect of a ban would be to class Britain as an aggressor since the Government announcement had been that the ban would be imposed on aggressors but this was not our position and we had not taken sides and could not therefore be an aggressor. Saqqaf admitted this but said that Saudi Arabia had to make some kind of gesture towards Arab unity at this difficult time and a gesture like this was unavoidable In reply to my question he implied agreement that when the situation settled down the ban would be withdrawn.

Mr. Cranston

Sent 1315Z 13 June
Recd 1952Z 13 June

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MR. COOK (2)

(32)

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F L A S H MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1030

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

DATED 13 JUNE 1977

RESTRICTED.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 1030 OF 13 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON AND PARIS.

MY TEL NO. 1027: MIDDLE EAST/GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

IT EMERGED AT COMMONWEALTH AMBASSADORIAL MEETING THIS MORNING, THAT ALL COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES EXCEPT FOR AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND OURSELVES WERE SUMMONED.

2. SO, ACCORDING TO INDIAN AMBASSADOR, AND CONTRARY TO INDICATIONS GIVEN YESTERDAY BY FRENCH EMBASSY, WERE THE FRENCH.

3. AFRICAN MEMBERS WERE PARTICULARILY FORTHCOMING, AND STATED FIRMLY THAT THEY HAD BEEN ASKED TO SUPPORT THE CALL FOR A GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION: THAT THE SOVIETS HAD STATED THEIR PURPOSE AS BEING TO GET THE QUOTE AGRESSOR UNQUOTE TO WITHDRAW BEHIND THE LINES HELD AS OF 4 JUNE: AND THAT THEY HAD MADE NO BONES ABOUT SAYING THAT THEY FAVOURED THE ASSEMBLY AS MORE LIKELY TO PRODUCE AN

LIKELY TO PRODUCE AN ANTI IMPERIALIST MAJORITY.

4. REFERENCE TO 4 JUNE POSITION WAS QUERIED BY INDIAN AMBASSADOR, WHO ASKED WHETHER SOVIETS HAD NOT SAID QUOTE ARMISTICE LINES UNQUOTE (WHICH PRESUMABLY THEY HAD IN THEIR APPROACH TO HIM). TANZANIAN, SUPPORTED BY HIS COLLEAGUES, WAS EMPHATIC THAT REFERENCE WAS SPECIFICALLY TO QUOTE 4 JUNE UNQUOTE.

5. DANISH AMBASSADOR, FOR HIS PART HAS TOLD ME THAT WHEN HE WAS SUMMONED REFERENCE WAS TO QUOTE TRUCE LINES UNQUOTE.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK 57, WASHINGTON 180 AND PRIORITY TO PARIS 53.

HARRISON

SENT AT 1320Z 13/6/67

RECD AT 1340Z 13/6/67

Cypher/Cat. A

IMMEDIATE JEDDA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 407 13 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No 407 of 13 June Repeated for information to Moscow Amman Bahrain Tunis Kuwait Beirut Tripoli Algiers Rabat Washington UKMission New York UKDel NATO and Tel Aviv

Your telegram No 108 to Amman: Soviet Intentions in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia is in an exceptional position in that she has never had relations with Soviet Russia or any other Communist country and has for long been the foremost Arab country in opposing Communism and any form of contact with the Soviet Union She has repeatedly warned Nasser and other heads of the danger of committing themselves to Russia. From the start of the present situation therefore she would not have looked to Russia for anything nor would have expected Russian help to the Arabs to the extent that other Arab countries probably did. She can therefore be expected to be pleased at this Russian setback.

2. Your paragraph 2(a) The standing of the Soviet Union amongst the Arabs must inevitably have been damaged by its failure to give physical support during the hostilities and seeming failure to give political support to the Arab cause overall. whereas formerly it had made itself out to be the leading protaganist on behalf of the Arabs It must weaken Arab confidence in the Soviet Union that at their time of greatest difficulty she appeared unable actively to help them. Nevertheless the feeling remains that during the crisis Russia stood out in support of the Arab cause, and was the one great power on the side of the Arabs whereas Western powers symbolised by the United States and Britain were regarded as the supporters of Israel For their defeat it seems from here the Arabs tend to blame their military weakness and unexpected Israeli strength and surprise aggression and the in their view active support given to Israel by the United States and Britain namely support over the Tiran Straits issue prior to hostilities, alleged air support, secret assurances of support prior to hostilities, and their consistent support of Israel since its foundation The emphasis of blame will therefore, be on the West rather than on Russia.

3. Your paragraph 2(b) Although Nasser probably feels he has been let down by the Soviet Union he could not admit to this publicly and is likely to look to the Soviet Union since he needs material support and there is no other to turn to A change in this position now would be a public admission that he had been wrong in the past in looking to the Soviet Union. His personal position in the Arab world at present has probably been strengthened and by his act of resignation and restoration at the call of the people, since it has created a seemingly widespread emotional appeal well

/beyond

beyond Egypt which temporarily obscures many aspects of his failure. He is likely to thrive on this rather than on the extent of Russian support in the immediate future. But if Nasser is disillusioned with Russia there could perhaps be a chance that he would seek through France to get some source of aid and support which would not leave him completely dependant on the Soviet Union.

4. Your paragraph 2(c). Despite disillusionment the Arabs will still look upon Russia as the one major power who stood on their side whilst the West in their view supported their enemy. In these circumstances she could quickly restore her position and influence if she takes a strong anti-Israeli line in the peace settlement.

F.O. pass Priority Moscow 1, Routine Amman 36, Tunis 2, Beirut 114, Tripoli 7, Algiers 1, Rabat 3, Washington 64, UKMission New York 28, UKDel NATO 1. and Tel Aviv 6.

Mr. Cranston

Sent 1630Z/13 June 1967
Recd 2155Z/13 June 1967

[Repetition to Moscow, Amman, Tunis, Beirut, Tripoli, Algiers and Tel Aviv referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts]

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U.N. Dept.

SSSSS

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

TELNO. 1001 13 JUNE, 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO 1001 OF 13 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, JEDDA, TRIPOLI, KHARTOUM, BENGHAZI.

MY TELEGRAM NO 2830 TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL.

2. YOU SHOULD SEE MR. EBAN URGENTLY AND SPEAK ON THE FOLLOWING LINES.

3. YOU SHOULD SAY WE ARE RELIEVED THAT MR. ESHKOL HAS NOT (ACCORDING TO THE SUMMARY IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 578) SPECIFICALLY ENDORSED THE STATEMENTS BEING ATTRIBUTED TO GENERAL DAYAN ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL. WE HAVE FULL SYMPATHY WITH ISRAEL'S CLAIM TO LIVE AT PEACE AND HER DEMAND THAT HER RIGHT TO DO SO SHOULD BE ACKNOWLEDGED BY HER NEIGHBOURS. WE HAVE NOT HESITATED TO EXPRESS THIS SYMPATHY PUBLICLY AND TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH IT IN SPITE OF THE HEAVY COST TO OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD. WE CANNOT AT THE SAME TIME DENY THE RIGHT OF OTHER COUNTRIES TO EXIST, HOWEVER MISGUIDED THEIR POLICIES MAY HAVE BEEN, AND WE CAN NO MORE ACKNOWLEDGE THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO DISMEMBER A FELLOW-MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS THAN WE COULD ACKNOWLEDGE THEIR RIGHT TO DESTROY ISRAEL. WHEN MR. EBAN WAS HERE IN FEBRUARY HE SPOKE TO US ABOUT THE NEED TO RESPECT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF ALL COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE CANNOT INTERPRET THIS AS APPLYING ONLY TO THE TERRITORY OF ISRAEL.

4. WE ARE PARTICULARLY DISTURBED BY REPORTS PUBLISHED IN TODAY'S PRESS THAT THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF THE WEST BANK TERRITORIES HAS ANNOUNCED THAT ANYONE WISHING TO CROSS OVER TO JORDAN WILL BE ALLOWED TO DO SO AND THAT NO PROOF OF IDENTITY WILL BE REQUIRED FROM THOSE WANTING TO GO. IN THE LIGHT OF PAST HISTORY THIS CAN ONLY BE INTERPRETED AS PRESSURE ON THE ARAB POPULATION TO LEAVE. THE HOPES FOR ANY ENDURING SETTLEMENT WILL DEPEND TO A LARGE EXTENT ON ISRAEL'S ACTIONS NOW. THE GENEROUS AND HUMANE TREATMENT OF THE

/ARAB

ARAB POPULATION IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS COULD CONTRIBUTE TO A BREAKING-DOWN OF THE BARRIERS OF HATRED AND HOPES OF A RECONCILIATION AT SOME DATE, HOWEVER REMOTE. THE CREATION BY ISRAEL OF A NEW REFUGEE PROBLEM, IN DEFIANCE OF WORLD OPINION, AND THE HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE PART OF THE JEWISH HERITAGE, WOULD BE THE WORST POSSIBLE AUGURYGM THE ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE IN THIS COUNTRY, WHICH HAS BEEN OVERWHELMINGLY SYMPATHETIC TOWARDS ISRAEL IN HER RECENT TROUBLES COULD QUICKLY CHANGE AND INDEED THERE ARE SIGNS ALREADY THAT THIS IS HAPPENING.

5. YOU SHOULD ALSO URGE THE ISRAELIS TO PERMIT GENERAL BULL AND HIS STAFF TO RETURN TO THEIR HEADQUARTERS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT .

6. WOULD LORD CARADON, AT HIS DISCRETION, PLEASE TALK ON SIMILAR LINES TO RAPHAEL.

SOSFA

SENT 1706Z 13 JUNE

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Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY ALGIERS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 178 13 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 178 of 13 June
Repeated for information Routine to Rabat and Moscow and Saving to Tunis, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Amman, Jedda, Beirut, Paris UKDel NATO and Washington

Your telegram No. 131.

Following is my (regrettably delayed) assessment of Algerian intentions.

2. The Algerian leaders are still in a state of exaltation. They probably view the situation something like this.

3. First the background, the United States is the arch-enemy the United Kingdom an accessory. Israel is the armed camp we maintain from which to strike the Arabs down whenever our interests are threatened. The latest aggression was launched by our Israeli agents because of the recent successes of the revolutionary cause. The U.A.R. was overwhelmed by surprise and superior forces before help could arrive. The Soviet Union despite explicit or implicit promises could not or would not intervene.

4. Secondly the new situation. This contains important new elements:

(a) The Arab Nation is now united round the banners of the Revolutionaries. The U.A.R. has lost a battle. But the fight is a world-wide one and Algeria recognises her responsibilities. She will not shirk them. She has the strongest Army in the Arab world and is admired by all for her heroic achievements.

(b) Despite the military set-back a massive blow has been dealt at United States influence and interests. United Kingdom interests have been even more severely damaged and the Arab Nation now has it in its power to strangle Britain's economy.

(c) The performance of friends of the Arab Nation has been a grave disappointment. Only the attitude of the Chinese has been beyond reproach. The Soviet Union now owes the Arabs a debt that must be discharged. The French attitude was also unsatisfactory. This cannot be admitted in

/public

public because the France of de Gaulle is Algeria's anchor in troubled seas. But France must be made to pay for her covert help to Israel and her anti-Arab bias.

(d) Algeria's economic policies have amply justified themselves. In particular she is the only Arab State left with an uninterrupted market for her oil.

In short the Algerians have almost certainly persuaded themselves that what looks to us like a disaster, was, for the third world, for the Arab Nation as a whole, and for Algeria in particular, a purification from which they have emerged all the stronger. It is important to bear in mind the world-wide nature of the struggle as they see it: Palestine is only one battlefield.

5. A less optimistic but not necessarily more realistic view will begin to emerge when the Arab Coalition starts to break up and when the Government has to turn its attention once more to the home front. (The Bill for the last few days will be heavy. The 5% tax is already causing grumbling). The sobering-up process will no doubt start in Moscow where hard bargaining must be in progress. But major modifications in the Algerian viewpoint cannot be expected for a long time. Boumedienne is above all obstinate.

6. If this analysis is correct the regime's aims reduced to their simplest expression will be:-

(a) To keep a tight grip on the internal situation (trying to satisfy on the one hand the hotheads who call for a holy war and on the other the masses who have had enough of sacrifices):

(b) To hold the Arabs together round the revolutionary banner:

(c) To consolidate Algeria's claims to leadership of the Arab world and consequently to play a major role in the third world as a whole (shades of Ben Bella).

7. In pursuing these aims they will need above all to secure maximum Soviet help: immediately on the diplomatic and military front in order to deprive Israel of the fruits of victory: but no less in the long-term provision of economic and other aid. This could take various forms including e.g. the cession to Algeria of potential markets for Soviet gas.

8. Algeria will also want to inflict maximum damage on United Kingdom and United States interests partly because we are the real enemy partly because successes are needed for the sake of Arab morale and partly because Algeria has less to lose than almost everyone.

/9. Lastly

9. Lastly Algeria's armed forces. Her main concern now must be to keep them as far as possible intact and out of danger since they are the basis of her claim to leadership of the Arab world and the guarantee of her territorial integrity (against Morocco). I should therefore expect her to maintain as small a force as she can get away with in the U.A.R. and to reduce it to the merest token as soon as the cease-fire is confirmed. But:

(a) She may continue to shuttle troops to and fro for some time to come to keep up appearances:

(b) She will probably continue to send supplies and equipment to the U.A.R.: and

(c) She may just possibly attempt some small but spectacular operation e.g. a Commando raid or bombing attack. But I doubt it.

Foreign Office please pass Routine to Rabat 21, Moscow 3 and Saving to Tunis 7, Tripoli 3, Tel Aviv 5, Cairo 9, Amman 4, Jedda 3, Beirut 7, Paris UKDel NATO 2 and Washington 35.

Mr. Dawbarn

Sent 2140Z/13 June 1967

Recd 0020Z/14 June 1967

[Repetition to Moscow referred for Departmental decision repeated as requested to other posts]

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CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NO. 1330

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
13 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
FOLLOWING FOR GEORGE THOMSON.

MIDDLE EAST.

AS I TOLD PETER HAYMAN THIS MORNING I HAVE HAD SECOND THOUGHTS ON THE QUESTION OF CONTRIBUTION TO ASSIST IN RELIEF OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS.

2. THINKING FURTHER ABOUT THIS I SUGGEST THAT IT MAY BE BEST IN THE FIRST PLACE NOT TO MENTION FIGURES (WHICH MIGHT BE RIDICULED AS BEING HOPELESSLY INADEQUATE). I THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT OUR ANNOUNCEMENT MIGHT POSSIBLY BE SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF THE WORDING IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. MY SUGGESTION WOULD BE THAT I SHOULD SPEAK IN THIS SENSE EITHER ON THE RESOLUTION PUT FORWARD BY ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND ETHIOPIA OR IN THE COURSE OF MY NEXT GENERAL SPEECH IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

LORD CARADON

SENT 131505Z
RECD 131506Z

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1332 13 JUNE 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1326: MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL.

THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOW ASKED FOR A COUNCIL MEETING AT 3 P.M. THIS AFTERNOON.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 1558Z/13

RECD AT 1558Z/13

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EN CLAIR

ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NO 1336

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

13 JUNE 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

FORWARD'S LETTER KO/LATHAM RP. OF 6 JUNE TO BYATT:

LATHAM TRUST FUND.

THE SECRETARIAT BELIEVE THAT THE FORMALITIES OF SETTING UP THE TRUST SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN A FEW WEEKS. ON HEARING OF MRS. LATHAM'S PROBLEMS, THEY AGREED TO MAKE A FURTHER GRANT TO HER OF 500 DOLLARS TO COVER THE INTERVAL. THEY ARE TELEGRAPHING THE U N REPRESENTATIVE IN KAMPALA TO EFFECT PAYMENT.

DECLARATION.

SENT 2333Z 13.6.67

RECD 2333Z 13.6.67

F I L E S:

CONSULAR DEPARTMENT

IMS

ddddddd

Prime Minister.

The first of the summaries for which you asked. It draws both on accounts of the latest Sikorsky, on which please see the departmental note.

13/6

Synopis of Telegrams of 13 June on the Middle East situation

Israel

Mr. Eshkol, in a speech to the Knesset on 12 June (notable for its failure to endorse General Dayan's recent pronouncement that Israel would not give up territory it had gained) reiterated Israel's interest in direct negotiations with the Arab countries for a peace settlement.

2. Any imposition of economic sanctions against Israel by the Soviet bloc is likely to have only an insignificant effect since trade in both directions is negligible.

Jordan
Refugees

3. 100,000 refugees are now estimated to have arrived on the East Bank. Many are former inhabitants of the refugee camps on the West Bank. A Ministerial Committee has been set up to deal with the problem. Supplies of tents, blankets and food are urgently required. Her Majesty's Government are offering emergency aid (to the extent of £20,000). In addition medical supplies are required for treatment of war casualties.

King Hussein

4. With regard to the Anglo-American air cover story, King Hussein said that he had no interest in perpetuating a lie and that a full investigation was required. In general he had no very clear idea about the future.

Lebanon

5. The small minority of intelligent and well informed Lebanese of all religions seem to be increasingly discrediting the allegation of Anglo-American assistance to Israel. The

/Muslim

Muslim masses however continue to believe the story.

The Suez Canal

6. The Suez Canal remains closed to navigation, although it is not clear who was responsible for the sinking of the vessels which are reported to be blocking the waterway.

Tunisia

7. The Tunisian Foreign Minister, in taking delivery of the Prime Minister's Note to his father, President Bourguiba, said that the latter although continuing to do what he could about the 'big lie' would probably feel that he could make a public statement just now.

/not

Sudan

8. The Italian Government have agreed to look after U.K. interests in the Sudan.

Oil

9. Bahrain have reported that the Bahrain Petroleum Co. workers have returned to work but are refusing to load tankers. In Kuwait the strike continues but the Minister of Finance and Oil has told H.M. Ambassador that the Kuwait Government intend to take action to get the strikers back to work. H.M. Ambassador in Tripoli has reported that oil workers are reported to have decided to remain on strike for a week.

we have heard from company sources Kuwait field production has started again in Saudi Arabia, and tankers are loading for destinations other than UK & US.

United Nations

10. Security Council ~~barring~~ The Council, some emergency call for an earlier meeting, is now expected to meet next on 14 June.

Now out of date (see 11 below and separate note).

11. The Assembly

Reports that the Soviet Union intends to raise the Middle East question in the Assembly, by calling a Special

/Session

Session have been confirmed. This is no doubt primarily a propaganda move, but the full implications are not yet clear. It is not intended to oppose this move.

12. The U.K. Attitude in the United Nations

Lord Caradon is being authorised to support in general terms the principle of withdrawal from conquered territory while leaving the modalities for negotiation between the parties. He will seek to concentrate upon the strengthening of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation (UNTSO) and other forms of U.N. presence in the area as the next step, and to avoid taking up any position in which we can be accused of supporting the Israelis against the Arabs.

13. Urgent consideration is also being given to the possibility of Lord Caradon announcing in the United Nations the restoration of the cuts we made in 1966 and 1967 (totalling $1 million) in our contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) as an immediate measure of relief for the Arab refugees.

14. Negotiations for a settlement

Two things emerge clearly from the replies we have so far had to our circular telegrams about long term moves in the Middle East crisis:-

(a) it will be contrary to British interests to take a lead in moves which the Arabs will not like;

(b) we cannot avoid taking a position on a number of substantive questions, if only because of Russian pressure at the United Nations.

Israel 5

Document No. 6

Extract from **RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE AT BREAKFAST AT THE HOTEL CRAVAT, LUXEMBOURG, ON 14 JUNE, 1967**

Middle East

11. *Mr. Rusk* said that until Nasser closed the Tiran Straits the United States Government had had the impression of a debate between hawks and doves in Moscow, *e.g.*, on Viet-Nam. He wondered what effect the Middle East crisis would have had on this debate. Had the Russians expected the Arabs to take care of themselves?

Top copy on Foreign Policy Jun '67

12. *Mr. Brown* thought the hawks would say that the doves had been too soft. He could only guess but perhaps the Russians had thought that with Russian weapons the Arabs were bound to win and they themselves could stay out. He had arrived in Moscow the day the political crisis broke and had found M. Kosygin totally relaxed and giving the impression of being certain that the Arabs would win. M. Podgorny had said that there was already one war in South-East Asia and the Russians did not want another. He was sure the Russians did not believe that the West controlled Israel; nor were they relying on the West to do so, but they knew that they must use their own influence with the Arabs.

13. *Mr. Rusk* said that Nasser had told the United States Government that the withdrawal of UNEF by the Secretary-General had led to the blockade of Tiran, since the Egyptians could not allow ships for Israel to pass their own guns, whereas if U Thant had left the Swedes there this would not have happened. *M. Couve* suggested that this meant that Nasser had decided on a blockade without consulting Russia and that the crisis was, therefore, not of Russian making. *Mr. Rusk* thought the Russians had been closely involved up to the closing of the Straits.

Extract Record of a meeting between the For. Sec. of the U.S. from Secretary of State, [illegible]

Draft A5

Middle East

Mr. Rusk said that the State Department thought a special Assembly was inevitable, since the Russians would be successful in rallying the necessary 62 votes. As regards the advice to be given to the members of NATO who had been canvassed by the Russians, the two Secretaries of State agreed to recommend abstention.

2. Mr. Rusk hoped the special Assembly would not meet until next week, but *Mr. Brown* thought it was more likely to start this week-end.

3. *Mr. Rusk* interpreted the Russian statement about " eminent persons " attending the Assembly as meaning that M. Kosygin would be going to New York. The question would then arise whether President Johnson should attend the Assembly. There was no question of his participating in the Assembly debate as Leader of the United States delegation, and indeed it might underline the difference between the propaganda debate in New York and serious discussions in Washington if the President did not go to New York but instead invited M. Kosygin to Washington. On the other hand, the President might address the Assembly and he might be able to use this opportunity to underline that the Russians had called the Assembly for purely propaganda purposes. *Mr. Brown* thought that if M. Kosygin went to New York the Prime Minister would probably want to go.

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4. *Mr. Rusk* suggested that the Western Powers ought to develop urgently a positive resolution to table at the Assembly. This would set out, perhaps on the lines of the long resolution recently produced for the Security Council, our proposals for a long-term settlement. Though this might stand no chance of being adopted, it might help us to mobilise the necessary blocking one-third to defeat the Soviet resolution. The two Secretaries of State agreed that, if a resolution of this kind were to be produced, there was a need for a lot of homework and for constant and urgent consultation between Washington and London. It would be necessary to " peg the ground " carefully where we parted company from the Israelis.

5. Mr. Rusk said he had received reports that moderate Arabs were not convinced that Nasser would survive for long. If the West could sit tight for a time frictions would develop in the Arab world. He added that it looked as if Boumedienne had returned empty-handed from Moscow. Useful information about the state of Arab opinion should be obtained from the visit to Washington of the Moroccan Foreign Minister, who would be arriving shortly, as soon as the emissaries despatched by the King of Morocco to other Arab States had returned and reported.

Israel pt 5

Document No. 7

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE KIRCHBERG, LUXEMBOURG, AT 3.15 p.m. ON 14 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P
The Hon. Sir Con O'Neill
M. Couve de Murville
M. de Beaumarchais

The Middle East

M. Couve de Murville opened the discussion by saying he wanted to tell Mr. Brown that the French Government had decided to sign the document (this meant: agree to the Soviet proposal for summoning a Special Assembly).

2. *Mr. Brown* said he was sorry to hear this. He thought it was quite a logical decision, given the French position; but all the same he thought it was mistaken.

Top Copy on Foreign Policy Jun '67.

3. The conversation turned to the date of a possible Special Assembly. Mr. Brown said he thought it might take place as soon as next Monday. *M. Couve* said that in that event he would not go. He asked why Mr. Brown thought it so important that the major Western Powers should be represented at the top level.

4. *Mr. Brown* replied that if the Soviet Government intended to be represented at the top level at the Special Assembly, he thought the Western Powers should be represented in the same way.

5. *M. Couve* said that of course if there were a Special Assembly meeting the Russians would table the same resolution as in the Security Council. France would abstain on it, as they would in the Security Council. But there would be many abstentions; and he thought the Russians would probably get a sufficient majority because of the number of abstentions.

6. The Ministers then discussed Britain and the Common Market (see paragraphs 11–32 below), and reverted briefly at the end of their meeting to the Middle East on which *M. Couve* remarked that Mr. Rusk had asked him earlier in the day why he thought Mr. Brown was insisting so much on top level representation by the Western Powers at any Assembly meeting in New York. M. Couve said he had replied that he did not know, but would ask Mr. Brown. He had told Mr. Rusk that he wondered whether perhaps it might be because Mr. Brown was hoping to secure a Four-Power meeting in the course of a Special Assembly meeting. For his part, M. Couve did not think it likely that the Russians would be ready for such a meeting during the Special Assembly, though they might perhaps be ready for one later on.

7. *Mr. Brown* expressed surprise to hear that Mr. Rusk had been asking M. Couve why he (Mr. Brown) was pressing for high-level representation; and he indicated his understanding that the Americans for their part were contemplating high-level representation.

8. *M. Couve* asked whether that meant M. Kosygin might be going to New York. Anyway, he thought there would be a few weeks before the Assembly met.

9. *Mr. Brown* remarked that he hoped that he and the French Foreign Minister could keep closely in touch on Middle Eastern developments. After all, they had broadly the same interests; and if they did not operate together they would leave the field free for the giant Powers to operate alone.

10. *M. Couve* said that it was necessary to get the giant Powers operating, but not alone. He agreed with Mr. Brown that no important interests separated Britain and France in the Middle East, and that they should keep in touch.

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

Foreign Office
S.W.1

14 June, 1967

Dear Michael, 14/6

I promised you a note on the situation created by the Russians' request for an emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly to discuss the Middle East situation. It is clear that U Thant will take no action on the Russians' request until the Security Council have voted on the Soviet draft Resolution. This may be pressed to a vote this afternoon. U Thant will then take soundings of the general membership of the U.N. about the Soviet request. There will almost certainly be a majority of the Members in favour of the emergency special session, but U Thant may not call it immediately. The earliest the session could open would be Friday afternoon, (New York time), but it could equally be delayed until early next week.

The Soviet delegation will almost certainly not leave Moscow until the date for the opening of the special session has been fixed. As the special session has been called at their request their delegate will obviously be the first speaker.

We are unlikely to know the composition of the Soviet delegation until it actually leaves Moscow. We must therefore plan our own tactics on the basis of various hypotheses. We will have to bear in mind our Ministers' various committments.

The three hypothetical situations we will have to consider are:-

(a) if Kosygin leads the Soviet delegation and President Johnson or Rusk decide to address the session at some stage;

/(b)

A. M. Palliser, Esq., CMG.,
10 Downing Street.

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(b) if Gromyko leads the Soviet delegation and Rusk proposes to address the session at some stage, and

(c) if Kosygin or Gromyko lead the Soviet delegation and Goldberg is to speak for the Americans.

It is impossible to say at this stage how long the debate will last, but since this session is designed by the Russians as a propaganda exercise they can be expected to mobilise as many speakers as possible to condemn Israel and to call for complete withdrawals. None of the Arab delegations will be willing to forgo the opportunity for sounding off. The debate is therefore likely to last several days.

Yours ever,

Donald (Maitland)

This just letter to us!

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DRAFT RECORD OF

To:— CONVERSATION

Type 1 +

No. 10.

From

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

AND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY

BETWEEN THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE

RECORD OF MEETING OVER BREAKFAST AT HOTEL CRAVAT, LUXEMBOURG, AT 8.30 a.m. ON WEDNESDAY, 14 JUNE.

Present:

The Hon. Dean Rusk

~~Mr. Rusk~~

Mr. R. Bowie

The Rt. Hon. George Brown, M.P.

Lord Hood

The Viscount Hood

Middle East

Mr. Rusk said that the State Department thought a special Assembly was inevitable, since the Russians would be successful in rallying the necessary 62 votes. As regards the advice to be given to the members of NATO who had been canvassed by the Russians, the two Secretaries of State agreed to recommend abstention.

2. Mr. Rusk hoped the special Assembly would not meet until next week, but Mr. Brown thought it was more likely to start this weekend.

3. Mr. Rusk interpreted the Russian statement about "eminent persons" attending the Assembly as meaning that Mr. Kosygin would be going to New York. The question would then arise whether President Johnson should attend the Assembly. There was no question of his participating in the Assembly debate as Leader of the U.S. Delegation, and indeed it might underline the difference between the propaganda debate in New York and serious discussions in

/Washington...

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DO NOT WRITE IN THIS MARGIN

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Washington if the President did not go to New York but instead invited Mr. Kosygin to Washington. On the other hand, the President might address the Assembly and he might be able to use this opportunity to underline that the Russians had called the Assembly for purely propaganda purposes. Mr. Brown thought that if Mr. Kosygin went to New York the Prime Minister would probably want to go.

4. Mr. Rusk suggested that the Western powers ought to develop urgently a positive resolution to table at the Assembly. This would set out, perhaps on the lines of the long resolution recently produced for the Security Council, our proposals for a long-term settlement. Though this might stand no chance of being adopted, it might help us to mobilise the necessary blocking one-third to defeat the Soviet resolution. The two Secretaries of State agreed that, if a resolution of this kind were to be produced, there was a need for a lot of homework and for constant and urgent consultation between Washington and London. It would be necessary to "peg the ground" carefully where we parted company from the Israelis.

5. Mr. Rusk said he had received reports that moderate Arabs were not convinced that Nasser would survive for long. If the West could sit tight for a time frictions would develop in the Arab world. He added that it looked as if Boumedienne had returned empty-handed from Moscow. Useful information about the state of Arab opinion should be obtained from the visit to Washington of the Moroccan

/Foreign....

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Foreign Minister, who would be arriving shortly, as soon as the emissaries despatched by the King of Morocco to other Arab states had returned and reported.

U.K. and E.E.C.

6. Mr. Brown, in reply to a question, said he still hoped that there would be a meeting before the holidays, at which he could expound the British case. Herr Brandt had suggested the possibility of combining this with the next W.E.U. Ministerial meeting, but this might prove impractical. Mr. Rusk said he was encouraged by the way the attitude of the Five had strengthened since the summit meeting in Rome.

NATO Ministerial Meeting

7. Mr. Rusk said he did not wish to get involved in detailed discussion about the non-proliferation treaty. He proposed, therefore, simply to explain what the present position was and suggest that any further discussion should be conducted at the level of Permanent Representatives.

8. He also said that Mr. Martin, having been taken at his word about restricted discussions on Vietnam, now wanted to run out, so the restricted session did not look as though it would last very long.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

PRIME MINISTER for see

CONFIDENTIAL

The Middle East

The Foreign Secretary is coming to see you at 11 p.m.

I attach today's Foreign Office summary of the situation; and a note addressed particularly to the situation created by the Russian request for an emergency special session of the General Assembly.

F.O. LETTER 13.6.67. ON PT. 4.

I also attach (in the envelope), todays JIC special assessment; which paints a rather discouraging picture of Soviet arms deliveries.

RETURNED TO CABINET OFFICE.

As I dictate this, the news has come that the Soviet resolution has been defeated in the Security Council. This will presumably step up Soviet pressure for a special session. But I will try to have the latest news for you before you see the Foreign Secretary.

June 14, 1967

Private Secretary,
10 Downing Street.

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1

15 June, 1967

Middle East - 14 June, 1967

Round-Up

United Nations

Security Council resumed discussion this afternoon of the Russian motion to condemn Israel and demand precise withdrawals. It is probable that the Resolution will not carry and that the Russians will call for an emergency Assembly which will then have to take place. We shall have to consider our line and the level of our attendance; on the first, we have a little time; we are submitting separately on the second. Meantime, Lord Caradon will speak briefly in general support of withdrawals in principle.

Relations with Individual Arab Countries

2. So far, despite some heavy losses for the Ministry of Works, we have not survived too badly. Relations with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, the Gulf States, Libya, Tunis and Morocco remain unbroken. In Lebanon a threatened break developed into a withdrawal of Ambassadors. There is complete breakage with Syria and Iraq, and a breakage (but with some hope of repair) with Sudan. We are trying to "mend" the latter with the help of the Sudanese Ambassador who is remaining here.

/ Actions

Actions to help the Arabs.

3. We have meantime tried to find things to do and say (the latter is not unimportant) to encourage the Arabs to realise that we remain friendly to them, e.g. medical relief for Jordan (the Jordanians have accepted a gift of blankets and tents worth up to £20,000, although the Syrians have not yet given clearance for them to be flown in), a contribution to the UNRWA (on which we are in urgent touch with the Treasury and ODM); removal of discouragement to tourists from visiting Tunis (see paragraph 12 below), representations to Israel on their treatment of refugees (and of Egyptians in the Sinai Desert). We are trying to think of further possible actions of this kind.

Oil.

4. The situation is slightly improved in that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have resumed the pumping and shipping of oil, but still officially exclude the United States and the United Kingdom as destinations. There is still a stoppage in Libya.

5. In the OECD Oil Committee proceedings failed to reach any decision owing to a French filibuster. But it may be advisable not to fight this too hard at the moment, since our only hope presently of freeing certain channels is to handle the matter quietly and privately.

/ Arms

Arms

6. There seems no immediate prospect of progress on this. There is evidence of the Russians sending in further arms to Iraq and Egypt and it would seem unlikely that the Russians are interested in limitation, at any rate until they have seen the effects of the present intensive propaganda exercise.

Propaganda

7. We have to accept that effective propaganda will operate slowly (e.g. Egyptian soldiers returning to Cairo may do something to modify Egyptian self-confidence). But we continue to be very active in looking for and plugging themes whether negatively (the "big lie" theme which we must go on and on with) or positively (the aid initiatives vis-à-vis the Arabs).

8. We have had some very frank discussion with the BBC which has brought our points of view about the use of the Overseas Service somewhat closer together, but they tend to be dogmatic to a less than practical degree about their independence and we are trying to work out with them some greater degree of "crisis guidance" which would help them to deal intelligently instead of unsystemically with situations of this kind.

/Handling

Handling in the Foreign Office.

9. Our existing experts are wholly taken up with operational work (briefing, speech-writing and answering telegrams) and we are putting extra people into the Department concerned to do some urgent work on two points:

(a) tactics and strategy for the immediate future; and,

(b) bringing up to date existing research papers on refugees, boundaries, etc.

10. Considerable long-term planning has been proceeding under the supervision of the Planning Staff, which is also being strengthened.

Evacuation.

11. Over 300 British subjects from Egypt, including Embassy staff, arrived in Cyprus this morning, and are being flown on to the United Kingdom by the RAF and by our chartered Britannias. As far as we know, there are none left who want to leave at present. The 300-odd British nationals from Amman are now back in this country. There have been no further demands for organised evacuation from other Middle East countries. We are therefore standing down the two Britannias which have been on call in Cyprus.

/12. In

12. In view of the assurances we have had from the Tunisian Government, we have agreed to withdraw our previous advice that tourists should not visit Tunisia. Tourists already there are being told that they may complete their holidays.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

14 June, 1967.

I thought you might like to see, for your personal information, a copy of a submission on the Middle East which I have prepared today for the Foreign Secretary's return from Luxembourg. I should add that the covering submission is in no sense an "agreed Office paper", and has not been cleared with Ministers here.

I am sending copies, on the same basis, to Joe Garner and to Michael Palliser.

(P.H. Gore-Booth)

Sir Burke Trend, K.C.B., C.V.O.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SECRETARY OF STATE

Middle East Round-Up

--- With this minute I attach a highly abbreviated round-up of the various aspects of the Middle East crisis as they stand to-day. Individual papers are being submitted separately on certain items, e.g. the UN position and oil.

2. Meantime there has been much in the way of policy advice from posts and policy suggestion from Departments. This is being gathered by the Planning section into further order, but in the meantime I put forward the following basic views on the situation which were, in general, concurred in by the Under-Secretaries' meeting this morning. The Israeli military victory and the failure of the Soviet Union to intervene to save the Egyptian forces has put the Russians on their mettle. They have got to do everything short of military involvement to "help" the Arabs and, within the Arab world, the so-called "revolutionary camp". It should be recalled in this connexion that the Soviet Union, having had some external setbacks over Indonesia, space, relations with China and a deadlock over Viet-Nam, is in need of a success to celebrate on the 50th Anniversary of the Communist Revolution.

/3. Against

3. Against the above background we would do best to conduct our affairs on the worst possible assessments, namely, that the UAR leadership is committed to doing its best to get Western influence and interests out of the Middle East. This has been said at intervals and is implicit in the actions not only of the UAR but also of, e.g. Syria and Algeria. This objective suits the Soviet Union, and the combination of the two will mean that neither will find themselves able to let up. I have no doubt, in addition, that Sir Richard Beaumont is right in thinking, as he telegraphed from Baghdad, that the object of the Iraq régime in breaking relations with us is really to destroy British influence and a liking for Britain in that country, which they fear to see persisting.

4. In this menacing situation we shall want in the immediate future, for obvious oil supply, financial and other reasons, to hang on in those countries which, although they may not say so loudly and explicitly, in fact would welcome this. We cannot however do this "at all costs". We have a public opinion here which will not stand, for instance, for the elimination of Israel. Unlike French public opinion ours is lively and insistent and would effectively limit HMG's ability, if that were the wish, to take a completely pro-Arab line.

/5. The

5. The principles, therefore, on which we will have to work can be roughly summarised as follows:

(a) we must, within the above limitations, do and say everything we can to encourage the friendly Arabs. Such activities include relief and refugee measures, and the considerable diplomatic activity in posts and in London over recent days. Our diplomacy also includes silence on certain subjects, e.g. probably the less said about oil for the moment the better.

(b) We must persist in the policy of trying to divide the Arabs. Our posts in the area advise this, while equally advising the avoidance of personal attacks on President Nasser, though this does not prevent us from persistently attacking "the big lie", the failure of UAR leadership, etc.

(c) We must, however, recognise that (a) and (b), particularly (a), are limited by Parliamentary and public opinion.

/6. In

6. In practical terms, what the above means is that we are going to be subjected to a very considerable test of nerves probably over the next few weeks, and there are propaganda battles which we shall not immediately win. But our opponents in this argument will have some difficulties and will tend to over-state their case, and this may give us opportunities to underline again that we are in favour not of tension and partisanship but of peace. We cannot draw up a blue-print of what we shall do in every conceivable contingency, but if we handle each successive event against the above analysis and tests, we may come through this one with a better survival of our interests than at the worst moments seems likely.

P H Gore-Booth

(P. H. Gore-Booth)
14 June, 1967

Copied to:

Mr. George Thomson
Sir Denis Allen
Mr. Rose
Mr. Brenchley
Planning Staff

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No. 10

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE KIRCHBERG, LUXEMBOURG, at 3.15 p.m. ON 14 JUNE

Present

THE RT HON. GEORGE
~~Mr.~~ Brown, MP ... M. Couve de Murville

Sir Con O'Neill M. de Beaumarchais

The Middle East

M. Couve de Murville opened the discussion by saying he wanted to tell Mr. Brown that the French Government had decided to sign the document (this ~~object~~ meant: agree to the Soviet proposal for summoning a Special Assembly).

2. Mr. Brown said he was sorry to hear this. He thought it was quite a logical decision, given the Frech position; but all the same he thought it was mistaken.

3. The conversation turned to the date of a possible Special Assembly. Mr. Brown said he thought it might take place as soon as next Monday. M. Couve ~~de Murville~~ said that in that event he would not go. He asked why Mr. Brown thought it so important that the major Western powers should be represented at the top level.

4. Mr. Brown replied that if the Soviet Government intended to be

/represented

W. 33009 Gp.853

represented at the top level at the ~~General~~ Special Assembly, he thought the Western powers should be represented in the same way.

5. M. Couve ~~de Murville~~ said that of course if there were a ~~General~~ Special Assembly meeting the Russians would table the same resolution as in the Security Council. France would abstain on it, as they would in the Security Council. But there would be many abstentions; and he thought the Russians would probably get a sufficient majority because of the number of abstentions.

6. The Ministers then discussed Britain and the Common Market (recorded separately), and reverted briefly at the end of their meeting to the Middle East on which M. Couve de Murville remarked that Mr. ~~Dean~~ Rusk had asked him earlier in the day why he thought Mr. Brown was insisting so much on top level representation by the Western powers at any Assembly meeting in New York. M. Couve ~~de Murville~~ said he had replied that he did not know, but would ask Mr. Brown. He had

/told

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told Mr. Rusk that he wondered whether perhaps it might be because Mr. Brown was hoping to secure a Four Power meeting in the course of a ~~General~~ Spaak Assembly meeting. For his part, M. Couve ~~de Murville~~ did not think it likely that the Russians would be ready for such a meeting during the ~~General~~ Spaak Assembly, though they might perhaps be ready for one later on.

7. Mr. Brown expressed surprise to hear that Mr. Rusk had been asking M. Couve ~~de Murville~~ why he (Mr. Brown) was pressing for ~~a~~ high level ~~meeting~~ representation; and he indicated his understanding that the Americans for their part were contemplating high level representation.

8. M. Couve ~~de Murville~~ asked whether that meant Mr. Kosygin might be going to New York. Anyway, he thought there would be a few weeks before the Assembly met.

9. Mr. Brown remarked that he hoped that he and the French Foreign Minister could keep closely in touch on Middle Eastern developments. After all, they had broadly the same interests; and if they

/did not

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did not operate together they would leave the field free for the giant powers to operate alone.

10. M. Couve ~~de Murville~~ said that it was necessary to get the giant powers operating, but not alone. He agreed with Mr. Brown that no important interests separated Britain and France in the Middle East, and that they should keep in touch.

4.1.15/6

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With the compliments of

SIR PAUL GORE-BOOTH

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

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C.O.

(23)

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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

MR. MOORE
HD. OF COMMUNICATIONS
~~MR. BRYANT B.O.T.~~
~~MR. SAMPSON MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT~~

Amman 665 IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 665

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

14 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO F O TEL NO 665 OF 14/6 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION

TO MOSCOW UKMIS NEW YORK WTON

ALLEGED ANGLO-AMERICAN AIR SUPPORT OF ISRAEL.

I TOLD KING HUSSEIN TODAY THAT YOU HAD BEEN INTERESTED TO HEAR THAT HE HAD ASKED THE RUSSIANS WHETHER THEY HAD ANY INFORMATION ON THIS, AND ASKED IF I MIGHT KNOW THE RESULT. HE SAID HE HAD PUT THE QUESTION TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR MORE THAN ONCE BUT SO FAR HAD RECEIVED NO REPLY,

2. THE KING SAID THAT ALL HE HAD RECEIVED WAS A REPORT FROM

4. THE KING SAID THAT ALL HE HAD RECEIVED WAS A REPORT FROM THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW THAT THE ARAB AMBASSADORS THERE H HAD BEEN BRIEFED BY THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES QUOTE AT AN EARLY UNQUOTE STAGE AND THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD THEN INDICATED THAT THE AMERICANS AND BRITISH WERE NOT REPEAT NOT INVOLVED. HE HAD INSTRUCTED HIS AMBASSADOR TO CHECK THIS WITH THE RUSSIAN BECAUSE HE WAS NOT CLEAR THAT WHAT WAS SAID AT THE BRIEFING WAS NECESSARILY THE WHOLE TRUTH. AGAIN HE WAS WAITING FOR THE REPLY.

5. I SAID I ASSUMED THAT THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR MUST HAVE BEEN PRESENT AT THE SOVIET BRIEFING AND THAT EGYPT MUST THEREFORE KNOW AS WELL AS THE REST OF US THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE THE STORY TO BE UNTRUE. I COMMENTED THAT IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT JORDAN HAD ALLOWED HERSELF TO BE A PARTY TO THIS PARTICULARLY DAMAGING PIECE OF PROPAGANDA AND SAID AGAIN THAT I FEARED FOR ANGLO-JORDANIAN RELATIONS UNTIL THE LIE WAS NAILED.

6. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE TOO ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO GETTING THE SOVIET EVIDENCE AND HE WOULD LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS HE HAD IT. FROM HERE IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE RUSSIANS WILL DRAG THEIR FEET TO ENSURE THAT THE LIE HAS MAXIMUM EFFECT.

7. WE ARE KEEPING UP PARALLEL PRESSURE ON THE JORDANIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

F O PASS IMMEDIATE MOSCOW N60, UKMIS NEW YORK 60, WTON 114

YYY

ADAMS

1543Z 14 JUNE 1967

1636Z 14 JUNE 1967

Private Secretary,
10 Downing Street.

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1

20 June, 1967

? file

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Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 601 14 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 601 of 14 June
Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Amman, Washington.

My telegrams Nos. 592, 593 and 596: Middle East.

I saw Mr. Eban in Jerusalem at 1415 hours GMT.

2. I said I presumed Mr. Lourie who was present had told him of my representations this morning. Mr. Eban said he was fully aware of the situation and he would like you to know that there was no Israeli policy to push out refugees. Quite the contrary, the Israel Government were very aware of the dangers if there were a further refugee flow. But both during and after the fighting there had been considerable panic on both sides of the Jordan and this had led to movements of population. Israel would now do everything to get the thing right. He hoped we would realise that the campaign against Jordan had not been anticipated and therefore the taking of Jerusalem and the West bank had not been anticipated. There was now some considerable chaos since the Israelis had had no plans and had certainly done no real thinking about the future. They had set up a group rather like the Washington group to work out new positions. Meanwhile, all he could say was that he was thinking in three phases:

(i) The consolidation of the cease-fire.
(ii) The bringing about of negotiations for peace, and
(iii) Of the formulation of positions to be taken at these negotiations.

He would be very grateful for an exchange of ideas with friendly Powers.

3. I asked him about the ideas he had given my United States colleague (my telegram No. 592, paragraph 5). He said that he had not given any firm statement about no annexation although he was sure that whatever the ultimate fate of the West bank it would not be absorption into Israel. The other ideas were just ones that were being kicked around. He could not at this stage speak for himself or the Government. What Israel desperately needed was time to think.

4. In the United Nations he hoped also that we could gain time and that there would be no precipitate United Nations action. He had been rather disturbed at the insistence in speeches from the United Kingdom to bring in the United Nations on every facet of

/the problem.

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the problem. If the United Nations were brought in on a problem it was not so much a question of seeing what good they would do as of having to try and prevent them from doing the maximum harm. For the present he hoped we would resist the Soviet resolution. This would merely be to turn the clock back to the situation of instability and undeclared hostilities of the last 20 years and put the Soviet [gp. undec.] Satellites back on top. An entirely new situation had been created in the Middle East which could be of considerable advantage to Israel's Western friends, and he hoped we would all not throw this opportunity away.

5. Although the United States draft was not entirely satisfactory and indeed was somewhat out of date, it was along the right lines and he hoped something like it could be pursued. But it was really our turn to try and spin out proceedings.

6. See my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office pass UKMIS New York 115, Amman 143, Washington 131.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1910Z/14 June
Received 2120Z/14 June

[Repetition to Amman referred for Departmental decision. Repeated as requested to other posts]

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CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY PARIS
TELEGRAM NO.601
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TO FOREIGN OFFICE
14 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.601 OF 14 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW AND LUXEMBOURG AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO AND UKDEL OECD.

MY TELEGRAM TO FOREIGN OFFICE NO.576: MIDDLE EAST.

IN THE LAST COUPLE OF DAYS WE HAVE HAD A NUMBER OF CONTACTS WITH THE FRENCH WHICH HAVE GIVEN US AN IDEA OF THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS MOST OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE IDEAL PACKAGE LISTED IN PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6 OF YOUR TELEGRAM TO MOSCOW NO.1629.

2. THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO THINK THAT THIS IS A TIME TO TAKE STOCK AND AVOID MAJOR INITIATIVES. LEBEL, DIRECTOR OF MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY, TOLD THE MINISTER ON 13 JUNE THAT THEY HAD CONSIDERED SUGGESTING TO THE ISRAELIS AN EARLY PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IN SINAI AS A GESTURE TO LOWER THE TEMPERATURE, BUT COUVE DECIDED AGAINST DOING THIS BECAUSE THE ISRAELI MOOD SEEMED TOO TOUGH. ONE THING WHICH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT DO INTEND IS TO SEND SUBSTANTIAL AID TO THE ARAB REFUGEES WHOSE PLIGHT, ACCORDING TO THEIR INFORMATION, IS DESPERATE.

3. LEBEL CONFIRMED THAT FRANCE WAS MAINTAINING AN ARMS EMBARGO EXCEPT FOR THE SUPPLY OF SPARE PARTS. THE EMBARGO, IF IT WAS MAINTAINED, WOULD BE SLIGHTLY MORE INCONVENIENT TO ISRAEL THAN TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES IN THE MONTHS AHEAD BUT THERE WAS NOT A GREAT DEAL IN IT, AND ISRAEL WAS NOT SHORT OF SUPPLIES. ACCORDING TO LEBEL, THE FRENCH THINK IT QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL DECIDE NOT TO REPLACE THE ARMAMENTS WHICH THE ARABS HAVE LOST AND

/TO

CONFIDENTIAL

TO SEND THEM ONLY TOKEN SHIPMENTS. WE HAVE NOT YET TOLD THE FRENCH THAT WE ARE TAKING THE LINE IN FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM TO WASHINGTON NO.6489.

4. THE ARAB AMBASSADORS HERE ARE VERY ACTIVE IN CANVASSING FRENCH DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT. THEY WANT FRANCE TO CONDEMN ISRAELI AGGRESSION BOTH IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND INDEPENDENTLY. THEY HAVE NOT VOICED ANY CRITICISM OF RUSSIAN TACTICS. THE MANIFESTATIONS OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR NASSER HAVE CONVINCED THE FRENCH THAT HE IS STILL A FORCE TO RECKON WITH IN MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS. THEY CONCEDE, HOWEVER, THAT HE MAY LOSE GROUND AS THE EXTENT OF THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY DISASTER BECOMES KNOWN TO THE MAN IN THE STREET. THE FRENCH ARE AT GREAT PAINS TO AVOID ANY MOVE WHICH COULD PROVOKE THE RESENTMENT OF THE ARABS WHILE THEY ARE IN A STATE OF HYPER-SENSITIVITY. LEBEL EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS WHY FRANCE WAS OPPOSED TO PUBLICISED DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF OIL SUPPLIES, SUCH AS THE RECENT OECD MEETINGS. ARAB REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS HAVE ALREADY COMPLAINED ABOUT FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE MEETINGS, WHICH THEY DESCRIBE AS QUOTE WESTERN GANGING-UP UNQUOTE AGAINST THE ARABS. LEBEL SAID THE FRENCH EXPECTED TO BE ABLE TO KEEP OIL SUPPLIES COMING THEIR WAY FROM THE MIDDLE EAST BUT WERE NOT YET SURE HOW THE DECISIONS OF THE MEETING IN SAUDI ARABIA ON 11 JUNE (BAGHDAD TELEGRAM TO FOREIGN OFFICE NO.812) MIGHT AFFECT THEM.

5. FRENCH VIEWS ON SOME OF THE OTHER ELEMENTS IN YOUR IDEAL PACKAGE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) STATE OF BELLIGERENCE

THE ARABS WOULD BITTERLY RESENT ANY SUGGESTION BY THE WESTERN POWERS THAT THEY SHOULD TERMINATE THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCE OR THE BOYCOTT. THE FRENCH ARE STEERING CLEAR OF THIS QUESTION.

(B) TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS.

IT IS CLEAR THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT GIVE UP ALL THAT SHE HAS GAINED. THE GAZA STRIP AND AT LEAST PARTS OF THE WEST BANK OF JORDAN WILL PROBABLY BE HELD. THE ISRAELIS WOULD, HOWEVER, MAKE A GRAVE MISTAKE IF THEY TRIED TO HOLD ON TO SHARM EL SHEIKH.

(C) JERUSALEM.

IT IS HARD TO IMAGINE ISRAEL GIVING UP THE OLD CITY BUT

/IT

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS TELEGRAM NO. 601 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

-3-

IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE HOLY PLACES.

(D) FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.

THE FRENCH WANT QUOTE A NEW MONTREUX CONVENTION UNQUOTE FOR THE STRAITS OF TIRAN BUT THIS WILL ONLY BE CONCEIVABLE IF THE ISRAELIS ARE WILLING TO LEAVE SHARM EL SHEIKH. COUVE HAS SPOKEN TO ARAB AMBASSADORS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF RE-OPENING THE SUEZ CANAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT HE HAS RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE PASSAGE OF ISRAELI SHIPPING. THE FRENCH PROBABLY REGARD THIS AS A MINOR MATTER WHILE THE GULF OF AQABA IS OPEN.

(E) UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE.

THE FRENCH ARE UNWILLING TO SAY ANYTHING DEFINITE YET BUT THEY CONSIDER THAT LATER ON A VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF U THANT MIGHT BE USEFUL.

6. I DO NOT THINK THAT THE FRENCH ARE GIVING US THE FULL STORY OF THEIR DEALINGS WITH THE RUSSIANS AND ARABS. I BELIEVE THEY ARE MORE INTERESTED IN CONCERTING A LINE WITH THEM THAN WITH THE WESTERN POWERS. FOR INSTANCE THIS MORNING'S +FIGARO+ CARRIES A REPORT FROM THEIR CAIRO CORRESPONDENT OF THE INTENSE ACTIVITY OF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR DURING THE LAST 48 HOURS, DURING WHICH HE IS THOUGHT TO HAVE HAD SEVERAL SECRET MEETINGS WITH NASSER. THE MOST INTERESTING THING WE HAVE HEARD FROM THE FRENCH IS THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY NOT SEND FURTHER MASSIVE ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE MIDDLE EAST. IT MAY BE THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO CONVINCE THE RUSSIANS AND THE ARABS THAT THEIR PROSPECTS OF REVERSING LAST WEEK'S MILITARY VERDICT BY DIPLOMATIC ACTION WILL BE DIMINISHED IF THEY ARE SEEN TO BE PREPARING FOR ANOTHER WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT THEY DO NOT ADMIT THIS. LEBEL JUST SAYS THEY HAVE THE GENERAL IMPRESSION THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY DECIDE AGAINST RE-INVESTING IN FAILURE. FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS PRIORITY WASHINGTON 178 UKMIS NEW YORK 47 MOSCOW 50 LUXEMBOURG 28.

SIR P. REILLY.

SENT 1718Z 14 JUNE
RECD 1718Z 14 JUNE

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW AND LUXEMBOURG REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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PRIORITY JEDDA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 416 14 June 1967

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Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 416 of 14 June. Repeated for information to Rabat, Algiers, Khartoum, Amman, Bahrain, Washington and Moscow.

Middle East Situation.

The First Secretary, Moroccan Embassy, told me this morning that an Arab Summit meeting was expected to take place soon in Khartoum. This would give the opportunity for Tunisian, Moroccan and certain other Heads of State to counsel a more moderate policy and recommend negotiations by the Arabs on a basis of realism and to counter the more extremist policies of Nasser.

2. Morocco and some kindred States think that at present the Arabs in the Middle East States, especially Egypt, Iraq, Syria as well as Algeria, are emotional and unrealistic and leading others astray. The First Secretary thought that although at present Nasser is still the widely accepted leading figure and has regained his position on an emotional appeal which will carry him through for the time being, later as emotions die down others will start asking questions and make him answerable for the Arab defeat and tax him with having moved his Army to war when it and others were so totally unprepared. Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and some others who have sent small units in support are very angry with Nasser. The First Secretary thinks that eventually he will be forced to go altogether.

3. The First Secretary did not think that the Middle East Arabs would recognize Israel now, but would be forced by their present weakness to come to terms of some kind and accept conditions including probably free passage of the Suez Canal and Tiran Straits to Israeli shipping and territorial adjustments by Israel. He thought that once matters settled more King Hussein might be able to negotiate with Israel for some restoration of his West Bank territories. He confirmed that King Hassan is visiting the United States to see President Johnson as the counterpart of Boumedienne's visit to Moscow.

4. He also thought that many Arabs (including his Embassy) especially in the more moderate States did not believe that Britain and the United States had assisted Israel with air cover and that in due course this would become more widely recognized though Palestine communities and much of the general populace in the central Middle East countries would retain the belief.

Foreign Office pass Rabat 4, Algiers 2, Khartoum 5, Amman 37, Washington 68, Moscow 2.

Mr. Cranston

Sent 1515Z/14 June 1967
Recd. 2017Z/14 June 1967

[Repetition to Moscow and Amman referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts]

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IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1357 14 JUNE, 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1357 OF 14 JUNE, RFI TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV, OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN, RIO DE JANEIRO, BUENOS AIRES, ADDIS ABABA, NEW DELHI, TOKYO AND SAVING TO AMMAN, JEDDA AND BEIRUT.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1340: MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE.

THE COUNCIL RESUMED AT 11.40 A.M. THE PRESIDENT POINTED OUT THAT 5 DRAFT RESOLUTIONS REMAINED ON THE TABLE: THE CANADIAN (S/7941 OF 7 JUNE): THE SOVIET REVISED DRAFT (S/7951 REV 2 OF 13 JUNE): THE UNITED STATES REVISED DRAFT (S/7952 REV 2 OF 9 JUNE): THE THREE POWER DRAFT (S/7968 REV 1 OF 13 JUNE): AND THE SHORT UNITED STATES DRAFT (S/7971 OF 10 JUNE).

2. I SPOKE FIRST (FULL TEXT SENT SEPARATELY).

3. SHAHI (PAKISTAN), PARTICIPATING WITHOUT VOTE, SAID THAT HIS COUNTRY WAS DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. FURTHERMORE, THERE WAS CONCERN IN SMALL COUNTRIES EVERYWHERE ABOUT THE DECLINE OF MORALITY MANIFESTED AT THE UNITED NATIONS SINCE THE MIDDLE EAST DEBATES BEGAN. THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS ''UNDER TRIAL''. THE WHOLE DRIFT OF ITS PROCEEDINGS SINCE THE END OF MAY HAD BEEN ACQUIESCENCE IN AGGRESSION. THE ISSUE OF NAVIGATION THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN WAS ESSENTIALLY OF A JURIDICAL NATURE, BUT ISRAEL HAD TURNED IT INTO A CASUS BELLI. THE CHARTER ONLY AUTHORISED THE USE OF FORCE IF AN ARMED ATTACK HAD OCCURRED. NO DECLARATION BY MARITIME POWERS COULD LEGALIZE THE USE OF FORCE TO KEEP THE

/ STRAITS

STRAITS OPEN. MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS HAD BECOME ''HELPLESS SPECTATORS'' OF A POTENTIAL RESORT TO FORCE AND UNDOUBTED THREAT TO THE PEACE. HE THEN CONTRASTED THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE COUNCIL AFTER 5 JUNE AND WHAT HAPPENED IN ITS KASHMIR DEBATES IN SEPTEMBER 1965 WHEN IT HAD CALLED FOR CEASE FIRE AND WITHDRAWAL. WHATEVER HAPPENED, THE COUNCIL COULD NOT ACCEPT ARGUMENTS OF FAIT ACCOMPLI WHICH SERVED TO ENDORSE ISRAELI AGGRESSION. IT SHOULD NOW (A) CONDEMN ISRAEL (B) DEMAND UNDER ARTICLE 39 THAT ISRAELI FORCES WITHDRAW TO THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES: AND (C) AFTER WITHDRAWAL, CONSIDER THE WHOLE NEXUS OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM, BEARING IN MIND WHO HAD STARTED THE AGGRESSION.

[SIC]
3. RUDA (ARGENTINA) SAID THAT A RESOLUTION WHICH CONDEMNED A MEMBER STATE WAS A VERY SERIOUS MEASURE AND CALLED FOR CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS. THOSE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE COUNCIL BY THE PARTIES, THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND OTHER MEMBERS GAVE A CONTROVERSIAL PICTURE OF EVENTS SINCE MID-MAY. THE THREE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS HAD NOW BEEN ACCEPTED BY ALL, SO THE EXPANSION OF HOSTILITIES HAD BEEN CHECKED. NOW IT WAS THE COUNCIL'S DUTY TO ESTABLISH CONDITIONS WHEREBY NEITHER PARTY NEED NEGOTIATE UNDER DURESS. TO THAT END, TROOPS MUST BE WITHDRAWN, AND FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS ENSURED. BUT BECAUSE UNDERSTANDING MUST BE BUILT UP FIRST AND WITHDRAWAL SHOULD NOT BE CAUSED BY EXTERNAL PRESSURE ARGENTINA COULD NOT SUPPORT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION.

4. SEYDOUX (FRANCE) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT IN PRINCIPLE SUPPORTED WHAT WAS IN THE SOVIET DRAFT. CONQUEST BY FORCE CANNOT RESULT IN THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY. BUT WHAT WERE THE CHANCES OF IT BEING ADOPTED, OR IF ADOPTED, CARRIED OUT? HIS DELEGATION BELIEVED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD TRY AND FACILITATE, IN DUE COURSE, DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO AGREEMENTS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES. IT WAS ON THE BASIS OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS THAT HIS DELEGATION WOULD VOTE ON IT.

5. MAKONNEN (ETHIOPIA), REVIEWING BOTH THE SOVIET AND

/AMERICAN

AMERICAN DRAFTS, SAID THAT IT WAS HIS GOVERNMENT'S HOPE THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD NOW PROCEED TO GET TROOPS BACK TO THEIR ORIGINAL POSITIONS, AND TO CREATE CONDITIONS LEADING TO A JUST SOLUTION OF LONG-TERM PROBLEMS. ETHIOPIA FAVOURED REACTIVATION OF A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN THE AREA WITHOUT DELAY. SHE HOPED TO SEE CONCERTED ACTION BY PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, WHOSE APPARENT DIVISIONS OF OPINION ON THE MIDDLE EAST DID NOT AUGUR WELL. NEITHER OF THE TWO MAIN DRAFTS MET HIS COUNTRY'S VIEW OF WHAT THE SITUATION REALLY DEMANDED. TIME WAS NEEDED FOR FURTHER STUDY OF THE TEXTS AND CONSULTATIONS. THERE WERE USEFUL SUGGESTIONS IN THE INDIAN STATEMENT OF 10 JUNE (WHICH HE QUOTED). HIS DELEGATION WOULD ABSTAIN ON BOTH MAIN DRAFTS.

6. IYALLA (NIGERIA) ALSO PLEADED FOR MORE TIME TO CONSIDER THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES INVOLVED. WHILE NIGERIA COULD NOT OF COURSE CONDONE AGGRESSION, HIS DELEGATION WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO VOTE ON THE SOVIET DRAFT UNLESS IT WAS TAKEN PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH.

7. FEDORENKO (USSR) EXPLAINED HIS COUNTRY'S POSITION ON THE CANADIAN DRAFT (S/7941). THIS WAS OBSOLETE, BUT REMAINED CONFUSED, AND COULD LEAD TO VIOLATIONS OF THE CHARTER IF ADOPTED. HIS DELEGATION WOULD VOTE AGAINST IT. THE THREE-COUNTRY DRAFT (S/7968) CONCERNING WELFARE OF REFUGEES AND PRISONERS OF WAR WAS UNSATISFACTORY BECAUSE IT WAS LIMITED TO ONE ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM ONLY. THE BEST WAY OF HELPING CIVILIAN POPULATIONS IN THE AREA WOULD BE BY THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF INVADING TROOPS. IN VIEW, HOWEVER, OF THE GOOD INTENTIONS OF THE PROPOSERS, HIS DELEGATION WOULD NOT OBJECT TO THIS DRAFT.

8. TOMEH (SYRIA), COMMENTING ON A SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT FROM GENERAL BULL TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CIRCULATED BEFORE THE MEETING STRESSED THE PASSAGE (BASED ON DAMASCUS OBSERVER SOURCES) REPORTING MOVEMENT BY ISRAELI TROOPS DOWN THE QUNEITRA-DAMASCUS ROAD EARLY ON 11 JUNE. THIS HE CLAIMED WAS A VIOLATION OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION NO.236 OF

12 JUNE WHICH LAID DOWN A SPECIFIC TIME FOR A CEASEFIRE, AND PROHIBITED ALL FORWARD TROOP MOVEMENTS THEREAFTER.

9. LIU (CHINA) SAID HIS DELEGATION SUPPORTED THE THREE COUNTRY DRAFT RESOLUTION AIMED AT ALLEVIATING THE SUFFERINGS OF WAR. IT WOULD ABSTAIN ON THE SOVIET DRAFT. MATSUI (JAPAN) TOOK THE SAME LINE ON BOTH DRAFTS. NOW THAT THE CEASE-FIRE WAS EFFECTIVE THE COUNCIL SHOULD MOVE ONTO THE NEXT PHASE, I.E. THE CONSTRUCTION OF A DURABLE PEACE.

10. KIDRON (ISRAEL) SAID EVERY EFFORT WAS BEING MADE BY HIS GOVERNMENT TO GET LIFE BACK TO NORMAL. UNRWA WAS OPERATING NORMALLY IN THE GAZA STRIP, AND THERE WAS NO MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES THERE. IN JORDAN, THERE HAD BEEN MOVEMENT INITIALLY FROM WEST TO EAST, BUT NOW THERE WAS A SWING BACK WESTWARD, WITH WHICH THE ISRAELIS WERE NOT INTERFERING. LOCAL POLICE WERE BACK ON DUTY IN JERUSALEM, AND THE HOLY PLACES HAD SUFFERED LITTLE DAMAGE. ISRAEL HAD MADE EVERY EFFORT TO STAND BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS ON TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR BUT WERE ANXIOUS ABOUT WHETHER IT WAS BEING OBSERVED IN THE U A R AND SYRIA.

11. SEYDOUX (FRANCE) RESERVED HIS POSITION ON PROBLEMS RAISED IN THE THREE COUNTRY DRAFT RESOLUTION, BUT SAID HE SYMPATHISED WITH IT.

12. TOMEH (SYRIA) AND EL FARRA (JORDAN) EXERCISED RIGHTS OF REPLY TO KIDRON'S (ISRAEL) STATEMENT).

13. KIDRON (ISRAEL) THEN STATED THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A CABLE CONCERNING AN AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVE OF UNRWA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WHEREBY UNRWA WOULD CONTINUE ASSISTANCE TO ARAB REFUGEES IN THE GAZA STRIP AND THE WEST BANK OF JORDAN, AND THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT WOULD FACILITATE THE TASK OF UNRWA SUBJECT ONLY TO CONSIDERAATIONS OF MILITARY SECURITY. AFTER READING OUT THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT, KIDRON DENIED THE SYRIAN ALLEGATION REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 8 ABOVE AND CLAIMED THAT NO FORWARD MOVEMENT OF ISRAELI TROOPS HAD TAKEN PLACE ALONG THE QNETRA - DAMASCUS ROAD.

14. KEITA (MALI) SUPPORTED THE SOVIET RESOLUTION. REFERRING TO

/ THE THREE

THE THREE POWER RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND ETHIOPIA (S/7968 REV1), HE PROPOSED AN ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS:-

''3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO FOLLOW THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL THEREON.''

HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT, THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF GENERAL BULL, UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL MIGHT BE MORE EFFECTIVELY USED TO ASSIST THE SUFFERERS.

15. AFTER A FURTHER STATEMENT BY TOMEH (SYRIA), SETTE CAMARA (BRAZIL) ANALYSED THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION. THAT RESOLUTION ACCUSED ISRAEL OF BREACHES OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, BUT HIS DELEGATION COULD NOT STATE CATEGORICALLY WHO HAD FIRST VIOLATED THOSE RESOLUTIONS. THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION ALSO ACCUSED ISRAEL OF OCCUPYING PART OF THE TERRITORY OF THE U A R, JORDAN AND SYRIA, BUT THE OCCUPATION BY ISRAEL HAD RESULTED FROM THE STATE OF WAR AND ISRAEL HAD NOT YET BEEN CALLED UPON BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO WITHDRAW. ON WITHDRAWAL, THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THE STATEMENT BY GENERAL DAYAN THAT ISRAEL HAD ''NO AIM OF CONQUEST''. THE PROBLEM OF WITHDRAWAL COULD NOT BE ENVISAGED AS AN ISOLATED STEP. FOR THESE REASONS, HE COULD NOT SUPPORT THE SOVIET DRAFT. HE FAVOURED A STRENGTHENING OF UNITED NATIONS MACHINERY IN THE AREA AND THE DESPATCH OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ASSIST IN FINDING SETTLEMENT.

16. ISMAILIEFF (CANADA) ANNOUNCED THAT HIS DELEGATION WAS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN DOCUMENT S/7905 WHICH IT HAD CO-SPONSORED JOINTLY WITH DENMARK. HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THE CANADIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION IN S/7941 BUT WAS WILLING TO CONSULT WITH OTHER MEMBERS WITH A VIEW TO REVISING THE DRAFT TO BRING IT MORE UP TO DATE. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HE WAS PREPARED TO ACCORD PRIORITY TO THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION.

17. GOLDBERG (UNITED STATES), IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION PUT BY THE PRESIDENT, STATED THAT HIS DELEGATION WOULD NOT PRESS TO THE VOTE THE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS WHICH IT HAD SUBMITTED IN DOCUMENTS S/7916/REV.1. AND S/7971. SINCE THESE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

/ HAD BEEN

HAD BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. HE ANNOUNCED THAT HIS DELEGATION HAD JUST SUBMITTED A THIRD REVISION OF THEIR SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTION IN DOCUMENT S/7952/REV.2. THIS DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS STILL BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE WOULD NOT ASK FOR A VOTE ON IT TODAY BECAUSE SEVERAL DELEGATIONS HAD MADE SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES IN THE TEXT WHICH HIS DELEGATION WISHED TO CONSIDER FURTHER. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES WAS TO ACHIEVE UNANIMITY ON MEASURES TO SECURE PEACE AND THE COUNCIL HAD NOT EXHAUSTED THE POSSIBILITIES. BUT HE WOULD NOT STAND IN THE WAY OF A VOTE ON ANY RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL.

18. THE PRESIDENT THEN ANNOUNCED THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD PROCEED TO VOTE ON THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION IN DOCUMENT S/7951/REV.2. A REQUEST HAD BEEN MADE BY NIGERIA FOR A VOTE ON EACH OF THE TWO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS. OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 WAS PUT TO THE VOTE. FOUR MEMBERS VOTED IN FAVOUR (U S S R, MALI, BULGARIA AND INDIA), NONE AGAINST AND ELEVEN MEMBERS ABSTAINED. THE PARAGRAPH THEREFORE FAILED OF ADOPTION. ON OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2, THERE WAS A VOTE OF 6 IN FAVOUR (U S S R, MALI, ETHIOPIA, NIGERIA, BULGARIA AND INDIA) NONE AGAINST AND NINE ABSTENTIONS. THIS PARAGRAPH ALSO FAILED OF ADOPTION. THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE THEREUPON AGREED THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE NEED NOT BE PUT TO THE VOTE.

19. FEDORENKO (U S S R) IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE SAID THE RESOLUTION WAS THE MINIMUM ACTION THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE IN THE FACE OF AGGRESSION. IT WAS REGRETTABLE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO ACT. AN EXTREME SITUATION HAD BEEN CREATED DEMANDING EXTREME MEASURES. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN THE COUNCIL COULD NOT HAVE ANY RESULTS IN PRESENT CONDITIONS. OTHER MEASURES MUST THEREFORE BE FOUND TO SECURE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES. EVEN IF THE U S DRAFT WAS AMENDED, IT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE AND HE WOULD VOTE AGAINST IT. HE ALSO TOOK A NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CANADIAN DRAFT. THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS THUS UNABLE, IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT AMONG THE PERMANENT MEMBERS, TO TAKE THE NECESSARY DECISIONS. OTHER

/ MEANS

MEANS WERE THEREFORE NEEDED, AND HE HOPED THAT ALL PEACE-LOVING STATES WOULD ASSIST THE ARAB STATES TO RESIST ISRAELI AGGRESSION. GOLDBERG (U S) SAID THE SOVIET DRAFT WAS NOT A GENUINE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS. THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF ANY SOVIET WISH TO REACH UNANIMITY IN THE COUNCIL. THEY WERE SIMPLY ATTEMPTING TO BUILD THE CASE FOR SOME OTHER MANOEUVRE.

PARTHASARATHI (INDIA) RECALLED ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF SYRIAN TERRITORY IN VIOLATION OF THE COUNCIL CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS AND REPEATED HIS DELEGATION'S VIEW THAT A CEASE-FIRE MUST BE LINKED TO THE ISSUE OF WITHDRAWAL AS SET OUT IN THE FOUR POINTS LISTED IN THE INDIAN STATEMENT ON 9 JUNE.

IGNATIEFF (CANADA) HOPED THAT WHATEVER OTHER MEASURES THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE HAD IN MIND THE PERMANENT MEMBERS SHOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO CONCERT THEIR ACTIONS AND THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONSULT TOGETHER.

TABOR (PRESIDENT) SPEAKING AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF DENMARK IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE SAID THE NEXT TASK OF THE COUNCIL WAS TO CREATE LASTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR A STABLE PEACE. COMPREHENSIVE AND BALANCED SOLUTIONS MUST BE SOUGHT. HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR THE COUNCIL TO ACT TOGETHER.

EL KONY (U A R) REGRETTING THE OUTCOME OF THE VOTE SAID THE COUNCIL HAD BEEN UNABLE TO DISCHARGE ITS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. HE BLAMED THIS ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE U S AND THE U K AND WARNED THAT THE ARABS WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THIS INJUSTICE.

KHALAF (IRAQ) EXPRESSED DISBELIEF, DISILLUSIONMENT AND DISGUST AT THE MANOEUVRES OF SOME PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WHICH ENABLED THE AGGRESSOR TO SECURE AS MUCH TERRITORY AS POSSIBLE. HE REPEATED ACCUSATIONS OF COLLUSION AND CONNIVANCE BETWEEN U S AND ISRAEL. THE U S WAS AS RESPONSIBLE AS THE ISRAELIS FOR THE ATTACK ON THE ARAB WORLD, AND THE U K WAS AS RESPONSIBLE AS THE U S. THE ARABS WOULD NOT FORGET OR FORGIVE.

BUFFUM (U S) IN RIGHT OF REPLY TO IRAQ REBUTTED THE ALLEGATIONS OF COLLUSION: HE REFERRED TO THE U S OFFER OF INVESTIGATION OF SUCH

/ CHARGES

CHARGES AND THE RECENT REAFFIRMATION OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON OF RESPECT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ALL STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
F O PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW 168, PARIS 171, TEL AVIV 181 AND ROUTINE TO COPENHAGEN 94, RIO DE JANEIRO 44, BUENOS AIRES 38, ADDIS ABABA 36, NEW DELHI 51, TOKYO 37, AND SAVING TO AMMAN 67, JEDDA 46 AND BEIRUT 63.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT 0250Z/15
RECD AT 0251Z/15

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1363 14 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1363 OF 14 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV
AMMAN COPENHAGEN AND OTTAWA.

MY TEL. NO. 1361 : SOVIET REQUEST FOR AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

WE HAVE ALREADY DECIDED THAT WE WOULD NOT WISH TO STAND IN THE WAY OF THE SOVIET REQUEST FOR AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION (MY TEL NO. 1325 AND YOUR TEL NO. 2828). NEVERTHELESS, IN OUR REPLY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CABLE, I THINK WE MUST BE CAREFUL TO RESERVE OUR POSITION FULLY ON THE PROCEDURAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES WHICH ARE INVOLVED.

2. I WOULD THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT OUR REPLY SHOULD BE SOMETHING TO THIS EFFECT:

QUOTE WE HAVE THE HONOUR TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S TELEGRAM OF JUNE 14 INQUIRING WITH REFERENCE TO RULE 9(B) WHETHER THE UNITED KINGDOM CONCURS IN A REQUEST MADE BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT FOR AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT ARE PREPARED TO CONCUR IN THE CONVENING OF AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST IF THIS IS THE WISH OF A MAJORITY OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THIS IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM ON WHETHER THE PRECONDITIONS SET OUT IN RESOLUTION 377 (V) WHICH IS THE ONLY BASIS FOR THE CONVENING

/OF EMERGENCY

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OF EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSIONS HAVE IN THIS CASE BEEN SATISFIED, HAVING IN MIND IN PARTICULAR THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS STILL SEIZED OF THE MATTER AND THAT THE COUNCIL HAS STILL RESOLUTIONS BEFORE IT ON WHICH NO DECISION HAS YET BEEN TAKEN UNQUOTE.
3. THE U.S. MISSION ARE RECOMMENDING THAT THEY SHOULD REPLY THAT THEY WILL NOT STAND IN THE WAY OF AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION, BUT ENTERING ALSO A RESERVATION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE.
4. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE PASS TO HAYMAN AT 8 A.M.
F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE MOSCOW 170, PARIS 173 AND ROUTINE TEL AVIV 183, AMMAN 98 AND COPENHAGEN 96.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT 0345Z+15
RECD AT 0346Z/15

[REPETITION TO TEL AVIV, AMMAN REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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CYPHER CAT A

IMMEDIATE FROM UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1364 DATED 14 JUNE, 1967

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1364 OF 14 JUNE,

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, COPENHAGEN OTTAWA AND TEL AVIV.

MY TELEGRAM NO 1350

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL.

THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY FOLLOWED PREDICTABLE LINES. THE SOVIET RESOLUTION FAILED THROUGH LACK OF SUFFICIENT VOTES, THE FIRST OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH RECEIVING ONLY FOUR IN FAVOUR AND THE SECOND ONLY SIX OUT OF THE NECESSARY NINE. THE LATIN AMERICAN/ETHIOPIAN RESOLUTION ON THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS AND PRISONERS OF WAR WAS PASSED UNANIMOUSLY THIS EVENING.

2. FOLLOWING THE FAILURE OF HIS RESOLUTION, THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE PREPARED THE GROUND IN HIS EXPLANATION OF VOTE FOR THE ACTIVATION OF HIS REQUEST FOR AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION. HAVING MADE CLEAR THAT HE WOULD VETO THE UNITED STATES AND CANADIAN DRAFTS IF THEY WERE PUT TO THE VOTE EVEN IN A REVISED FORM, HE THEN CLAIMED THAT NO FURTHER PROGRESS WAS POSSIBLE IN THE COUNCIL BECAUSE OF LACK OF AGREEMENT AMONG THE PERMANENT MEMBERS. THE SECRETARIAT HAVE DESPATCHED TELEGRAMS TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ASKING WHETHER THEY CONCUR IN THE REQUEST FOR AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION UNDER RULE 9 (B) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE.

3. THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR GENERAL ASSEMBLY AFFAIRS (NARASIMHAN) HAS TOLD US THAT THE EARLIEST DATE FOR A MEETING OF THE GENERAL

/ ASSEMBLY

ASSEMBLY WOULD BE SATURDAY, BUT HIS PERSONAL GUESS WAS THAT WITH SO MANY SMALLER MEMBERS HAVING DIFFICULTY IN COMMUNICATING WITH THEIR GOVERNMENTS THE ASSEMBLY WAS UNLIKELY TO MEET BEFORE MONDAY.

4. THERE IS AN AIR OF UNCERTAINTY THIS EVENING AMONG DELEGATIONS HERE ABOUT WHAT THEY SHOULD SAY IN REPLY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S TELEGRAMS. MANY DELEGATIONS HERE ARE LESS THAN SATISFIED THAT THE SOVIET MOVE IS IN ORDER AND ALSO ABOUT THE PRACTICAL BENEFIT LIKELY TO FLOW FROM IT= NOR ARE THEY ENTIRELY HAPPY AT THE WAY IN WHICH THE SECRETARIAT HAVE ALLOWED THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO DUCK THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THEIR CALL FOR THE EMERGENCY SESSION IS MADE UNDER THE 'UNITING FOR PEACE' PROCEDURE. THEY RECOGNISE THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO RESIST THE SOVIET MOVE, BUT I THINK IT POSSIBLE THAT A NUMBER OF CONCURRENCES WILL ENTER SOME RESERVATION ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MOVE. NOR WILL ACTIVITY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL NECESSARY CEASE, SINCE THE CANADIANS ARE CONSULTING INFORMALLY ABOUT A SUBSTANTIALLY REVISED VERSION OF THEIR RESOLUTION AND THE AMERICANS TODAY MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WERE FULLY OPEN TO CONSULTATION ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THEIRS.

5. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE PASS TO HAYMAN AT 8 A M.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS ROUTINE TO MOSCOW NO 171, PARIS NO 176 COPENHAGEN NO 97 AND TEL AVIV NO 184

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT Ø311Z/15
RECD AT Ø312Z/15

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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CYPHER CAT A
IMMEDIATE FROM UKMISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1365 DATED 14 JUNE, 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1365 OF 14 JUNE,
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS,
COPENHAGEN, OTTAWA AND TEL AVIV.

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL.

MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A NEW CANADIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION ON WHICH THEY ARE CONSULTING INFORMALLY WITH INDIA AND ETHIOPIA IN PARTICULAR, IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THERE IS ANY POSSIBILITY OF BUILDING ON THE SUGGESTION THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD SEND A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY HAVE FOLLOWED AS CLOSELY AS THEY CAN IDEAS FORMULATED IN THE STATEMENTS OF INDIA AND ETHIOPIA, AND HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THE EXISTING TEXT IS MEANT ONLY TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION.

2. THE TERMS OF REFERENCE IN THE CANADIAN RESOLUTION ARE VAGUE AND I VERY MUCH DOUBT WHETHER, NOW THAT THE RUSSIANS WANT TO GET THE ISSUE OUT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL INTO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THEY WILL PERMIT THE INDIANS TO COOPERATE IN THE CANADIAN EFFORT. INDEED, I WOULD EXPECT THEM TO PUT VERY STRONG PRESSURE ON THE INDIANS NOT TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY. FOR OUR PART, I THINK THAT WE COULD TELL THE CANADIANS THAT WE FIND THE TERMS OF REFERENCE SOMEWHAT VAGUE. WE UNDERSTAND HOWEVER THE NEED TO SEEK COMMON GROUND WITH THE INDIANS IF THEY ARE TO MAKE ANY PROGRESS. WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE IN GETTING A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE AREA AND WE, FOR OUR PART,

/WOULD BE

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WOULD BE FLEXIBLE ABOUT THE TERMS OF REFERENCE IF THEY COULD ACHIEVE THE SUBSTANCE OF ENABLING ANY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO COMMENCE A ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE STATES INVOLVED ON HOW THE PRESENT SITUATION MIGHT BE ALLEVIATED.

3. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE PASS TO HAYMAN AT 8 AM WITH MIFT.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS TO MOSCOW NO 172, PARIS NO 175, COPENHAGEN NO 98 AND TEL AVIV NO 185.

LORD CARADON

SENT 15/0318Z
RECD 15/0318Z

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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CYPHER CAT A
IMMEDIATE FROM UKMISSION NEWYORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1366 DATED 14 JUNE, 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1366 OF 14 JUNE,
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS,
COPENHAGEN, OTTAWA AND TEL AVIV.

MIPT: MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NEW CANADIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION (NOT YET CIRCULATED):-

BEGINS.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING RESOLUTIONS 233 (1967) OF 6 JUNE, 1967, 234 (1967) OF 7 JUNE, 1967, 235 (1967) OF 9 JUNE, 1967 236 (1967) OF 12 JUNE 1967 AND

REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL:

(I) TO MAINTAIN FULL CONTACTS WITH ALL THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING ABOUT FULL AND EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE WITH THESE RESOLUTIONS.

(II) TO DESPATCH A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA TO HELP IN REDUCING TENSIONS, RESTORING PEACEFUL CONDITIONS AND ENSURING THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN OCCUPIED AREAS.

(III) TO REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE RESULTS OF HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S EFFORTS.

ENDS

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS ROUTINE TO MOSCOW NO 173, PARIS NO 176, COPENHAGEN NO 99 AND TEL AVIV NO 186

LORD CARADON

SENT 15/0359Z
RECD 15/0359Z

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1367 14 JUNE 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1367 OF 14 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV OTTAWA COPENHAGEN RIO DE JANEIRO BUENOS AIRES ADDIS ABABA NEW DELHI TOKYO AND SAVING TO AMMAN JEDDA AND BEIRUT.

MYTEL 1357:

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE.

AT THE SESSION, WHICH BEGAN AT 5.50 P.M., RUDA (ARGENTINA) INTRODUCED THE THREE POWER DRAFT RESOLUTION ON REFUGEES AND PRISONERS OF WAR (MYTEL 1356). HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEALT WITH POLITICAL MATTERS, IT COULD NOT OVERLOOK THE HUMAN TRAGEDIES WHICH WERE THE BY PRODUCT OF WAR. CIVILIAN POPULATIONS CAUGHT UP IN WAR HAD A MINIMUM STANDARD OF RIGHTS AND THESE MUST BE GUARANTEED. THE THREE COUNTRY DRAFT WAS ADDRESSED PRIMARILY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL. THE ISRAEL DELEGATE HAD SAID THERE HAD BEEN WIDE-SCALE MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES FROM EAST TO WEST OVER THE JORDAN, AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NOT PREVENTED THIS. RUDA AND THE OTHER SPONSORS OF THE RESOLUTION HOPED THAT THIS POLICY WOULD CONTINUE, AND THAT SIMILAR HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS WOULD APPLY TO THE PRISONERS OF WAR OF BOTH SIDES. THE SPONSORS ACCEPTED AN AMENDMENT PROPOSED EARLIER BY THE DELEGATE OF MALI, WHICH WOULD ADD AN OPERATIVE THIRD PARAGRAPH TO RUN AS FOLLOWS:-

''REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO FOLLOW THE IMPLEMENTATION

/ OF THIS

OF THIS RESOLUTION AND TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL THEREON.''

2...KEITA (MALI) SAID THE WORDING HE HAD PROPOSED WOULD INSERT THE ADJECTIVE ''EFFECTIVE'' BEFORE ''IMPLEMENTATION''. THIS WAS ACCEPTED.

3...PARTHASARATHI (INDIA) SAID THAT THOUGH THE CEASE-FIRE WAS NOW OPERATIVE, WITHDRAWAL BY THE AGGRESSOR HAD NOT YET BEGUN. LARGE AREAS OF LAND HAD BEEN OVERUN BY INVADERS, AND MANY WERE HOMELESS AND SUFFERING. THERE WAS THEREFORE URGENT NEED FOR THE JOINT THREE POWER DRAFT. U THANT HAD ALREADY MADE CERTAIN SUGGESTIONS ABOUT WELFARE OF REFUGEES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL.

4...IGNATIEFF (CANADA) WELCOMED THE THREE POWER INITIATIVE. HIS FOREIGN MINISTER HAD SAID LAST WEEK THAT THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WAS A COLLECTIVE ONE FOR ALL HUMANITY. IN RECOGNITION OF THIS DESPERATE HUMAN PROBLEM, CANADA WOULD SUPPORT THE DRAFT AND HOPED IT WOULD BE ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY.

5...SEYDOUX (FRANCE) EXPRESSED HIS GOVERNMENTS DEEP SATISFACTION AT THE DRAFT. IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO ENSURE THAT CIVILIANS WHO HAD FLED SHOULD RETURN TO THEIR VILLAGES. IF THE MANY STORIES CURRENT WERE CONFIRMED, AND IT BECAME CLEAR THAT EXPULSIONS HAD BEEN ORGANISED BY THE ISRAELIS, A VERY SERIOUS SITUATION WOULD FACE THE COUNCIL. THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT HAD NO DOUBT TAKEN THE POINT. HIS GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT UNRWA SHOULD INVESTIGATE THE FATE OF REFUGEES IN AREAS WHERE THERE HAD BEEN FIGHTING. THE WHOLE REFUGEE PROBLEM SHOULD BE TREATED AS HUMANITARIAN AND APOLITICAL. (AT THIS STAGE THE COUNCIL WAS INTERRUPTED BY A COMPLAINT FROM THE SAUDI REPRESENTATIVE ABOUT A LETTER WRITTEN BY BUNCHE WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY).

6...TARABANOV (BULGARIA) THEN COMMENTED ON PREDICTABLE LINES ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. IF THE AGGRESSORS WITHDREW THERE WOULD BE NO REFUGEE PROBLEM, OR RATHER NO ADDITIONAL PROBLEM. HIS DELEGATION WOULD HOWEVER SUPPORT THE DRAFT.

7...AFTER THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE CLEAR HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE CANADIAN AND U S DRAFTS ON THE TABLE WOULD NOT BE PRESSED TO A VOTE

/TODAY

TODAY, THE THREE COUNTRY DRAFT (S/7968), WITH THE MALIAN ADDITION (SEE PARAS 1 AND 2 ABOVE) WAS ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY.

8...FEDORENKO (U S S R) THEN MADE HIS CLOSING ADDRESS. THE SECURITY COUNCIL, HE SAID, HAD IN HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEW NOW CONCLUDED THIS STAGE OF ITS EXAMINATION OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE. IT HAD SHOWN ITSELF INCAPABLE OF TAKING APPROPRIATE ACTION UNDER THE CHARTER. THE U S DRAFT RESOLUTION HAD BEEN MENTIONED BUT, IF IT WAS EVER PUT TO A VOTE, THE U S S R WOULD ''USE ITS RIGHT IN THE COUNCIL''. IF THE AMERICANS CHOSE TO AMEND OR OTHERWISE ALTER THEIR DRAFT, THAT WAS THEIR AFFAIR. THEIR POSITION WAS NEGATIVE AND THERE COULD BE NO BASIS FOR UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND U S POSITIONS. BUFFUM (U S) INDICATED THAT HIS DELEGATION INTENDED TO CONTINUE CONSULTATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THEIR DRAFT, TO TRY TO FIND GROUND FOR AGREEMENT. IGNATIEFF (CANADA) SUPPORTED CONSULTATIONS. THERE WERE FURTHER NEGATIVE STATEMENTS BY FEDORENKO AND TARABANOV.

9...BEFORE WE ADJOURNED AT 8.05 P.M., I MADE CLEAR MY UNDERSTANDING THAT ANY MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL COULD, AS USUAL, CALL A MEETING AT ANY TIME.

F O PASS IMMEDIATE MOSCOW 174, PARIS 177, TEL AVIV 187 AND ROUTINE TO COPENHAGEN 100, RIO DE JANEIRO 45, BUENOS AIRES 39, ADDIS ABABA 37, NEW DELHI 52, TOKYO 38, AND SAVING TO AMMAN 68, JEDDA 47 AND BEIRUT 64.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT 0442Z/15
RECD AT 0443Z/15

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Mr Pollier

COPY NO. 11

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NO. 1368

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
14 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE.
PROPOSED EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
MY TELEGRAM NO. 1364.
WE CAME OUT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT 8 P.M. TONIGHT AND NO ONE HAS YET HAD TIME TO DECIDE ON WHAT REPLY TO MAKE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S TELEGRAM OR TO CONSULT THEIR GOVERNMENTS.
2. IT IS GENERALLY ASSUMED THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL GET A MEETING OF THE ASSEMBLY IN SPITE OF LEGAL AND OTHER DOUBTS IN MANY DELEGATES MINDS.
3. IT IS THE GENERAL VIEW THAT A MEETING BEFORE MONDAY NEXT (JUNE 19TH) IS UNLIKELY. IT MIGHT POSSIBLY BE ON THIS SATURDAY OR COULD BE LATER NEXT WEEK.
4. NO ONE YET KNOWS WHO ELSE WILL COME AND DECISIONS WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER KOSYGIN COMES AS WELL AS GROMYKO. THE ASSUMPTION IS THAT IF KOSYGIN DOES COME SOME PRIME MINISTERS MAY COME TOO.
5. IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO WE SHALL SOUND INTENTIONS OF OTHERS AND LET YOU KNOW QUICKLY WHAT WE DISCOVER. BUT THERE IS SO MUCH UNCERTAINTY AT PRESENT THAT WE SHOULD HOLD OUR HAND AT PRESENT. I FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO MAKE ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS UNTIL WE KNOW MORE.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0425Z/15
RECD AT 0426Z/15

P R I S E C (F.O.)

SSSSS

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4. SOVIET AIMS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WERE LIKELY TO BE:
(I) BRAND ISRAEL AS THE AGGRESSOR:
(II) ATTACK BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES:
(III) SEEK TO RECOUP THROUGH DIPLOMACY AND PROPAGANDA FROM THE RECENT SETBACKS TO SOVIET PRESTIGE.
5. THE RUSSIANS MIGHT IN THE END SETTLE FOR A SIMPLE PROPOSAL CALLING FOR A WITHDRAWAL BEHIND THE ORIGINAL DEMARCATION LINES BEFORE THE FIGHTING STARTED PLUS A MODERATELY CRITICAL REFERENCE TO ISRAEL: A RESOLUTION ON THESE LINES MIGHT HAVE A FAIRLY BROAD APPEAL. THE UNITED STATES MIGHT COUNTER BY SAYING THAT THIS WOULD MERELY REPRESENT A RETURN TO THE OLD SITUATION WITH ITS INHERENT DANGERS OF WAR AND WOULD NOT BE A STEP TOWARDS REAL PEACE.
6. IN THE UNITED STATES VIEW THE ASSEMBLY COULD NOT IN ANY CASE BE EXPECTED TO PRODUCE REASONABLE PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT, BUT MIGHT HAVE A USEFUL ROLE TO PLAY IN SUCH MATTERS AS THE APPOINTMENT OF A UNITED NATIONS INTERMEDIARY.
7. THE MEETING OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MIGHT COME AS EARLY AS FRIDAY OR SATURDAY: THE UNITED STATES WOULD PREFER THAT IT BE DELAYED UNTIL MONDAY. THERE WAS NO CONFIRMATION THAT KOSYGIN WOULD COME. SISCO STRESSED THAT NO FIRM DECISION HAD YET BEEN TAKEN ON THE LINE TO BE ADOPTED BY THE UNITED STATES OR WHO WOULD REPRESENT HER AT THE MEETING.
8. THE PRINCIPAL POINT AT WHICH THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAMMER AWAY WOULD BE WITHDRAWAL AND, FROM THE WAY IN WHICH SISCO PUT IT, IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS IS WHAT IS REALLY WORRYING THE AMERICANS. HE THOUGHT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT SETTLE FOR A MILDLY PHRASED PARAGRAPH ON WITHDRAWAL, IN RETURN FOR THE DROPPING OF THE MORE VIOLENT SOVIET ACCUSATIONS, AND THAT SOMETHING ON THESE LINES MIGHT HAVE QUITE A BROAD APPEAL. SISCO DREW MY ATTENTION TO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION IN WHICH WITHDRAWAL IS SPECIFICALLY LINKED TO OTHER MATTERS (UKMIS TELEGRAM 1275).
9. I ALSO DETECTED SOME ANXIETY ON SISCO'S PART THAT WE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO GO RATHER FURTHER ON WITHDRAWAL THAN THE AMERICANS THOUGHT WISE. I AGREED THAT THIS WAS A CRUCIAL POINT TO WHICH I KNEW YOU WERE GIVING CAREFUL THOUGHT (YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 2859 TO UKMIS NEW YORK).
F.O. PASS MOSCOW PRIORITY 141
SIR P. DEAN

SENT 1853Z 14 JUNE
RECD 1853Z 14 JUNE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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H. N. Pollock, Esq., CMG,
10, Downing Street.

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

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Personal

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1

15. 6. '67.

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CYPHER/ CAT A
FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO 2028

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
14 JUNE 1967

C O N F I D E N T I A L
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 2028 OF 14 JUNE,
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UK MIS NEWYORK AND MOSCOW.
MIDDLE EAST: SOVIET CALL FOR EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE A FEW WORDS WITH THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR U.N. AFFAIRS THIS MORNING AND HE GAVE ME A BRIEF BUT SUCCINCT OUTLINE OF STATE DEPARTMENT THINKING ON TACTICS IN THE UNITED NATIONS. SISCO STRESSED THAT HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND HAD NOT YET OBTAINED CLEARANCE FROM ABOVE FOR WHAT HE HAD TO SAY.
2. IF, AS WAS EXPECTED, THE SOVIET RESOLUTION WERE DEFEATED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY, THE UNITED STATES WOULD ACQUIESCE IN A SOVIET REQUEST FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
3. THE UNITED STATES POSTURE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WOULD BE THE SAME AS HAD BEEN AGREED BY MINISTERS AT THE N.A.T.O. COUNCIL MEETING IN LUXEMBURG . IT WOULD BE FOR THE RUSSIANS TO GO OUT AND TRY TO FIND VOTES IN SUPPORT OF THEIR RESOLUTION. SISCO SAID THAT THE AMERICANS TOO HAD HAD INDICATIONS OF DISQUIET AMONG THE ARABS AT THE PROSPECT OF A MOVE FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (UKMIS TELEGRAM 1351 REFERS).

/4.

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Cypher/Cat A Copy No.....

IMMEDIATE RAWALPINDI TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno. 623 14 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MIDDLE EAST

I was summoned by the Director General, Middle East Affairs, this evening and was handed a message from President Ayub to Mr. Wilson. Text in my immediately following telegram.

2. I made no comment, other than to say that Mr. Irtiza Husain would have seen Mr. Wilson's statements on the subject and would know that the President's message would be received with sympathy and understanding.

Sir C. Pickard

Sent 1523Z 14 June
Recd. 1622Z 14 June

[Copies sent to No.10 Downing Street]

PRISEC (C.O.)

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Prime Minister

The Middle East situation: 14 June
Summary of Telegrams etc

Israel

Rumours continue to circulate about Russian participation in the hostilities in Syria but the Israel censor has not allowed publication of stories on these lines.

Jerusalem

2. All physical barriers between the old and new cities of Jerusalem are being removed. We are in discussion with other Governments who have Consuls in Jerusalem as to how to govern their relations with the Israel authorities without prejudicing our position on the status of Jerusalem.

Jordan
Refugees

3. The plight of the refugees on the East Bank has been described as appalling. We have been given a list of medical requirements and are seeing how far we can go towards meeting these.

Oil

4. Kuwait have reported that the Kuwait Oil Co. has resumed production and export. Jedda have confirmed that Saudi Arabian production has now been fully restarted and that tanker loading (including one British tanker) is proceeding normally.

U.A.R.

5. The organised evacuation of British subjects has been carried out successfully. The evacuees have now landed in Cyprus. They are due to be flown to the U.K. on 15 June in R.A.F. aircraft and aircraft chartered by H.M.G.

United Nations

6. Security Council. The Soviet Union recalled the Council

/yesterday

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yesterday afternoon and pressed for a vote on a draft resolution condemning Israeli aggression and demanding Israeli withdrawal behind the armistice lines. After a procedural battle, Lord Caradon succeeded in securing an adjournment until today. The Council will meet at 1600 (BST), and a vote on the Soviet draft resolution is probable. It is unlikely to attract more than 5 or 6 votes out of the 9 required. The U.K. will abstain. Lord Caradon will speak on the question of withdrawal, but will avoid using a specific formula.

7. The Assembly. The Soviet Union by means of a letter from Mr. Gromyko to the Secretary General has formally requested the Secretary General to convene an Emergency Special Session in order to "adopt a decision designed to bring about the liquidation of the consequences of aggression and the immediate withdrawal of Israel forces behind the armistice lines". They do not specify the procedure they envisage. They may intend to involve the "Uniting for Peace" procedure, despite their previous criticism of this as illegal. U Thant, however, intends to take no action on the Russian request until after todays vote in the Security Council. A meeting of the Assembly before 16 June appears unlikely.

8. The Soviet motive is clearly to give themselves a better field for propaganda than the Security Council provides. Mr. Gromyko informed U Thant that a delegation "including leading statesmen of the Soviet Union" would be sent to the Assembly. There is so far no firm indication of who will be going.

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 593 14 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.593 of 14 June,
Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Amman and Washington.

My immediately preceding telegram.

As forecast, Eban is not available this morning, so I have spoken to Lourie by telephone in the interests of speed. He took down at my dictation message in your telegram No.1001. I also made suggestion that Israel Government should permit entry of team of observers (your telegram No.2830 to New York), and put to him Mr. Quintin Hogg's anxieties about Egyptians in Sinai. I then asked for an interview in Jerusalem with Mr. Eban this afternoon if possible for the purpose of finding out whether there had been an advance in Israeli thinking on the longer term settlement.

2. Lourie is bringing all this to Mr. Eban's attention as soon as he can get hold of him.

3. Meanwhile, he assured me that the situation had been misinterpreted. Israelis were acutely aware of the need to avoid creating a new refugee problem and they saw that they had done badly in the propaganda battle with regard to refugees which had suddenly been launched by the Arabs and their friends on the outside world.

4. With regard to Egyptians in Sinai he said that we could assure Mr. Hogg that the Israelis were doing all they could to round up such scattered groups as there were and were sending out water trucks and relief columns. But it was a difficult task since, as the journalists had reported, these were disorganized units wandering about off the main routes. When rounded up the Egyptian soldiers were being taken to the canal bank so that they could cross back. On this latter point, I have heard from journalists that on one occasion Egyptian soldiers swimming the canal to the Egyptian side were fired at by Egyptian troops to stop them crossing. Another journalist has said that there is reliable information that the Egyptians are building barbed wire camps on the other side into which all returnees are put. Nasser obviously does not want the defeated remnants of his army coming back to Cairo. Blowing the gaff on the extent of the military disaster he has suffered and stirring up disaffection.

Foreign Office please pass UKMIS New York 111, Amman 138 and Washington 128.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1010Z/14 June
Recd 1500Z/14 June

[Repetition to Amman referred for Departmental decision. Repeated as requested to other posts].

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Copy No.....

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL TELEGRAM

SERIAL No. T no 67

IMMEDIATE RAWALPINDI TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE.

Telno. 624 14 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

My immediately preceding telegram: Middle East.

Following is text of President Ayub's message.

Begins:

The recent tragic events in the Middle East have caused grave concern to us as they have done to you. I feel it is necessary and indeed vital to see that the settlement that emerges is such that does not create more problems than it solves.

The Israelis have no doubt won a military victory and it would be quite natural for them to make political and territorial demands which, if conceded, will in the long run aggravate the situation instead of alleviating it. This, if I may submit, will be in nobody's interest. So in the promotion of the interest of all and indeed in the discharge of your obligations as a Great Power, I would suggest that you use your immense influence to restrain Israeli ambitions and now allow a settlement to be imposed on the Arabs which their pride will not tolerate. Even if the Arab leaders are made to submit to harsh terms, I have no doubt in my mind that their people will not go along with them. Such a solution would be counter productive.

I would therefore beseech you to give the question of the restoration of the Arab territories and the Holy places your urgent and sympathetic consideration. By doing so, you will not only win the gratitude of the Arab people, but of the Muslim world and of all peace loving people.

I am sending a message to Premier Kosygin, President Johnson and President de Gaulle on similar lines.

With kindest regards.

Ends.

Sir C. Pickard

Sent 1520Z 14 June
Recd. 1620Z 14 June

[Copies sent to No.10 Downing Street]

PRISEC (C.O.)

CONFIDENTIAL

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A-P7

SECRET

June 15, 1967

I should perhaps confirm my understanding of the points that emerged from the Prime Minister's talk with the Foreign Secretary here last evening at 11 p.m.

Apart from a brief account by the Foreign Secretary of his talk with Couve about the British approach to E.E.C., they spoke almost exclusively about the Middle East. The Foreign Secretary summarised the latest position at New York and also described the attitude that he thought we should take towards the Soviet demand for an emergency session of the General Assembly; which he had also discussed with several of his NATO colleagues. He said that he and Mr. Rusk agreed that, if Kosygin and Gromyko both attended the special session it would still be preferable that the Prime Minister and President Johnson should not do so; but should leave the conduct of the British and American case to the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Rusk - though the latter had made it clear that he did not know exactly what was in the President's mind. The Foreign Secretary also expressed very strongly the view, which was supported by the unanimous weight of official advice in the Foreign Office, that it would be inappropriate if Kosygin staged through Prestwick for the Prime Minister to go up and see him.

After further discussion the following conclusions were reached:-

(i) the Prime Minister would not attend the special Assembly. If Kosygin did so and if it seemed clear that Rusk and a number of other foreign Ministers were going, the Foreign Secretary should go;

(ii) the Prime Minister would send a message to the President on the foregoing lines and also seeking to establish whether or not the President himself was likely to try to see Kosygin;

(iii) unless there was some clear notification from the Russians that Kosygin (or some equivalent Soviet personality) would be coming through Prestwick, the Prime Minister would not propose to go there;

(iv) If the Foreign Secretary and Rusk and other foreign Ministers were attending the General Assembly it would be desirable for the French also to be represented by their Foreign Minister; and the Prime Minister would probably make this point to General de Gaulle on June 19.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Reid (Cabinet Office).

R M Pallis

C. M. MacLehose, Esq., C.M.G., M.B.E.,
Foreign Office.

Extract from record of conversation between PM and PM Australia on 15.6.67 at 6.30 pm

8

The Middle East

Top copy on Australia's file.

The Prime Minister described the latest developments and the position, as we understood it, of the U.S. and French Governments. He thought that General de Gaulle was probably right in principle in his belief that any imaginative settlement of the Middle East question would require Four Power agreement. There must be a satisfactory

SECRET

balance: certain Israeli rights. such as acceptance of the country's existence, free passage through the Straits of Tiran and through the Suez Canal, should be secured but, as he had said recently to the Soviet Ambassador, any settlement must also take account of legitimate Arab aspirations. In particular, there must be some effective solution to the refugee problem. He doubted whether this could be achieved by wh[illegible] ight become a diplomatic haggle and there [illegible] he danger of the Israelis saying simply that [illegible] ould hold on to what they had. He believed that some fo[illegible] Four Power meeting and possibly Four Power guarantee for a settlement would probably be required [illegible] ead as if there was a new arms build- [illegible] area and we had to work for some [illegible] of i[illegible] ic agreement to control the supply o[illegible]. [illegible] b whether any of these problems could be satisfa[illegible] r settled without an agreement at a high level Four P[illegible] r meeting. It was clear that Israel would have to play a helpful part. There would probably have to be some form of U.N. Force on both sides of the border. Mr. Holt said that on his arrival in Britain he had expressed the willingness of the Australian Government to accept some Arab refugees in Australia and also to help contribute to the cost of the settlement. This had at once produced a critical Press reaction in Australia, on the lines of "the Arabs are coming". But he fully shared the Prime Minister's view that a decisive effort must now be made to obtain a definitive and lasting settlement.

The Prime Minister said that this was why he thought a Four Power meeting would be necessary. President Johnson disliked the idea because of the risk that the French might make common cause with the Russians and possibly help them in seeking to have any discussion extended to cover Vietnam. But, provided we insisted on confining the discussion to the Middle East, he believed this would be the right course. He would be discussing all this with General de Gaulle on June 19. Mr. Holt said that he agreed broadly. Given the lack of balance in the United Nations and the ineffectiveness of the Secretary General, the Four Powers would be obliged to help towards a settlement. He added, with perhaps a tinge of Schadenfreude, that it was ironical to see the Canadians, who had so dedicated themselves to the cause of the United Nations, now under such hostile attack for the part they had played in the Middle East.

The Prime Minister: There was no suggestion that Lord Alport was the only one acceptable. I would have thought that he was acceptable to hon. Members opposite, for he was a member of their Administration and he was a very distinguished High Commissioner in that part of the world. But, of course, it is true that there are many hon. Members, as there are those in another place and outside both Houses, who could have been chosen for this Mission. We chose Lord Alport.

COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

Q6. **Mr. Cordle** asked the Prime Minister what discussions he has had with Commonwealth Prime Ministers about this year's Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference.

The Prime Minister: There is no convention of annual meetings, Sir. As to the next meeting, I would refer the hon. Member to the Answer I gave on 4th May to a Question by the hon. and learned Member for Antrim, South (Sir Knox Cunningham).—[Vol. 746, c. *112*.]

Mr. Cordle: In view of events in Africa and the Common Market and our somewhat ambiguous East of Suez policy, does the Prime Minister not agree that the conference should be held sooner rather than later?

The Prime Minister: I see no pressing need for such a conference. We had quite a fascinating one last September and I do not think there is any hurry to have another at this moment—the words are still ringing in my ears. On the Common Market we are in close touch with all the countries concerned, and on a Ministerial basis with those principally concerned. As for East of Suez, and other defence policies, I have explained the discussions that we are having with leading Commonwealth Prime Ministers.

Mr. E. L. Mallalieu: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind the desirability and feasibility, when the next Conference takes place, of the Commonwealth taking a lead towards the establishment of a real system of peace-keeping in the world?

The Prime Minister: Yes, I would very much like to see a greater contribution by some Commonwealth countries, some of the newer Commonwealth countries, particularly in the matter of responsibility for peace-keeping. When I suggested at the beginning of the last Conference that the length of speeches should be in proportion to what each country was doing to help Zambia, I had in mind one of my colleagues whose speeches might have been a bit shorter. He is no longer a Prime Minister.

SUEZ CANAL (DETAINED BRITISH SHIPS)

Mr. Bessell (*by Private Notice*) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement about British subjects on board the four ships held in the Suez Canal and what provision is being made to ensure their safety.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. William Rodgers): Four British ships are detained in the Great Bitter Lake together with several ships of other nationalities. There are 261 passengers and crew on board, of whom 202 are known to be British.

I have seen reports in the Press that the United Arab Republic Foreign Minister has said that the canal will remain closed so long as the Israelis are on the east bank.

The head of the United Arab Republic Interests Section in London has been summoned to the Foreign Office and told that it is intolerable that our ships should be detained in this way. We are working together with other Governments concerned and plans are being prepared for evacuation.

Meanwhile, the Canadian Ambassador in Cairo, who looks after British interests in the United Arab Republic, has told us that the passengers and crew on board are well. He is arranging for consular officers of the Canadian Embassy and the British Interests Section to make contact with the ships.

The shipping agents have told us that steps have been taken to provide the ships with food supplies.

Mr. Bessell: While thanking the hon. Gentleman for that statement, which I am sure will be appreciated on both sides

of the House, may I ask him whether the Red Cross has been invited to assist in the evacuation of these British subjects, and whether he is quite satisfied that there is no possible danger to the passengers in the present situation?

Mr. Rodgers: Is it impossible to give a categoric answer to the second question, but to the best of our information, the people involved are as well as can be expected, and we see no immediate danger to them.

We have obviously to try to find the best means by which evacuation can be accomplished, if it has to be done. On these occasions, sometimes the more dramatic course is not necessarily the one which will ensure the safety of the people involved.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Has not Egypt accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court in this matter? Therefore, is it not open to Her Majesty's Government, and other Governments affected, to apply for an injunction which would compel Egypt to open the canal?

Mr. Rodgers: The question of opening the canal is somewhat larger than this specific question relating to British subjects. What I can say to the right hon. Gentleman is that this is precisely the sort of matter to which we are now trying to find a clear answer.

Mr. Paget: If the Egyptians insist upon defying international law in these matters, is there not a case for asking our Israeli friends to step over on to the opposite shore?

Mr. Biggs-Davison: Can we have an assurance from the Government that their policy with their allies, and other friendly nations, is to secure on a permanent basis the freedom of navigation in this international waterway, according to the Constantinople Convention and the resolutions of the United Nations?

Mr. Rodgers: That supplementary question goes a great deal wider than the original Question. What we are primarily concerned with at the moment is the safety of the British subjects involved.

Mr. Sandys: Will not the Minister say a little more about opening the canal, and not merely confine himself to the question of the evacuation of British subjects? If he is not able to make a statement himself, will he promise us that a statement will be made by the Government, at the first possible moment, about what action is being taken to reopen the canal?

Mr. Rodgers: I can certainly give an undertaking on the larger question that we shall make a statement as soon as we are in a position to say something which will be useful to the House. I do not think that we can possibly make a statement earlier than the moment at which we have something helpful to say to the House. I thought that I was saying "Yes" to the right hon. Gentleman's request.

Mr. Molloy: Will my hon. Friend give the House an assurance that he will not embark on any disastrous policy in this matter, such as was followed by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys)?

Mr. Rodgers: The assurance which I have given, and will give again, is that we shall do all that we possibly can to ensure the safety of this group of British subjects, stranded in difficult circumstances.

Mr. Thorpe: Can the Minister say whether his information is that the canal is blocked by the presence of such ships as alleged or merely by political reasons?

Mr. Rodgers: It is not possible to know precisely why it is blocked at present. [An HON. MEMBER: "Why not?"] The information available to the House is the same as the information available to the Government on this point.

As I said in my original statement, we have, irrespective of what the original cause may be for the moment, the remark which has been made by the U.A.R. Foreign Minister, that the canal will remain closed as long as Israelis are on the east bank.

Lord Balniel: Surely it is possible at this time, and not at some indefinite time in the future, to confirm that the 1951 resolution imposes an obligation upon the Security Council to keep international waterways open?

Mr. Rodgers: Whatever the obligations, our immediate purpose must be twofold. First, and this was the burden

[MR. RODGERS.]
of the Question asked, how can we best help the 202 British subjects who are stranded? I hope that nothing will be said this afternoon in the House which will in any way make it more difficult to help.

Mr. Maxwell: Can my hon. Friend say what are the nationalities of the other ships which are locked in the canal, and what Governments are they with whom he is having consultations about the possibility of getting the passengers and the ships released?

Mr. Rodgers: I cannot tell my hon. Friend immediately the nationalities of the other ships. [An HON. MEMBER: "Why not?"] As I have made clear, we are, in particular, in consultation with the Canadian Government, because of their special responsibility for British interests in this matter. We shall, of course, consult and act with every Government which can help to solve this problem.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order. Mr. Heath. Business Question.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. Heath: May I ask the Leader of the House to state the business of the House for next week?

The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Richard Crossman): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:

MONDAY, 19TH JUNE—In the morning—

Adjourned Second Reading debate of the Bermuda Constitution Bill.

Second Reading of the Public Works Loans (No. 2) Bill.

In the afternoon—

Debate on Aden on a Motion for the Adjournment of the House.

Second Reading of the Aden, Perim and Kuria Muria Islands Bill.

Adjourned debate on the Gas (Borrowing Powers) Order.

Resumed debate on the Second Reading of the Anchors and Chain Cables Bill.

TUESDAY, 20TH JUNE—Remaining stages of the Leasehold Reform Bill.

WEDNESDAY, 21ST JUNE—In the morning—

Motions on the Agricultural Investment (Variation of Rate of Grant) Order, the Calf Subsidies (United Kingdom) (Amendment) Scheme, and on the Agriculture (Tractor Cabs) Regulations.

Lords Amendments to the Marine &c., Broadcasting (Offences) Bill.

In the afternoon—

Committee stage of the Finance (No. 2) Bill, which it is hoped to complete in time to allow consideration of the remaining stages of the Decimal Currency Bill.

THURSDAY, 22ND JUNE—Debate on a Government Motion on the White Paper on the D Notice System (Cmnd. 3312).

Motion on the Iron Casting Industry (Scientific Research Levy) Order.

FRIDAY, 23RD JUNE—Remaining stages of the Sexual Offences (No. 2) Bill and of the Criminal Law Bill [*Lords.*]

MONDAY, 26TH JUNE—The proposed business will be:

In the morning—

Second Reading of the Public Records Bill [*Lords.*]

Second Reading of the Advertisements (Hire Purchase) Bill [*Lords*] and of the Legal Aid (Scotland) Bill [*Lords*], which are consolidation Measures.

Remaining stages of the Bermuda Constitution Bill.

In the afternoon—

Supply [21st Allotted Day].

A debate will take place on a topic to be announced later.

At seven o'clock, as the House is aware, the Chairman of Ways and Means has set down opposed Private Business for consideration.

Mr. Heath: Am I right in thinking that it is still the intention of the Foreign Secretary to make a statement about Government policy on Aden on Monday?

Mr. Crossman: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Heath: I am glad to have that confirmation. But what is the objection to taking the remainder of the Committee

Personal

A. M. Palliser, Esq., C.M.G.,
10, Downing Street.

With the compliments of

PLANNING STAFF

Mr. J.A. Thomson

FOREIGN OFFICE
LONDON, S.W.1

15 June, 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

K

Mr. Ross

Middle East

Following our conversation this morning you asked me to do a note about where we stand and what we ought to be concentrating on.

2. On the basis of reports from posts I conclude:-

(a) there will be no substantive Arab-Israel talks because the Arabs won't have them;

(b) no progress will be made in substantive US/USSR talks because the USSR will not agree;

(c) there will be endless talk at the United Nations but no real progress towards a settlement;

(d) the Israeli attitude will be to deny territorial ambitions while insisting that they cannot withdraw until they have guarantees of a satisfactory settlement;

(e) in these circumstances, the present position will continue with only slight modifications;

(f) part of the present position is that the Suez Canal is blocked and there are serious impediments to the flow of oil to this country;

(g) the USSR and the UAR will try to maintain this position and will try to make Anglo-Arab relations as difficult as possible.

3. I submit that we need to do all we can to improve Anglo-Arab relations to avoid further damage to British interests and in order to get the Canal open and the oil flowing. To this end we need to consider urgently, and where appropriate act upon, the following points:-

Anglo-Arab Relations in General

(a) We should inject into our public statements and our attributable publicity elements giving some satisfaction to the Arabs; for instance

(i) Can we condemn both at the United Nations and outside it Israeli aggression on 5 June on the lines that we have now examined that evidence, have come to the conclusion that the Israelis fired the first shot, and take the view that it was reprehensible of them not to wait for the efforts we and others were making to extricate them from the admittedly impossible situation in which the UAR had placed them? If not

/ (ii)

CONFIDENTIAL

(ii) we should at least condemn the Israelibreach of the cease fire in Southern Syria if confirmed (UKMIS New York telegram No. 1311 paragraph 6).

(iii) we should express admiration for the fight put up by the Jordanians and sympathy for the sufferings of the civilian population.

(iv) We should make a financial offer to Jordan.

(v) We should make public play with our differences with the Israelis over the status of Jerusalem and H.M. Consul-General.

(vi) We might also express our appreciation for the help some Arab countries have given us in evacuating our nationals.

(b) We should explore what practical measures we can take to help the refugees in Jordan by sending men and materials as well as money; we should, if possible, increase our contributions for this purpose (UKMIS New York telegram No. 1317).

(c) On the question of Israeli withdrawal, our line should be that the war should not lead to the territorial aggrandisement of Israel;

(d) We must take all possible measures to nail "the big lie". These will include

(i) attributable and non-attributable publicity;

(ii) pressing for a U.N. investigation;

(iii) trying to persuade King Hussain to retract (are there any incentives we and the United States could offer him to do so?)

(iv) ? inviting responsible Arabs, if they would come, to visit the bases and vessels concerned.

(e) We must try to restore diplomatic relations; could we, for instance, use public condemnation of Israeli aggression (3(a)(i) or (ii) above) to help wavereres, especially the Sudan?

Suez Canal

(f) Our best course here is to persuade the Belgians to get other Canal users, especially the Indians, who have not been deeply involved in recent events to bring pressure on the Egyptians to reopen the Canal as soon as possible.

Oil

(g) We must maintain pressure on the Kuwaitis, the Saudis, the Libyans and the smaller oil producers to resume supplies by

stressing that their pretext for cutting supplies was not a valid one and (where we judge it would be useful) by drawing attention to the advantages their competitors are gaining from the present situation. At the same time we should not show undue anxiety in public; we must not confirm the Arabs in their belief that Arab oil can be used to blackmail us.

4. In general it will be in our interests and in keeping with the foregoing to keep out of the limelight and not to get involv e.g. with the Americans, in major schemes for long term settleme of the Arab-Israel dispute. However, we shall not be able to avoid enquiries about our position in Parliament, and from the press. Nor can we escape taking part in debates in the Securit Council and the General Assembly. In the case of general questions about our position we can probably get away with the formula that there are rights and wrongs on both sides, and that the test of any proposals must be whether or not they will help to prevent a recurrence of the recent fighting. But there will be occasions, especially at the United Nations, when we shall no be able to avoid taking a more specific position. The safest points on which to concentrate might be:-

(a) that Jerusalem should be an Open City;

(b) that the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank should not be driven from their homes and land and that those who left of their own accord during the recent fighting should be allowed to return forthwith;

(c) that there should be a United Nations Force on both sides of the frontiers between Israel and her Arab neighbours.

5. In the longer run a modus vivendi may arise from a certain coincidence of attitude on some points between the United States and the USSR. We should meanwhile bear this in mind but it does not follow that we should therefore refrain from trying to defen ourselves against the Russians and indeed from turning the table on them, if we can. The more pressure they are under the more likely they are in the longer run to put pressure on the Arabs, as they did in the case of the cease fire.

6. I recommend that:-

(a) we should now decide to which individual in the Foreig Office responsibility for working out our positions on each of the points in paragraphs 3 and 4 above should be assigned;

(b) we should put up a comprehensive submission seeking authority to act in the appropriate circumstances on each of the points in paragraphs 3 and 4.

(J.A. Thomson)
14 June, 1967.

Copies to: Sir D. Allen
Mr. Peck
Mr. Hayman
Mr. Moore
Mr. Speares
Mr. Lambert
Mr. Mar
Mr. Morris

NOT.
CKYL
MIDEAST - FRANCE

BY HAROLD KING

PARIS, JUNE 15, REUTER - FRANCE TODAY OPPOSED ANY EVENTUAL ATTEMPTS BY ISRAEL TO ANNEX ARAB TERRITORY OCCUPIED LAST WEEK WITHOUT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

IN A CAREFULLY-WORDED STATEMENT, THE GOVERNMENT SAID:

"FOR THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, WHICH ENDEAVOURED TO PREVENT THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES AND WHICH AFTERWARDS TOOK ACTIVE STEPS TO BRING THEM TO AN END, IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT NO FAIT ACCOMPLI ON THE SPOT CONCERNING TERRITORIAL LIMITS AND THE CONDITION OF CITIZENS OF THE INTERESTED STATES CAN BE CONSIDERED AS DEFINITE."

THE STATEMENT, DRAFTED BY PRESIDENT DE GAULLE HIMSELF, WENT ON TO SAY THAT "ONLY A FREELY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, ACCEPTED BY ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED AND CONSECRATED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, COULD ONE DAY RESOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS POSED."

MORE RD/EC 1437

CKYL
MIDEAST - FRANCE 2 PARIS

"IT IS WITH THIS PROSPECT IN VIEW THAT FRANCE HAS AGREED TO THE MEETING OF AN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS."

THE PRESIDENT IS PREPARED TO ATTEND A SUMMIT MEETING OF THE "BIG FOUR" - WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND BRITAIN - IN NEW YORK DURING THE PROPOSED EMERGENCY GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION, RELIABLE SOURCES SAID.

HE MIGHT PAY A VISIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS - HIS FIRST TO THE WORLD ORGANISATION - AND ADDRESS THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE SOURCES ADDED.

INFORMATION MINISTER GEORGES GORSE SAID THAT FRANCE DID NOT BELIEVE THE TIME WAS YET RIPE FOR REACHING A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

MORE RD/EC 1439

A. M. Pollitzer, Esq., CMG
10 Downing St.

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1

15. 6. 67.

Middle East Pt

Foreign Office
S.W.1
15 June, 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Michael, 15/6

You asked for a note on our views on the question of a Minister meeting the Russian delegate to the special session of the United Nations when he passes through Prestwick.

We still do not know when the aircraft will come through and we think this will not be known until the date for the opening of the special session has been fixed. When the aircraft does come it is expected to stop for some two hours so that there would be time for discussion.

The main reason why we are against a Minister meeting the Russian delegate at Prestwick is this. One of the Russians' purposes in calling for a special session of the Assembly is to play on the resentment the Arabs feel at our alleged support of the Israelis. They will do all they can in this respect in an effort to restore some of the prestige they themselves have lost with the Arabs. The reverse of this is that they will seek to profit from our own difficulties. While they will probably not go so far as to endorse the Big Lie they will do all they can to bracket us with the Israelis. This posture will be anti-American and anti-British and will be seen to be such. For this reason we think it would be unwise for us to be seen to be seeking them out at this juncture.

/Apart

A. M.Palliser, Esq., CMG,
10 Downing Street.

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Apart from this we do not think they will yet have anything helpful to say to us on substance and they will not, at this stage at any rate, be open to influence by us. Indeed, they might think it necessary to safeguard themselves against the suspicion that any talk they had with a British Minister at Prestwick had been conciliatory by not only taking an unduly hard line, but also by publicising this fact.

The situation would of course be quite different if a definite request, or even a reasonably direct hint came from the Russians for a talk when their aircraft refuels at Prestwick.

Yours ever,

Donald

Nonostante da mesi
7.5.
Sempre con affetto
Non ti abbia scritto a lungo
del.
Non mi è arrivata
più tua notizia

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

JEDDA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 423 15 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 423 of 15 June, Repeated for information Saving to Bahrain.

Middle East Situation: Future Policy.

The following is a "think piece" towards our policy in the immediate future. It is a fact that in Saudi Arabia as well as in other Arab countries Britain has lost much in her standing and reputation over the recent crisis owing to her being commonly associated as on the side of Israel despite our protestations of neutrality. We should consider how we can restore our position and regain Arab confidence in us.

2. From the beginnings of the post-1939 war stage in trying to establish good Saudi Arabian/British relations and mutual friendly confidence, we have started under a handicap based on the following factors:-

(a) Britain and the United States are regarded as the primary establishers of Israel. Russian support for the establishment of Israel in the United Nations and elsewhere is admitted but in the Arab view this does not lessen our predominant part.

(b) Ever since then it has been firmly believed that Israel could not have continued to survive but for the consistent support of the United States, Britain and West Germany (France is left to one side).

(c) The Suez operation confirmed the Arabs in their opinion that Britain supported Israel rather than the Arabs.

(d) Since then there has been a slow climb back through a period of uneasiness to the more normal and reasonably friendly relations which had been established with Saudi Arabia, but there was still some underlying Arab doubt that we were completely sincere and decided in wanting to establish ourselves in the Arab world as real friends, cooperators and worthy of mutual confidence.

(e) More recent British policy has strengthened this Arab doubt. In the United Nations when dealing with Arab/Israel border and other incidents, Britain (with the United States) has appeared to the Arabs always to have been ready to blame them when given cause but not Israel when she transgressed. The tone of the British political attitude towards the Arab world expressed by the Government and in the Press and on the BBC has been generally critical and fault-finding rather than one of enthusiasm to maintain the best of relations in the Arab world.

(f) In Saudi Arabia Britain's policy over South Arabia (early withdrawal of the base and no defence agreement)

her cultivation of Nasser against Saudi advice, and policy in South East Arabia, did not give confidence that we were really prepared to be a true and abiding friend of Saudi Arabia who would stand by her in her difficulties. Nevertheless genuine attempts were made, and good progress too was made, to establish sound practical relations based on friendship and mutual confidence though some underlying unease and readiness to doubt could not be fully eradicated in the relatively short time.

(g) When the present Israel/Arab crisis began Saudi Arabia was one of the Arab countries which stood out for an independent line though when hostilities became imminent she was obliged, and wished, to show herself as a good Arab joining the ranks in uniform Arab support against their common enemy. She was criticised for her close association with two major Western Powers, Britain and the United States whom others regarded as supporters of Israel, but she still did not deviate. She hoped in turn that Britain would support her in her relative isolation by showing in fact that she was a good and abiding friend of the Arabs, ready to stand by them in their difficulties. To her disappointment and embarrassment, from the beginnings of the present crisis, even prior to hostilities, our actions in their (and the common Arab) view confirmed the traditional belief that we supported Israel rather than the Arabs. Evidence of this lay in our demand for the opening of the Tiran Straits the result of which was solely to benefit Israel and air cover for Israel during the conflict (which is widely believd though not by the Government) which in turn strengthened a belief of some that prior to hostilities we and the United States had given Israel secret assurance of support. In the Arab view Israel was clearly the aggressor and the initiator of a conflict. To establish this did not require lengthy examination. Yet no word of condemnation has come from the West for that nor for her later failures to observe the cease-fire.

(h) Saudia Arabia, who has stood out independently from Nasser, is thus in the awkward position of being publicly (and by her wish) committed to a close association with Britain and America and is on that account subjected to criticism as a friend of those supporters of Israel. Despite this she has maintained her friendly and her diplomatic relations at a time when many others have broken, but she had hoped for some visible act by us which would show that we were not wholly committed to Israel whilst regarding the Arabs as of only secondary interest. Such an act would help her by showing to all that her association was with a country genuinely ready to stand by the Arabs: but so far no sign of this kind has been made.

3. In this situation some visible and early act on Britain's part is needed to show publicly that she genuinely has the interests of

Arabs at heart and supports her friends. The first and most effective would undoubtedly be to name Israel as the aggressor and condemn too her later failures to observe the ceasefire. The next would be to ensure equitable terms for the Arabs in the peace settlement and that Israel was not left in possession of her recent territorial gains since this would only encourage the doctrine that aggression pays and that Israel will be free to aggress again in the future when she wishes. We should avoid pressure on the Arabs to accept humiliating terms. Their feeling against Israel is probably even more intense now than before and despite their defeat they would not recognise Israel: were they compelled to do so by force it would be a lip-service act to be broken later.

4. Prior to the peace settlement, a practical gesture of sympathy is needed. The plight of Jordan has become symbolical. Early and generous aid would be the most welcome and effective act (especially when the BBC announced on 12 June that within a few days £10 million had been collected in Britain for a fund to help Israel). Her Majesty's Government have announced that they are going to do this but no details are yet available.

5. Acts of the foregoing kind could best help us to see through the present uneasy stage and could the most effectively lead to a restoration of confidence and the firm friendship which Saudi Arabia could confidently support and which could best contribute to our economic and commercial as well as political future here.

Foreign Office pass Bahrain 11 Saving.

Mr. Cranston

Sent 1420Z 15 June
Recd 1855Z 15 June

[Repeated as requested]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
Eastern Dept.

NNNNN

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2051
SECRET

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
15 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2051 OF 15 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND MOSCOW.
YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 6610: MIDDLE EAST.
I TALKED THIS EVENING TO RUSK BATTLE WAS PRESENT. HAVING EXCHANGED INFORMATION ABOUT THE LIKLIHOOD OF A SPECIAL ASSEMBLY AND THE PROBABLE PARTICIPANTS RUSK SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE *RUSSIAN MOVE HAD BEEN MADE WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE ARAB STATES. IN SOME CASES THE ARABS HAD BEEN UNHAPPY. HE THOUGHT IT WAS PRIMARILY A PROPAGANDA MOVE DESIGNED TO SALVAGE SOVIET PRESTIGE BUT THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT ALSO THINK THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A MAN-TO-MAN TALK TO SOME OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. THIS WOULD GIVE THEM A CHANCE TO AGREE THEIR STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT PERIOD AND TO DECIDE ON HOW TO EXPLOIT THE GREAT LIE, ALLEGATIONS OF COLLUSION AND SO ON. RUSK DID NOT EXPECT ANYTHING CONSTRUCT-IVE TO COME OUT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND HE SAW VERY LITTLE CHANCE OF MODERATION ON EITHER THE ISRAELI OR ARAB SIDE.
LATER ON THERE MIGHT BE SOME COOLING OFF AND IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS A LONGER-TERM SETTLEMENT BUT THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF THIS AT PRESENT.
2. AS REGARDS LONGER-TERM IDEAS AND VIEWS RUSK SAID THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CERTAINLY HAD NO BLUE PRINT AND WERE BEING VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT PRODUCING EVEN TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS OR SUGGESTIONS. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ANY SETTLEMENT WERE CLEAR ENOUGH ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE EXISTENCE OF

/THE STATE

* Just as the original Arab move was probably without Russian consent!

Copies to Sir B. Trend 166

THE STATE OF ISRAEL, THE ABOLITION OF BELLIGERENCE ON THE ARAB SIDE, A SETTLEMENT OF TIRAN AND SUEZ, PROGRESS ON REFUGEES, PROGRESS ON ARMS LIMITATION AND A REGIME FOR THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM. THE LAST WOULD BE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT. RUSK DOUBTED WHETHER THE UN MACHINERY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD SURVIVE THE PRESENT CRISIS SINCE BOTH SIDES WERE THOROUGHLY DISILLUSIONED WITH IT. INDIVIDUAL NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT EVENTUALLY PROVE BETTER THAN A ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE. A HIGH-POWERED MEDIATOR WAS URGENTLY REQUIRED BUT THE ISRAELIS WERE REFUSING TO ACCEPT ONE. US POLICY AT PRESENT WAS TO BE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS, TO PRODUCE NO DECISIONS OF EVEN PROPOSALS AND TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA WOULD DO. RUSK INDICATED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT FELT THAT IT HAD VERY LITTLE INFLUENCE AT PRESENT WITH THE ISRAELIS AND WOULD HAVE EVEN LESS IF DAYAN CAME INTO POWER. RUSK SAID THAT NEITHER HE NOR ANYBODY ELSE COULD TELL ME MORE AT PRESENT ABOUT U.S. LONGER-TERM THINKING, BUT HE AGREED TO KEEP CLOSELY IN TOUCH AS THEIR THINKING DEVELOPED.

F O PASS MOSCOW 142
SIR P DEAN

SENT AT 0133Z/16
RECD AT 0133Z/16

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION]

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COPY NO. 22

TOP SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2052 15 JUNE 1967
DEDIP
TOP SECRET
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE AS SOON AS CONVENIENT.
MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.
MIDDLE EAST.
RUSK TOLD ME THAT HE HAD HAD A GOOD TALK WITH YOU IN LUXEMBOURG. HE WENT ON TO DISCUSS WITH ME THE PROSPECTS FOR, AND SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN AND DURING, THE SPECIAL ASSEMBLY.
HE SAID THAT SOME PEOPLE SEEMED TO THINK THAT IF ONLY THE PRESIDENT AND KOSYGIN COULD HAVE A GOOD TALK ALL THE WORLD'S PROBLEMS WOULD BE SOLVED. THEY FORGOT TOO EASILY THAT ON THE LAST SIMILAR OCCASION (WHEN KENNEDY MET KRUSCHCHEV) WE HAD BEEN FACED AT ONCE WITH A MAJOR CRISIS OVER BERLIN. ALTHOUGH KOSYGIN'S MOTIVES IN DECIDING TO COME HIMSELF MIGHT BE THOSE SET OUT IN M.I.P.T. THERE MIGHT BE MORE TO IT THAN THAT. I ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT KOSYGIN'S MOTIVE IN COMING MIGHT BE TO MAKE THINGS WORSE RATHER THAN BETTER AND WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE MIGHT REACH BEYOND RECOVERING THEIR PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE WITH THE ARABS TO ELIMINATE WESTERN AND PARTICULARLY UK/US INFLUENCE AND POWER IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES. RUSK SAID THAT THIS POSSIBILITY WAS IN HIS MIND. HE REMARKED THAT THE REGIMES IN BOTH THE MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES SUCH AS LIBYA AND IN THE EXTREME COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE UAR WERE IN VERY SERIOUS TROUBLE.
2. WE THEN TALKED ABOUT THE FRENCH AND RUSK SAID THAT SOME FRENCHMEN WERE BEHAVING EXTREMELY BADLY IN SOME PLACES: AND HE MENTIONED SOME INTELLIGENCE REPORTS ABOUT KUWAIT STERLING WHICH YOU HAVE NO DOUBT SEEN. HE SEEMED VERY SUSPICIOUS

/OF

TOP SECRET

Copies to Mr B. Trew N.6

OF THE FRENCH BUT SAID ON THE OTHER HAND THAT COUVE DE MURVILLE HAD TOLD HIM IN CONFIDENCE IN LUXEMBOURG THAT THE ALGERIANS HAD ASKED THE FRENCH TO SUPPLY THEM WITH ARMS IN THE PLACE OF THE RUSSIANS AND THAT THE FRENCH HAD AGREED TO DO THIS.

3. FINALLY AS REGARDS A POSSIBLE SUMMIT MEETING RUSK SHOWED ME THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT (WHICH I HAVE NOW RECEIVED THROUGH ORDINARY CHANNELS). HE COMMENTED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT BE AT ALL ENAMOURED WITH THE IDEA OF A FOUR-POWER SUMMIT AND I WAS LEFT WITH THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NO PLANS AT PRESENT TO GO TO NEW YORK HIMSELF AND WOULD WAIT TO SEE WHETHER KOSYGIN MADE ANY MOVE TOWARDS TRYING TO MEET HIM: IF THERE WERE A MEETING, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE A BILATERAL ONE. THE PRESIDENT OF COURSE MIGHT ALSO SEE OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT BILATERALLY.

SIR P. DEAN.

SENT AT Ø1Ø1Z/16
RECD AT Ø1Ø2Z/16

P R I S E C (F.O.)

SSSSS

EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 616
UNCLASSIFIED

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
15 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 616 OF 15 JUNE AND RFI IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND ROUTINE TO MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV.

MIDDLE EAST.

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS MADE TO THE PRESS BY THE FRENCH INFORMATION MINISTER, M. GORSE, AFTER THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ON 15 JUNE:-

BEGINS.

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS TAKEN NOTE OF THE SERIOUS WORLD POLITICAL RESULTS AND THE DEPLORABLE HUMAN SEQUELS IN THE AREA WHICH HAVE ARISEN FROM THE MILITARY ACTION UNLEASHED ON 5 JUNE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TRIED TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ACTIVE IN BRINGING THEM TO A HALT: FOR THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT, AS FAR AS TERRITORIAL LIMITS AND THE STATUS OF THE CITIZENS OF THE INTERESTED STATES ARE CONCERND, NO+FAIT ACCOMPLI+ ON THE SPOT COULD BE TAKEN AS HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED (QUOTE NE SAURAIT ETRE TENU POUR ACQUIS UNQUOTE).

ONLY A SETTLEMENT FREELY NEGOTIATED AND ACCEPTED BY ALL THE PARTIES IN QUESTION AND ENDORSED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD ONE DAY SOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED. IT IS WITH THIS

/PERSPECTIVE

PERSPECTIVE THAT FRANCE HAS GIVEN HER ASSENT TO THE SPECIAL MEETING OF THE UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY.
ENDS.

2. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS, M. GORSE IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT FRANCE WAS NOT AT THE MOMENT FACED WITH SERIOUS PROBLEMS EITHER OVER THE SUPPLY OF PETROL OR WITH REGARD TO THE CLOSURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL.

3. A TWO-DAY FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE BEGAN IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY THIS AFTERNOON. M. COUVE DE MURVILLE'S OPENING STATEMENT DID NOT DWELL AT PARTICULAR LENGTH ON THE MIDDLE EAST OR CONTAIN POINTS OF SUBSTANCE NOT ALREADY FAMILIAR. SUMMARY WILL BE TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY.

FO PSE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON 181 AND UKMIS NEW YORK 48 AND ROUTINE TO MOSCOW 51 AND TEL AVIV 12.

SIR P REILLY

SENT AT 1930Z/15 JUNE 1967
RECD AT 1930Z/15 JUNE 1967

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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PPPPP

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT.A.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERS...
SERIAL No. ID1/67

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

TELNO. 1973 15 JUNE, 1967 (PS)

Copy re France (Visit to Paris, June 1967)

SECRET.

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE AT ONCE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT DE GAULLE.

BEGINS:

MONSIEUR DE COURCEL WILL HAVE TOLD YOU OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS I HAD WITH HIM LAST WEEK ABOUT THE POSSIBLE TOPICS THAT YOU AND I MIGHT DISCUSS WHEN I HAVE THE PLEASURE OF SEEING YOU NEXT MONDAY. WHILE I BELIEVE YOU MAY SHARE MY VIEW THAT WE SHOULD NOT ESTABLISH ANY FORMAL AGENDA FOR WHAT WILL, I HOPE, BE ESSENTIALLY AN INFORMAL AND WIDE-RANGING EXCHANGE OF IDEAS ABOUT WORLD PROBLEMS GENERALLY, I EXPECT WE SHALL BOTH AGREE ON THE NEED TO TAKE A HARD LOOK AT THE MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION AND THE POSSIBILITIES THAT MAY NOW EXIST TO BRING ABOUT A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT THERE.

IT IS ABOUT THIS THAT I AM NOW WRITING TO YOU, AS A KIND OF PROLOGUE TO OUR DISCUSSION.

YOU AND I HAVE BOTH EXCHANGED A NUMBER OF MESSAGES IN THE PAST FEW DAYS WITH PREMIER KOSYGIN: AND OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH OTHER FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS. FROM THE OUTSET OF THIS UNHAPPY CRISIS WE HAVE, AS YOU KNOW, STRONGLY SUPPORTED YOUR VIEW THAT ONLY IF THE FOUR GREAT POWERS WERE PREPARED TO FACE UP TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES COULD ANY HOPEFUL ISSUE RESULT.

/THIS

THIS WAS THE VIEW THAT I URGED ON THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA, WHEN I SAW HIM ON JUNE 1: AND I AM GLAD TO SAY THAT BOTH THEN AND IN SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGES THAT I HAVE HAD WITH HIM, MR.PEARSON EXPRESSED HIS FULL SUPPORT FOR IT. EQUALLY, I ARGUED THIS WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES WHEN WE MET ON 2 JUNE. MR JOHNSON ACCEPTED THE FORCE OF THE CASE IN SO FAR AS THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL WAS CONCERNED BUT SHOWED LESS ENTHUSIASM FOR IT AS A GENERAL CONCEPT.

IN MY SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGES WITH MR. KOSYGIN I HAVE EQUALLY URGED THE VITAL NECESSITY FOR FOUR POWER CO-OPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING IF PEACE AND STABILITY ARE EVER TO BE RESTORED TO THIS UNHAPPY REGION.

SINCE THEN WE HAVE WITNESSED THE SERIES OF EVENTS THAT RESULTED FROM THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING: THE PROGRESSIVE WEAKENING OF THE SOVIET POSITION RESULTING, AS I BELIEVE, FROM THEIR DISCOVERY OF THEIR INABILITY TO CONTROL A SITUATION WHICH THEY WERE AT LEAST PARTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR CREATING: THEIR ACQUIESCENCE IN THE UNANIMOUS CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE LATTER'S RELUCTANT ACCEPTANCE BY THE ARAB POWERS.

BUT THE CEASE-FIRE, AS WE BOTH KNOW, IS ONLY THE FIRST ESSENTIAL STEP IN WHAT IS BOUND TO BE AN EXCESSIVELY DIFFICULT AND DELICATE ADVANCE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM. I BELIEVE THAT ALL OF US WILL NOW RECOGNISE THAT WE ARE CONFRONTED WITH A MAJOR CHOICE IN WORLD AFFAIRS. EITHER WE CAN SEEK TO BRING ABOUT AN HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT, IN WHICH THE LEGITIMATE CLAIMS AND ASPIRATIONS OF ALL CONCERNED, ISRAEL AND ARAB ALIKE, WILL SO FAR AS POSSIBLE BE MET: OR WE SHALL ALLOW THE RIVALRIES BETWEEN THE LOCAL POWERS TO BE REFLECTED AND MAGNIFIED BY THE RIVALRIES BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS, LEADING EITHER TO A PATCHED-UP SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL SATISFY NO ONE OR TO NO SETTLEMENT AT ALL - AND IN EITHER CASE TO AN INEVITABLE RENEWAL OF CONFLICT: WITH THE

/IMMEASURABLE

IMMEASURABLE DANGERS FOR WORLD PEACE THAT THIS WOULD ENTAIL.

IN SUCH A SITUATION, THE CHOICE IS CLEAR. THE PROBLEM IS HOW TO ACHIEVE THIS SETTLEMENT WHILE TAKING ACCOUNT NOT ONLY OF THE INTERESTS OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN POWERS THEMSELVES, BUT ALSO OF THOSE OF THE GREAT POWERS WHICH, AS POLITICAL REALISTS, WE MUST RECOGNISE INTERACT CONSTANTLY ON THE AREA, ON ITS RESOURCES AND ON ITS PEOPLES. IN THE PAST, HISTORICALLY AND AGAIN MORE RECENTLY, FRANCE AND BRITAIN HAVE NOT ALWAYS SEEN EYE TO EYE ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. INDEED, IN THESE LATEST WEEKS OF CRISIS THERE HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIAL NUANCES OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US. BUT, AS I SAY, THE TASK NOW IS TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE. AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT, IN FACT, OUR INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST DO NOW VERY MUCH COINCIDE. IN MY MESSAGE TO YOU OF 28 MAY I HINTED THAT, AS THE TWO EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE FOUR POWER GROUP, WE MIGHT, BY COMMON ACTION, ACHIEVE A COMMON PURPOSE. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAST FEW DAYS HAVE STRONGLY REINFORCED ME IN THAT VIEW. THIS IS NOT SIMPLY BECAUSE WE IN EUROPE DEPEND TO AN INCREASING DEGREE ON THE OIL SUPPLIES WE DERIVE FROM THE ARAB WORLD, IMPORTANT AS THOSE ARE. IT IS ALSO BECAUSE WE SURELY MUST ENSURE THAT DECISIONS AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF THIS KEY REGION TAKE DUE REGARD OF THE GENERAL POLITICO-STRATEGIC INTERESTS THERE OF THE EUROPEAN POWERS, AS WELL AS OF THEIR OBVIOUS ECONOMIC INTERESTS.

I AM NOT OF COURSE SUGGESTING A RETURN TO THE KIND OF ANGLO-FRENCH APPROACH WHICH CHARACTERISED THE DISASTROUS 1956 EXCURSION NOR AM I SUGGESTING THAT ANY JOINT PUBLIC INITIATIVE BY US BOTH IS NECESSARILY REQUIRED AT PRESENT. OUR POSITION IN THE FIGHTING, LIKE YOURS, HAS BEEN ONE OF STRICT NEUTRALITY. NOW WE MUST SURELY WORK TOGETHER TO EXERT EFFECTIVE INFLUENCE ON THE NEGOTIATION OF A LASTING AND HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT. BUT I DOUBT WHETHER BRITAIN OR FRANCE, ACTING INDIVIDUALLY, CAN EXPECT TO DEPLOY SUCH INFLUENCE. IF, HOWEVER, WE COULD ESTABLISH A COMMUNITY OF INTEREST AND OF VIEW ABOUT SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THAT WILL FACE US IN THE COMING WEEKS,

/THEN,

THEN, WHETHER IN A FOUR POWER MEETING AT THE UNITED NATIONS, IN SOME OTHER FORUM, OR MORE GENERALLY, WE MAY PERHAPS ENSURE THAT THE INTERESTS OF WESTERN EUROPE AS A WHOLE, AS WELL AS THOSE OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES, ARE TAKEN EFFECTIVELY INTO ACCOUNT.

THIS IS THE BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH I SUGGEST WE MIGHT DISCUSS THE MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION NEXT MONDAY. I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF I GAVE YOU THIS ADVANCE NOTICE OF MY TENTATIVE THINKING.

ENDS.

SOSFA SENT 1515Z 15 JUNE

P R I S E C (F.O.) [COPIES SENT TO NO. 10, DOWNING ST.]

Mr Pollock 13
B

COPY NO. ...4...

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT.A.
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2054
SECRET

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
DATED 15 JUNE 1967

MY TELEGRAM NO 2052 AND YOUR TELEGRAM NO 6671.
FOLLOWING FOR MACLEHOSE
UNFORTUNATELY I DID NOT SEE YOUR TELEGRAM NO: 6671 UNTIL I HAD RETURNED FROM SEEING RUSK. MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE ANSWERS SOME OF THE QUESTIONS IN YOURS. I HAVE SINCE SPOKEN TO RUSK ON THE TELEPHONE. HE TOLD ME THAT IT WAS 99 PER CENT CERTAIN THAT HE WOULD ATTEND THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE G.A. HE SAID THAT COUVE WOULD ALSO BE THERE.
2. RUSK ALSO SAID THAT HIS CONVERSATION WITH COUVE IN LUXEMBOURG HAD BEEN VERY DISJOINTED AND HAD COVERED VERY LITTLE GROUND. APART FROM THE INFORMATION ABOUT SUPPLYING ARMS TO ALGERIA REPORTED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE THE ONLY POINT COUVE HAD MADE WAS THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE ISRAELI'S WERE MUCH OVER-ESTIMATING THEIR CHANCES OF GETTING ANY OF THE ARAB STATES TO SIT DOWN AND TALK WITH THEM.
3. THE PRESS AND RADIO HERE ARE FULL OF SPECULATION ABOUT JOHNSON/KOSYGIN MEETINGS, SUMMIT MEETINGS AND SO ON. IN SPITE OF ALL OF THIS I THINK THAT, ALTHOUGH RUSK WILL CERTAINLY GO TO NEW YORK, HIS ROLE TO BEGIN WITH WILL BE TO LISTEN AND TO OBSERVE AND NOT TO TAKE ANY INITIATIVE AND THAT THE STRONG INCLINATION OF THE PRESIDENT WILL BE TO PLAY IT COOL AND SLOW AND TO SEE WHETHER KOSYGIN MAKES ANY MOVE TO ASK TO MEET HIM RATHER THAN THE REVERSE
SIR. P. DEAN.

SENT AT 0415Z/16
RECD AT 0416Z/16

P R I S E C (F.O.)

SSSSS

SECRET

COPY NO. 13

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 6671 15 JUNE 1967 (PS)

SECRET.
FOLLOWING FROM MACLEHOSE.
WE WILL SHORTLY BE TELEGRAPHING THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE P.M. TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT MINISTERIAL REPRESENTATION AT THE SPECIAL ASSEMBLY.
WHAT PASSED IN LUXEMBOURG LEFT US IN SOME DOUBT AS TO WHAT RUSK'S INTENTIONS WERE IF GROMYKO OR KOSYGIN LED FOR THE RUSSIANS. IN CONVERSATION WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE FIRST DAY HE LEFT A VERY CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT IF GROMYKO WENT HE THOUGHT THAT HE SHOULD GO TOO. THIS COINCIDED ENTIRELY WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S OWN INCLINATION. HE WAS LESS CLEAR ABOUT WHAT PART THE PRESIDENT WOULD PLAY, BUT DID NOT EXCLUDE HIM DOING SOMETHING IF KOSYGIN WERE THERE.
2. SUBSEQUENTLY ON 14 JUNE COUVE TOLD THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT RUSK HAD SAID TO HIM (COUVE) THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS TRYING TO GET ALL OF THEM TO GO TO A SPECIAL ASSEMBLY. NO DOUBT THIS WAS SAID TO SOME EXTENT MALICIOUSLY AND TO MAKE TROUBLE. HOWEVER, WE COULD NOT RISK A MISUNDERSTANDING AND, ON INSTRUCTIONS. I TOLD BOB BOWIE WHAT COUVE HAD SAID, AND ASKED HIM TO OUTLINE THE AMERICAN POSITION ABOUT MINISTERIAL PARTICIPATION.
3. BOWIE SAID FIRSTLY THAT HE COULD NOT SAY WHAT HAD PASSED BETWEEN COUVE AND RUSK AS THEY HAD BEEN TOGETHER AT A DINNER ON THE PREVIOUS EVENING. SECONDLY, W!TH REGARD TO THE SUBSTANCE, WE SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT RUSK HAD YET DEFINITELY DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE IF GROMYKO OR KOSYGIN ATTENDED. HE CERTAINLY HAD THIS POSSIBILITY VERY MUCH IN MIND, BUT HE WISHED TO RETAIN ROOM FOR

/MANOEUVRE

MANOEUVRE AND HAD NOT YET DECIDED ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. APART FROM OTHER CONSIDERATIONS HE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT GOLDBERG'S PERSONAL POSITION.

4. WITH REGARD TO THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION BOWIE SAID THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF HIM TAKING OVER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION. IF HE DECIDED TO INTERVENE, THIS WOULD BE LIKELY TO TAKE THE FORM OF AN ADDRESS TO THE ASSEMBLY.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD FIND OUT WHAT EXACTLY DID PASS BETWEEN RUSK AND COUVE. PRESUMABLY THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT WILL CLEAR UP THE QUESTION OF WHAT THE AMERICAN POSITION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER IS.

SOSFA SENT 2214 15 JUNE 1967

PRISEC (F.O.)

:::::

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1373 15 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1373 OF 15 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW AND PARIS.

MIDDLE EAST: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

I WAS GLAD TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF SPEAKING TO YOU THIS EVENING.

2..HERE ARE ONE OR TWO POINTS YOU MAY WISH TO BEAR IN MIND:

(1) THE EMERGENCY SESSION WILL PROBABLY START WITH A FORMAL OPENING ON FRIDAY NIGHT OR SATURDAY MORNING, WITH NO SPEECHES. (IT MUST BE CALLED WITHIN 24 HOURS OF A MAJORITY OF CONCURRENCES BEING RECEIVED AND ONLY NINE ARE OUTSTANDING).

(2) THE SPEECHES WILL PROBABLY START ON MONDAY MORNING OR AFTERNOON (19 JUNE).

(3) WE EXPECT THE DEBATE TO CONTINUE FOR SOME WEEKS.

(4) THERE IS INTENSE COMPETITION FOR PLACES ON THE LIST OF SPEAKERS. SEVERAL COUNTRIES HAVE PUT THEMSELVES DOWN TO SPEAK ON TUESDAY (20 JUNE) INCLUDING THE U S S R AND FRANCE.

(5) WE HAVE PUT IN A TENTATIVE BID FOR TIME ON BOTH TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY BUT WE THINK THE BEST TIME FOR YOU TO SPEAK WOULD BE SECOND OR THIRD ON THE MORNING OF WEDNESDAY (21 JUNE) IF WE CAN GET IT.

(6) KOSYGIN MAY SPEAK ON MONDAY OR TUESDAY BUT IF HE SPEAKS ON MONDAY I DO NOT THINK THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR YOU TO BE HERE TO LISTEN TO HIM AND I THINK THAT YOUR PRESENT PLAN OF FLYING TO NEW YORK ON MONDAY NIGHT WILL BE BEST. THIS WOULD GIVE SOME TIME ON TUESDAY FOR COMPLETING YOUR SPEECH IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID BY OTHERS.

/(7)

(7) WE HEAR THAT COURVE DE MURVILLE AND EBAN AND SEVERAL OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS ARE COMING BUT WE HAVE NO FIRM INFORMATION THAT ANY PRIME MINISTERS ARE COMING (THOUGH PEARSON MAY SPEAK FOR CANADA).

3..WE SHALL REPORT BY TELEPHONE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION WE GET.

4..RESIDENT CLERK PASS TO HAYMAN AT 8.00 A.M.

F O PASS MOSCOW 175 AND PARIS 178.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 16/0023Z
RECD AT 16/0026Z

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO U.K.MIS NEW YORK

Telno 2905 15 June, 1967 (UND)

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to U.K.Mis New York telegram No. 2905 of 15 June
Repeated for information to:- Washington

Your telegram No. 1262 [Middle East: Accusation of United Kingdom involvement].

You will have seen exchanges in the House on 13 June (Hansard, 14 June, Column 312). I should like now to follow up our offer with a firm request to the Secretary General to appoint an investigating team immediately and a repetition of our offer to give the team full facilities.

2. Subject to your advice about modalities and any comments or suggestions the United States Mission may have, the simplest method would seem to be for you to write now to the Secretary General regretting that these lies were still being circulated and that no investigation had yet been undertaken; and requesting him to nominate United Nations officials, to whom we would give every facility to visit our aircraft carriers, as well as the airfields in the sovereign base areas in Cyprus and our installations and the airfields in Malta to inspect the logs, etc., and assure themselves that no British aircraft could possibly have taken part in the Arab/Israeli fighting.

3. You should inform Mr. Goldberg of our intention to go ahead in this way unless he raises substantial objection. You may also wish to discuss the question informally with U Thant or the Secretariat before actually sending the letter. It would of course be important to get the right sort of team - e.g. General Rikhye supported by a Secretariat lawyer and official, and not national representatives. This might better be indicated orally, whilst the letter merely makes clear we are requesting a Secretariat investigation without spelling it out.

4. If U Thant objects that he would require specific authority from the Council before undertaking any such investigation, you could reply that in our view he already has sufficient authority under Article 99 of the Charter which has always been held to imply that the Secretary General has the capacity to ascertain the facts of any situation which may threaten peace without recourse to the Council; and under the recent Security Council Resolution which requests the Secretary General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed of the situation. Arab accusations of United Kingdom involvement are certainly an element in the current situation. /5. The

5. The object is of course to give further publicity and weight to our denials and I do not, therefore, think that any uncertainty about how the Secretary General could proceed should dissuade us from sending the letter. If he then merely referred it to the Council for consideration, at any rate the publicity part of the exercise would have been promoted. In any case you would presumably send a copy of the letter to the President of the Council with a request to him to circulate it as a Council document.

SOSFA Sent 1933Z 15 June, 1967

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U.N.D.

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CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]PHER/CAT A

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO RABAT

TELNO. 289 15 JUNE 1967 (MR. GEORGE THOMSON'S OFFICE)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO RABAT TELEGRAM NO.289 OF 15/6 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TUNIS.
MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. CALL OF MOROCCAN AMBASSADOR, PRINCESS LALLA AICHA SAW MR. THOMSON ON 14 JUNE AND DELIVERED ORAL MESSAGE FROM KING HASSAN WHOM SHE HAD RECENTLY SEEN. HE AND HIS MINISTERS WERE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE ASKED THE U.K. TO BE PATIENT AND TO GIVE MOROCCO ITS MORAL SUPPORT. U.K., U.S. AND OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES SHOULD HELP IN THE SEARCH FOR NEW INITIATIVES FOR A SETTLEMENT. KING HASSAN HAD TRIED TO ARRANGE AN ARAB SUMMIT MEETING BEFORE THE FIGHTING BROKE OUT. HE WAS TRYING AGAIN : THE MEETING SHOULD TAKE PLACE EITHER IN MOROCCO OR IN ANOTHER COUNTRY, ARAB OR NON-ARAB, WHICH HAD NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN THE ACTUAL FIGHTING AND WOULD NOT PROVIDE TOO BELLIGERENT AN AMBIENCE.

2. MR. THOMSON THANKED HER FOR BRINGING THE KING'S MESSAGE AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING IN TOUCH DURING THE AFTERMATH. HE ASKED HER TO EXPLAIN TO HIS MAJESTY THAT IT HAD NEVER BEEN A PART OF OUR POLICY TO SUPPORT ISRAEL AGAINST THE ARAB COUNTRIES. OUR SOLE AIM HAD BEEN TO PREVENT AND THEN TO STOP THE FIGHTING. H.M.G. WERE HAPPY TO RESPOND TO HIS MAJESTY'S CALL TO SEARCH FOR NEW INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION. WE WERE SENDING MEDICAL AID TO JORDAN AND WERE USING ALL THE INFLUENCE WE HAD TO PERSUADE ISRAEL TO TREAT PROPERLY THE ARAB PEOPLE IN THE TERRITORIES SHE HAD OCCUPIED. WE WOULD DO ALL WE COULD TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT.

3. THE PRINCESS LAID CONSIDERABLE STRESS ON THE NEED FOR UNDERSTANDING OF MOROCCO'S POSITION AND MR. THOMSON GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT HER CALL WAS INTENDED TO PREVENT US FROM TAKING TOO SERIOUSLY ANY PUBLIC GESTURES AGAINST US THAT MOROCCO MAY HAVE TO MAKE.

SOSFA SENT 0245/16 JUNE

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CYPHER/CAT A

F L A S H FOREIGN OFFICE TO TRIPOLI

TELNO 540 15 JUNE 1967 (V)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO TRIPOLI TELNO.540 OF 15 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON BENGHAZI.

YOUR TELNO.469: LIBYAN REQUEST.

WE CANNOT TAKE A FINAL DECISION SO QUICKLY ON THIS MAJOR POLICY QUESTION. BUT I UNDERSTAND THE FORCE OF YOUR ARGUMENTS AND THE PRESSURES WHICH HAVE PROMPTED THIS LIBYAN REQUEST. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE DRAW ATTENTION TO THE STATEMENT IN THE DEFENCE REVIEW (COMMAND 2901) OF FEBRUARY 1966 THAT QUOTE THERE WILL BE NO ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN DEFENCE FACILITIES IN AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY AGAINST ITS WISHES. UNQUOTE. YOU SHOULD GO ON TO SAY THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO IMMEDIATE DISCUSSIONS FOR THE APPLICATION OF THIS PRINCIPLE TO THE BRITISH MILITARY FACILITIES IN LIBYA.

SOSFA SENT 1700Z/15 JUNE 1967

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CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO KUWAIT

TELNO 355 15 JUNE 1967 (BK)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO KUWAIT TELEGRAM NO.355 OF 15 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, UK MIS NEW YORK, BAHRAIN, JEDDA.
THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR CALLED ON THE PUS AND THE MINISTER OF STATE SEPARATELY ON 13 JUNE AT HIS OWN REQUEST TO DISCUSS THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. HE ARGUED THAT BRITAIN SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN WORKING OUT A SETTLEMENT AND THAT THIS WOULD IN ITSELF PROVIDE THE PRACTICAL ANSWER TO THE ALLEGATIONS OF OUR INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ISRAELI ATTACK. HE PERSONALLY WOULD LIKE TO SEE AN INITIATIVE TOWARDS GETTING THE ISRAELIS BACK TO WHERE THEY WERE ON 4 JUNE. THE UNITED NATIONS WAS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE SITUATION BUT THEY COULD NOT DEAL WITH THE WHOLE PROBLEM ALTHOUGH THE FOUR GREAT POWERS MIGHT DO SO UNDER A UN UMBRELLA. THERE WAS NO PROSPECT WHATSOEVER OF THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS SITTING DOWN FACE TO FACE THEMSELVES.

2. MR. THOMSON REPLIED THAT TO US THE MOST IMPORTANT PARTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN TERMS OF OUR DIRECT INTERESTS WERE THE GULF AND SOUTH ARABIA. A TRAGIC FEATURE OF THE CONFLICT WAS THAT IT HAD DAMAGED OUR RELATIONS WITH STATES IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA. ABOVE ALL WE HOPED THAT NONE OF OUR FRIENDS BELIEVED THE EGYPTIAN STORY OF ANGLO/US INTERVENTION ON ISRAEL'S BEHALF EVEN IF THEY DID NOT SAY AS MUCH PUBLICLY. WE HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT OUR POWER TO SHAPE A SETTLEMENT. OUR INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS TO BE COMPARED TO THAT OF FRANCE AND NOT THAT OF THE US OR USSR. FOR THE MOMENT WE WERE CONCENTRATING ON REDUCING THE HUMAN SUFFERING CAUSED BY THE WAR AND WERE SENDING HELP TO THE JORDAN REFUGEES. WE WERE ALSO URGING THE ISRAELIS NOT TO ADD TO THE

/ ALREADY

ALREADY EXISTING REFUGEE PROBLEM.
IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SAY WHAT THE SHAPE OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE . BUT MAYBE IT WOULD INCLUDE WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL AND RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO LIVE.

3. ASKED ABOUT THE RESUMPTION OF OIL SUPPLIES SHAIKH SALEM SAID THE ANSWER LAY WITH BRITAIN. BRITAIN'S ACTIONS WOULD GIVE THE KUWAIT GOVERNMENT THE STRENGTH TO HELP HER AND TO CONVINCE OTHERS THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR. HE SUGGESTED THAT WE WERE WELL PLACED AMONGST THE FOUR POWERS TO SHAPE A SETTLEMENT (FAVOURABLE OF COURSE TO THE ARABS) BECAUSE OF OUR INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON AND BECAUSE OF THE SYMPATHY WITH WHICH A LABOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD BE HEARD IN MOSCOW.

4. THE AMBASSADOR APPEARED TO DISMISS CAIRO RADIO'S ALLEGATIONS OF BRITISH INVERVENTION BUT WENT ON TO DRAW A DISTINCTION WITH MR. THOMSON BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE AMERICANS. HE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN INVOLVED BUT PROFESSED TO BE CONVINCED THERE WAS SOMETHING IN THE STORY OF US INVOLVEMENT. HOW COULD THE ISRAELIS HAVE DEFEATED SUCH OVERWHELMINGLY SUPERIOR FORCES WITHOUT OUTSIDE HELP, INCLUDING FOR EXAMPLE INFORMATION ON JORDANIAN MILITARY DISPOSITIONS? MR. THOMSON REITERATED THAT WE WERE COMPLETELY CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT INVOLVED. WE SHOULD KNOW SINCE WE HAD WORKED CLOSELY WITH THEM ON THE GULF OF AQABA PROBLEM IN AN EFFORT TO AVERT AN OUTBREAK OF WAR AND TO SAVE THE MIDDLE EAST FROM THE DISASTERS WHICH HAD NOW OVERTAKEN IT. NOBODY HAD BEEN MORE SURPRISED THAN WE OURSELVES WHEN THE FIGHTING BROKE OUT. WE HAD EVEN BEGUN TO FEEL THAT AS A RESULT OF OUR EFFORTS THE DANGER WAS RECEDING.

SOSFA SENT 1926Z 15 JUNE 1967

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
ARABIAN DEPT.

:::::

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1374 15 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1374 OF 15 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 2905: MIDDLE EAST. ACCUSATIONS OF U.K. INVOLVEMENT.

WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE U.S. DELEGATION ABOUT THIS IN THE LAST FEW DAYS. THEIR VIEW HAS BEEN TO DOUBT WHETHER INSISTENCE ON A SECRETARIAT INVESTIGATION WOULD HELP TO IMPROVE OUR POSITION BUT WE WILL SPEAK TO THEM AGAIN TOMORROW ON THE BASIS OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

2. I ALSO PROPOSE TO TALK TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL INFORMALLY FIRST AS SUGGESTED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. OTHERWISE THERE SEEMS TO ME A DANGER OF OUR GETTING INTO A FORMAL ARGUMENT WITH HIM ABOUT HIS AUTHORITY OR OF HIM REPLYING THAT IF WE WISH AN INVESTIGATION TO TAKE PLACE WE SHOULD SEEK AUTHORITY FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IN EITHER CASE WE MIGHT GET MORE MUD FLYING AT US WITHOUT GETTING THE INVESTIGATION. I SHOULD THEREFORE LIKE TO EXAMINE WITH HIM HOW THE FIRM REQUEST COULD BE PUT TO HIM WITHOUT RUNNING THESE DANGERS.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT 0032Z/16
RECD AT 0033Z/16

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U.N.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

JB

SECRET

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON

It looks as if we must expect a Soviet-inspired debate in the United Nations General Assembly about the Middle East and, to judge from Gromyko's letter to U Thant, Kosygin himself and possibly some of the other top Soviet brass may go to it. The Russians are obviously preparing a full-scale propaganda and diplomatic effort to retrieve their friends and themselves from the disaster of the past week.

George Brown tells me that Dean Rusk and he had a good talk about this in Luxembourg [George and I think and agreed that if this debate takes place and Kosygin (or someone of equivalent standing and not simply Gromyko) attends on the Soviet side it would ~~almost certainly~~ be a mistake for you or me to dignify their efforts by attending ourselves. I think this is right ~~sound advice~~] but I shall be glad to know your views about it.

(Naturally Dean was not in a position to commit himself but I understood their feeling was that)

Equally, I think we can assume that, if the debate takes place, a great many Arab Foreign Ministers, no doubt Eban and probably the Foreign Ministers of many other countries are likely to be there. In that case, George and I feel that it would be right for him to go; and we hope you would agree that Dean should also attend. I would then do what I could with De Gaulle on Monday to get him to [~~send Couve~~ do the same as we do] - not that we have any particular hopes of much help from that quarter, but we feel that they ought at least to get their feet wet.

[All this, as I say, is on the assumption that Kosygin, or someone like him, attends the debate.] If the Russians finally decide to leave Gromyko to play the hand, it becomes a much more open question whether we should not leave Arthur Goldberg and Hugh Caradon to play it on our side.

I hope you can let me know what you feel about all this and also whether you yourself are likely to wish to have a fuller exchange at some point with Kosygin, if he goes to the United States.

If Kosygin goes there might be an outside chance, whatever he said in public, of making some progress outside the U.N., with him on substance, if Gromyko goes however, it is unlikely that even this outside chance would not exist. However, assuming that foreign ministers from other countries and particularly Arabs turned up we might be able to persuade some of them to see the Western part in the events of the last three weeks in its true colours.

Subject

16

UK 001/15
17.00 ZULU JUNE 15, 1967

FROM PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT
SECRET

T 173/67

BEGINS

IT LOOKS AS IF WE MUST EXPECT A SOVIET-INSPIRED DEBATE IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND, TO JUDGE FROM GROMYKO'S LETTER TO U THANT, KOSYGIN HIMSELF AND POSSIBLY SOME OF THE OTHER TOP SOVIET BRASS MAY GO TO IT. THE RUSSIANS ARE OBVIOUSLY PREPARING A FULL-SCALE PROPAGANDA AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO RETRIEVE THEIR FRIENDS AND THEMSELVES FROM THE DISASTER OF THE PAST WEEK.

GEORGE BROWN TELLS ME THAT DEAN RUSK AND HE HAD A GOOD TALK ABOUT THIS IN LUXEMBOURG. NATURALLY DEAN WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO COMMIT HIMSELF BUT I UNDERSTAND THEIR FEELING WAS THAT IF THIS DEBATE TAKES PLACE AND KOSYGIN (OR SOMEONE OF EQUIVALENT STANDING AND NOT SIMPLY GROMYKO) ATTENDS ON THE SOVIET SIDE IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR YOU OR ME TO DIGNIFY THEIR EFFORTS BY ATTENDING OURSELVES. I THINK THIS IS RIGHT BUT I ~~S~~ SHALL BE GLAD TO KNOW YOUR VIEWS ABOUT IT.

EQUALLY, I THINK WE CAN ASSUME THAT, IF THE DEBATE TAKES PLACE, A GREAT MANY ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS, NO DOUBT EBAN AND PROBABLY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF MANY OTHER COUNTRIES ARE LIKELY TO BE THERE. IN THAT CASE, GEORGE AND I FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE RIGHT FOR HIM TO GO: AND WE HOPE YOU WOULD AGREE THAT DEAN SHOULD ALSO ATTEND. I WOULD THEN DO WHAT I COULD WITH DE GAULLE ON MONDAY TO GET HIM TO DO THE SAME AS WE DO - NOT THAT WE HAVE ANY PARTICULAR HOPES OF MUCH HELP FROM THAT QUARTER, BUT WE FEEL THAT THEY OUGHT AT LEAST TO GET THEIR FEET WET.

IF THE RUSSIANS FINALLY DECIDE TO LEAVE GROMYKO TO PLAY THE HAND AND IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT FEW FOREIGN MINISTERS OF INTEREST ARE TO ATTEND, IT BECOMES A MUCH MORE OPEN QUESTION WHETHER WE SHOULD NOT LEAVE ARTHUR GOLDBERG AND HUGH CARADON TO PLAY IT ON OUR SIDE.

IF KOSYGIN GOES THERE MIGHT BE AN OUTSIDE CHANCE, WHATEVER HE SAID IN PUBLIC, OF MAKING SOME PROGRESS WITH HIM ON SUBSTANCE, OUTSIDE THE U.N. IF GROMYKO GOES HOWEVER, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT EVEN THIS OUTSIDE CHANCE WOULD EXIST. HOWEVER, ASSUMING THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES AND PARTICULARLY ARABS TURNED UP WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO PERSUADE SOME OF THEM TO SEE THE WESTERN PART IN THE EVENTS OF THE LAST THREE WEEKS IN ITS TRUE COLOURS.

I HOPE YOU CAN LET ME KNOW WHAT YOU FEEL ABOUT ALL THIS AND ALSO WHETHER YOU YOURSELF ARE LIKELY TO WISH TO HAVE A FULLER EXCHANGE AT SOME POINT WITH KOSYGIN, IF HE GOES TO THE UNITED STATES. IF THERE WERE A QUESTION OF SOME KIND OF SUMMIT I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THIS TO BE ON A WIDER BASIS.

G
ENDS

Subject

17

No 10 Downing St.

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL TELEGRAM

SERIAL No T173/67

SECRET COPY NO:

CYPHER/CAT 'A'
IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON
TEL NUMBER 6670 DATE 15 JUNE
SECRET.
ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 6670 OF 15 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW.
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON SENT TODAY OVER THE PRIVATE WIRE.

IT LOOKS AS IF WE MUST EXPECT A SOVIET-INSPIRED DEBATE IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND, TO JUDGE FROM GROMYKO'S LETTER TO U THANT, KOSYGIN HIMSELF AND POSSIBLY SOME OF THE OTHER TOP SOVIET BRASS MAY GO TO IT. THE RUSSIANS ARE OBVIOUSLY PREPARING A FULL-SCALE PROPAGANDA AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO RETRIEVE THEIR FRIENDS AND THEMSELVES FROM THE DISASTER OF THE PAST WEEK.

GEORGE BROWN TELLS ME THAT DEAN RUSK AND HE HAD A GOOD TALK ABOUT THIS IN LUXEMBOURG. NATURALLY DEAN WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO COMMIT HIMSELF BUT I UNDERSTAND THEIR FEELING WAS THAT IF THIS DEBATE TAKES PLACE AND KOSYGIN (OR SOMEONE OF EQUIVALENT STANDING AND NOT SIMPLY GROMYKO) ATTENDS ON THE SOVIET SIDE IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR YOU OR ME TO DIGNIFY THEIR EFFORTS BY ATTENDING OURSELVES. I THINK THIS IS RIGHT BUT I SHALL BE GLAD TO KNOW YOUR VIEWS ABOUT IT.

EQUALLY, I THINK WE CAN ASSUME THAT, IF THE DEBATE TAKES PLACE, A GREAT MANY ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS, NO DOUBT EBAN AND PROBABLY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF MANY OTHER COUNTRIES ARE LIKELY TO BE THERE. IN THAT CASE, GEORGE AND I FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE RIGHT FOR HIM TO GO: AND WE HOPE YOU WOULD AGREE THAT DEAN SHOULD ALSO ATTEND. I WOULD THEN DO WHAT I COULD WITH DE GAULLE ON MONDAY TO GET HIM TO DO THE SAME AS WE DO - NOT THAT WE HAVE ANY PARTICULAR HOPES OF MUCH HELP FROM THAT QUARTER, BUT WE FEEL THAT THEY OUGHT AT LEAST TO GET THEIR FEET WET. /IF THE

IF THE RUSSIANS FINALLY DECIDE TO LEAVE GROMYKO TO PLAY THE HAND AND IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT FEW FOREIGN MINISTERS OF INTEREST ARE TO ATTEND, IT BECOMES A MUCH MORE OPEN QUESTION WHETHER WE SHOULD NOT LEAVE ARTHUR GOLDBERG AND HUGH CARADON TO PLAY IT ON OUR SIDE.

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I HOPE YOU CAN LET ME KNOW WHAT YOU FEEL ABOUT ALL THIS AND ALSO WHETHER YOU YOURSELF ARE LIKELY TO WISH TO HAVE A FULLER EXCHANGE AT SOME POINT WITH KOSYGIN, IF HE GOES TO THE UNITED STATES. IF THERE WERE A QUESTION OF SOME KIND OF SUMMIT I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THIS TO BE ON A WIDER BASIS.

SOSFA SENT 2221/15 JUNE

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OF REVIEW

(date) 17-3-97

(Signed) J.R. Green

Prime Minister

Today's Symmary.

15/6.

The Middle East Situation, 15 June

Israel

The movement of refugees from the West Bank of the Jordan eastwards is diminishing and there is now even some movement in the reverse direction. The Israel Government have assured H.M. Ambassador that they are acutely aware of the need to avoid creating a new refugee problem. They hope to send a Red Cross team to the West Bank and are meanwhile in favour of visits there by diplomats. They are doing all they can to round-up scattered groups of Egyptian soldiers in Sinai whom they are returning to the Canal.

2. Mr. Eban has said to H.M. Ambassador that the Israel Government still needs time to formulate its position on the terms of a settlement. The only two points on which he was prepared to comment were that:-

(i) he did not think that the West Bank of Jordan would be absorbed into Israel; and

(ii) whatever happened to Jerusalem Israel would ensure the "spiritual internationalisation" of the Holy places.

He did not think that any political or administrative internationalisation was possible.

3. Mr. Eban undertook to see that General Bull was properly housed as befitted his station, however he would not commit himself to allowing the General to return to his former headquarters.

Jordan

4. A rupture in diplomatic relations is unlikely although

/the

the possibility still exists.

5. Provided that Syrian airspace is cleared, Amman Airport will be fully operational by 19/20 June.

6. King Hussein has stated that at an early stage in the fighting the Russians had indicated that neither the U.K. nor the U.S. were involved. ~~in the fighting~~. He was now asking the Russians for their evidence to this effect.

Suez Canal

7. The Deputy Head of the Canal is reported as saying that clearance of the Canal presented few technical difficulties but a considerable political one. The Israeli presence on the East Bank was the principal stumbling block to the clearance of the Canal.

8. A journalist has reported seeing a medium sized tanker lying across the Canal near Ismailia.

9. The Israelis were not providing much information on the state of the Canal. Mr. Eban told H.M. Ambassador that he himself knew little of the Canal's condition but would see that all the necessary information be given to the U.K. Mission.

U.N.

The Security Council

10. The Soviet Resolution failed for lack of votes; but a "humanitarian" resolution calling on Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of areas where military operation have taken place and to facilitate the return of those who fled, was adopted unanimously. The Council then adjourned without naming a time to meet again.

The Assembly

11. The Secretary-General has now asked all members, in

/terms

terms which suggest that he intends to invoke the "unity for peace" procedure, to say whether they concur in the Soviet request for an Emergency Special Session. Some Arab delegations are in two minds about the advisability of the Soviet move and amongst the more extreme African delegations it is recognised as a Soviet propaganda maneouvre. It is unlikely, however, that there will be serious opposition to the Soviet request. There is no firm date for the opening of the session; 17 June is possible, but 19 June (or even 20th) is more likely. Nor is there confirmation of the level of Russian representation.

The U.K. Attitude

12. The U.K. reply to the Secretary-General will concur in the Soviet request while making it clear that we do not regard the Security Council as having ceased to fulfil its functions with regard to the Middle East situation.

Oil

13. Kuwait have reported that the Kuwait Oil Company are for the present not sending any British or U.S. flag tankers to Kuwait. This is because the Oil Workers Federation have made the resumption of operations conditional upon British and U.S. tankers not being loaded.

Morocco

14. A Moroccan source has stated that there will be an Arabs Heads of State meeting in Khartoumn at an as yet undecided date. This will allow the moderate group of Arab states to temper the extremist policies of Nasser and his followers.

Saudi Arabia

15. The Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Saudi Arabia wished to remain on good relations

/with

with the U.K. and the U.S. The Government do not believe the "big lie". Their moderate stand has caused them, however, embarrassment in the Arab world; therefore the U.K. could help their position by :

(a) declaring Israel the aggressors in the war; and

(b) demanding that Israel troops retire behind the original national boundaries.

U.A.R.

16. A source from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the U.A.R. would not negotiate directly with Israel.

17. Reports have been received that troops of the defeated Sinai division have been shot or detained on returning to Egypt so that the extent of defeat will not become common knowledge in the U.A.R.

Iraq

18. Sweden had undertaken the protection of British interests.

Tunisia

19. The Tunisian Government have re-established diplomatic relations with the U.A.R.

Sudan

20. Sudan airways have applied for resumption of flights in particular to London.

Lebanon

21. Beirut Airport has been reopened.

22. Port Unions have refused to work British ships. This has not affected the loading and unloading of British goods from foreign ships.

Libya

23. The Libyan Foreign Minister has been reported as saying

/that

that the King will never agree to a rupture of diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. However, Hussein Mazig will not abandon his pro-Nasser sympathies. He will not therefore allow oil exports to be resumed nor will he refute the "big lie".

France and the Middle East

24. The French have said that they have not resumed the supply of arms to the Middle East. They have also stated that the Israelis should leave Sharm es Sheikh and a new "Montreux agreement" be drawn up for the Straits of Tiran.

/diplomatic 25. The French maybe concealing extensive/contacts with Nasser the purposes of which are not clear.

Eastern Department

15 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

TELNO 1098 16 JUNE 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TEL NO. 1098 OF 16 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFMN TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AMMAN AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO.

THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR CALLED TO SEE ME THIS MORNING AT HIS REQUEST. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE MANNER AND CONTENT OF GENERAL DAYAN'S RECENT SPEECHES AND THAT IN THIS CONTEXT I SHOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT MR. EBAN'S VIEWS WERE ABOUT THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM, THE ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM, THE ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK. I SAID THAT I SHOULD ALSO LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER MR. EBAN HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS AS TO ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF ISRAEL/ARAB RELATIONS WHICH COULD BE RESOLVED QUICKLY IN ADVANCE OF ANY GENERAL SETTLEMENT. MR. REMEZ SAID THAT HE WOULD REPORT THIS TO MR. EBAN.

2. ON JERUSALEM I WENT ON TO SAY THAT WHILE I COULD UNDERSTAND AND SYMPATHISE WITH ISRAELI FEELINGS, I BELIEVED THAT THE ANNEXATION OF THE OLD CITY BY ISRAEL COULD NEVER BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS AND WOULD BE LIKELY TO BLOCK ANY GENERAL SETTLEMENT. MR. REMEZ SUGGESTED THAT THERE WERE OVER-RIDING ADVANTAGES IN HAVING A UNIFIED CITY AND THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE ABLE TO ASSURE FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO THE HOLY PLACES AND THAT SOMETHING MIGHT EVEN BE DONE TO GIVE JORDAN A SHARE OF TOURIST REVENUES. I REPLIED THAT A UNIFIED CITY NEED NOT NECESSARILY BE UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL AND I REPEATED MY VIEW THAT ANNEXATION OF THE OLD CITY WOULD BE BOTH UNWISE AND UNJUST.

3. ON THE QUESTION OF ARAB REFUGEES, MR. REMEZ CLAIMED THAT ISRAEL HAD BEEN THE VICTIM OF A WIDESPREAD AND WELL-ORGANISED CAMPAIGN OF DEFAMATION. EVERYTHING WAS BEING DONE TO ENCOURAGE THE ARAB

/INHABITANTS

CONFIDENTIAL

INHABITANTS OF THE OCCUPIED AREAS TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND, IN FACT, MORE WERE NOW GOING BACK TO THE WEST BANK THAN LEAVING. THE REASON WHY ISRAEL HAD STRESSED THE FREEDOM OF ARABS ON THE WEST BANK TO LEAVE, IF THEY WISHED, WAS THAT MANY SOLDIERS AND OTHERS WHOSE FAMILIES WERE ON THE EASTERN SIDE OF THE JORDAN HAD BEEN STRANDED ON THE WEST BANK AND ISRAEL DID NOT WISH TO APPEAR TO BE DETAINING THEM AGAINST THEIR WILL. I SAID THAT NEVERTHELESS NOTHING WOULD DO MORE TO REASSURE PEOPLE HERE AND ALSO IN THE ARAB WORLD ABOUT ISRAEL'S INTENTIONS THAN A CLEAR PUBLIC STATEMENT FROM THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT THAT THEY WISHED THE ARAB POPULATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY TO STAY WHERE THEY WERE, AND THAT THIS WOULD ASSURE THEIR RIGHT TO DO SO.

4. MR. REMEZ INDICATED THAT THERE WAS STILL SOME HANKERING ON THE PART OF THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT AFTER A SEPARATE PEACE WITH JORDAN. I DEPRECATED THIS IDEA AS BEING QUITE UNREALISTIC AND CERTAINLY NOT LIKELY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SURVIVAL OF KING HUSSEIN WHICH I ASSUMED WAS STILL AN INTEREST OF THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT AS IT WAS OF H.M.G.

5. IN THE COURSE OF OUR CONVERSATION, MR. REMEZ MENTIONED SOME IDEAS OF THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT ABOUT A MORE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT. HE SAID THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF LEAVING SHARM AL-SHAIKH WITHOUT DEFINITE ASSURANCES OF FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. HE MENTIONED THAT MR. EBAN HAD RECENTLY SUGGESTED TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR THAT AN END TO THE STATE OF WAR WOULD IN ITSELF SETTLE THE QUESTION OF FREE PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND THE SUEZ CANAL. IN SINAI, MR. REMEZ SAID, ISRAEL WOULD LOOK FOR SOME ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD PREVENT THE AREA BEING USED AS A JUMPING OFF GROUND FOR WAGING WAR, E.G. SOME FORM OF DEMILITARISATION. TALKING

/OF THE

OF THE GAZA STRIP, HE SAID THAT EGYPT HAD NO REAL CLAIM TO BE THERE. ITS FUTURE WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT. IN THIS CONTEXT THEY MIGHT HAVE TO CONSIDER A OUTLET FOR JORDAN TO THE MEDITERRANEAN.

6. WE HAD SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT THE FUTURE OF ADEN. ON THIS MR. REMEZ EXPRESSED THE FAMILIAR ISRAELI VIEW THAT A BRITISH PRESENCE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE KING FAISAL.

SOSFA SENT 0255Z/17 JUNE 1967

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EASTERN DEPT.

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P.U.S. 13/6
Sir D. Allen
Sir D. Carmichael
Mr Hayman
N. Dept for info.

Copies to: 1. Mr. Arbuthnott
2. { Mr. Hayman / N. Dept.
3. { Mr. Brimelow / E. Dept.
4. { Mr. Rose / N.E.A.D.
5. Planning Staff

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

13 June, 1967

Dear Paul,

I called today on Llewellyn Thompson, a very old friend who, unless he is held here by the President, will shortly be returning to Moscow. I asked him to give me his views generally about the Russians after the events of the last ten days.

Thompson said that he thought that the Russians would give us a very bad time in the United Nations: they would insist to the maximum on an Israeli withdrawal and do their best to line the Americans and ourselves up with the Israelis against the whole of the Afro/Asian bloc; and that the assault would probably be led by Gromyko. The Russians would also continue to send in arms to their Arab friends not with any expectation that they would be used in the near future, but in order to restore their own image and to encourage the Arabs in their hour of defeat. He thought there was no reason for us to become particularly excited about this, though the Russians might try to frighten the Israelis that these arms might in the last resort be used against them.

Thompson then said that he was greatly surprised at the extent of the Russian miscalculation. They must surely have known that many of the Egyptian aircraft were not usable because of uncare and of the very poor quality of most of the UAR and Arab forces. He thought that the basic Russian objective throughout had been the preservation of progressive governments in the Arab world. They probably calculated that they had not too much to lose, even if armed conflict broke out,

/since....

Sir Pail Gore-Booth, G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.,
Foreign Office.

[illegible], as they thought, they could always stop it by action in the United Nations before it had gone too far. Their attitude at the beginning seems to have been rather relaxed and a leading Arab was reported to have said that the Russians neither encouraged nor restrained them. On the other hand, Thompson thought that the Russians certainly did not know in advance about Nasser's action over the Straits of Tiran and they were apparently taken by surprise by the speed at which Nasser went forward. In the short run, Soviet miscalculation would do them a great deal of damage among the Arabs, but he feared that in the longer run the magnitude of the Arab defeat might enable Nasser to hold the Arabs together and help the Russians to gain a stronger position than ever in the Middle East.

I asked Thompson whether he expected there to be much change in the Russian attitude towards US/Soviet relations and on bilateral matters. He said that it seemed to him even more important than before to get a Non-Proliferation Treaty and members of the Soviet Embassy here had recently said the same thing to him. In present circumstances, there could be no progress about ABM's until the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been agreed. Thompson said that he thought that during the weeks preceding the Middle East crisis, the Russians had been conducting a full-scale review of their relations with the United States but that the result of this might well be obscured by what had happened in the last ten days. He rather feared that relations might take

/a considerable...

a considerable turn for the worse; in any case, he expected life in Moscow to be pretty miserable in the months ahead.

I asked Thompson whether he thought the Arab rebuffs and the Soviet miscalculations would have any effect on the leadership for the Soviet Union. He said that he thought that the military and intelligence people involved would catch it pretty hard, and that in any case the military hierarchy was long overdue for a shake-up. He was rather uncertain whether there would be any effect on the political leadership though he commented that if Brezhnev had gone to Cairo instead of Gromyko some weeks ago he, Brezhnev, would have been in great difficulty by now. Thompson added that he regretted that he would not be able to have a long talk with Dobrynin, who is expected here shortly, since they would probably crowd in like old.

In general, Thompson - who of course had had a very exhausting week - seemed to me depressed and worried, though he was by no means panicky. He repeated several times that he thought that the Russians would make life very difficult for us, particularly in the United Nations and in Moscow, and he seemed to fear that at the end of the day the Russians might well be forced to have demonstrated in spite of all their recent mistaken and irresponsible behaviour.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Geoffrey Harrison in Moscow.

Yours Ever Pat Dean

/t.h. I ...

.S. I should perhaps add that Thompson expressed in the
rongest terms his suspicions of what the French might be
ming at and his apprehension that they would be no help at all
us in trying to work out the area.

Foreign Office
S.W.1

CONFIDENTIAL 16 June, 1967.

Dear Michael,

You may I think like to see the enclosed copy of a letter from Pat Dean in Washington recording a recent conversation with Llewellyn Thompson about the implications for the Russians of the Middle East crisis.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to William Reid and to Pat Nairne.

Yours sincerely,

Derek

A. M. Palliser, Esq., CMG,
10 Downing Street.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG
PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS
GUIDANCE NO. 151 16 JUNE, 1967 (IP)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO CERTAIN MISSIONS TELEGRAM NUMBER GUIDANCE 151
OF 16 JUNE.

MIDDLE EAST.

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS MORE FLUID, AND PRESENTS WIDER POSSIBILITIES AND GRAVER DANGERS, THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE 1948.
2. THE U.K. STAKE IN THE AREA IS STILL VERY IMPORTANT INDEED TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST. ITS MAIN ELEMENTS ARE RELATIVELY CHEAP OIL SUPPLIES, A LARGE AND VERY PROFITABLE SHARE OF THE OIL OPERATION, BIG ARAB INVESTMENT IN LONDON, AND A GROWING EXPORT MARKET. IN ADDITION WE ARE CONCERNED TO HAVE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS BY SEA AND AIR TO THE EAST, AND TO DENY EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE AREA AND ITS RESOURCES TO THE COMMUNIST POWERS. WE MUST THEREFORE PERSIST WITH EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT, WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON US BY THE SITUATION, TO DEFEND THIS STAKE. IT IS LIKELY TO BE A LONG HARD FIGHT.
3. THE SOVIET UNION'S ATTITUDE ESPECIALLY IN THE U.N., INDICATES THAT THEY (WITH THE CHINESE BREATHING DOWN THEIR NECKS) ARE LAUNCHED ON AN ALL OUT EFFORT FIRST TO RESTORE THEIR POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD AND THEN TO EXPLOIT OUR AND U.S. DIFFICULTIES IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE WESTERN INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, AND INDEED THE WHOLE ARAB WORLD. WE MUST EXPECT THAT REVOLUTIONARY ARAB NATIONALISM, STILL LED BY NASSER, BUT WITH THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS IN THE WINGS, WILL BE IDENTIFIED WITH THIS CAMPAIGN, THOUGH NOT WITH WHAT WILL BE THE LONG TERM SOVIET AIM OF ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE COMMUNIST CONTROL.
4. SOVIET STRATEGY WILL BE TO DIVIDE THE ARABS IRREVOCABLY FROM THE U.K. AND THE U.S. BY IDENTIFYING THESE WITH THE ISRAELI POSITION. INITIALLY ANYWAY THEIR TACTICS WILL BE UNRELENTING PRESSURE IN THE U.N. FOR CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL, COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES, AND SANCTIONS TO THAT END. EVERY ARAB WILL HAVE

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TO SUPPORT THIS LINE.

5. ISRAEL'S AIMS AND STRATEGY ARE NOT YET CLEAR. HER MINIMUM OBJECTIVES, (AND THEY MAY BE A GOOD DEAL MORE) ARE LIKELY TO BE:-

(I) DE FACTO ARAB ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE AS A STATE.

(II) CONSEQUENTIAL TO (I) FREE PASSAGE THROUGH THE GULF OF AQABA, WITH CAST IRON GUARANTEES, AND THE SUEZ CANAL.

(III) ENJOYMENT OF ALL JERUSALEM PERHAPS WITH AN ELEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL.

(IV) SUCH RECTIFICATIONS OF THE FRONTIERS AS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THEIR SECURITY.

ISRAELI TACTICS ARE LIKELY TO BE TO RETAIN THE PHYSICAL FRUITS OF VICTORY UNTIL THESE OBJECTIVES ARE REACHED. WHAT CONCESSIONS OR SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS SHE WOULD ACCEPT IN RETURN E.G. OVER REFUGEES, BOUNDARY CHANGES, AND U.N. SUPERVISION MUST REMAIN SPECULATION.

6. NASSER AND THE RUSSIANS START WITH THE MAJOR ADVANTAGES:-

(A) THAT ALL ARABS BELIEVE THAT CONSISTENT U.S. U.K. SUPPORT OF ISRAEL OVER THE LAST 50 YEARS IS THE CAUSE OF ISRAEL'S STRENGTH AND ARAB WEAKNESS: HENCE THEIR READINESS TO ACCEPT NASSER'S QUOTE BIG LIE UNQUOTE ABOUT U.S. U.K. AIR ATTACKS, OR ANY OTHER SIMILAR LIE, AS AN ALIBI FOR THEIR, AND HIS, FAILURE.

(B) THAT THE SOVIET UNION CAN ALWAYS OUTBID US WITH PRO-ARAB PROPOSALS WHICH IT WILL BE EMBARRASSING FOR US TO TURN DOWN, AND

(C) WE GENUINELY SUPPORT THE ISRAELI OBJECTIVES AT 5(I) AND (II).

7. IF THE SOVIET UNION COULD MAINTAIN A UNITED ARAB FRONT IN DEED AS WELL AS WORD, AND WAS ABLE AND READY TO FOOT THE BILL WHICH WOULD

/FOLLOW

FOLLOW IF THE ARABS AGREED TO CUT OFF THEIR NOSES ALONG WITH WESTERN INTERESTS, THEN THE OUTLOOK FOR US WOULD BE BLEAK INDEED.

8. THERE IS HOPE THAT TIME WILL ERODE THE STRENGTH OF THIS THREAT TO OUR INTERESTS, AND THAT THE FOLLOWING FACTORS WILL TELL INCREASINGLY:-

(A) MORE AND MORE ARABS WILL LOOK BEYOND NASSER'S ATTEMPT TO PURGE AND ATONE FOR THE ARAB DEFEAT BY HIS RESIGNATION OFFER. THEY WILL START TO CALCULATE THE MATERIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COST TO THE ARAB NATION, AS A WHOLE, AND TO THEMSELVES IN PARTICULAR, OF NASSER'S LEADERSHIP AND FAILURE:

(B) THE CONSIDERABLE ENDEMIC, IF OFTEN QUIESCENT, ANTI-COMMUNIST SENTIMENT IN THE ARAB WORLD. SOVIET PRESTIGE HAS BEEN HEAVILY DAMAGED BY ITS FAILURE, WHATEVER THE EXCUSES, TO PROTECT THE ARABS AGAINST ISRAEL:

(C) THE NATURAL TENDENCY OF THE ARAB STATES TO FALL APART, AND PARTICULARLY OF THE OIL RICH STATES TO RESIST NASSER'S ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE HIS REVOLUTIONARY POLICIES AT THE EXPENSE OF THEIR ASSETS.

9. OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE IS DEFENCE OF OUR DIRECT NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE SHORT TERM. OUR BROADER AIM IS A REASONABLE EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT, OR MODUS VIVENDI, BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS AS THE BASIS OF A MORE STABLE MIDDLE EAST IN WHICH OUR INTERESTS CAN BE SECURE. OUR STRATEGY MUST BE TO AVOID OFFERING FRESH TARGETS FOR SOVIET/EGYPTIAN ATTACKS, TO WEAKEN NASSER'S LEADERSHIP IN THE ARAB WORLD AND TO CONCENTRATE ON IMPROVING OUR POSITION IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES WHERE OUR MATERIAL INTERESTS MAINLY LIE. OUR TACTICS MUST BE FLEXIBLE, AND REALISTIC, AND OUR ARGUMENTS ADAPTED TO PARTICULAR AUDIENCES.

10. ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, AND BEARING IN MIND THE DISABILITIES UNDER WHICH WE SHALL BE WORKING (PARA 7 ABOVE), WE SHALL SEEK TO AVOID ANY INITIATIVES RELATED TO TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT, WHICH CAN BE BROUGHT HOME TO US, WHETHER IN THE U.N. THE FOUR POWER CONTEXT, OR BILATERALLY. WE SHALL HOPE TO BE VISIBLY ACTIVE ONLY ON MOVES CALCULATED TO STYMIE SOVIET/EGYPTIAN TACTICS, E.G. U.N. OR

/OTHER

OTHER INITIATIVES TO ASSIST OR PROTECT ARAB POPULATIONS. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO COUNTER CHARGES OF PRO-ISRAELI ACTIONS AS EFFECTIVELY AS WE CAN.

11. AS REGARDS OTHER ACTIONS WE MUST TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY BY ALL MEANS OPEN TO US, TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION EVERYWHERE IN A SENSE FAVOURABLE TO US, AND YOU SHOULD TREAT THIS AS A PRIORITY TASK. M.I.F. GUIDANCE LISTS A NUMBER OF RELEVANT FACTORS AND ARGUMENTS OF WHICH POSTS SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT AS APPROPRIATE TO LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

SOSFA/CROSEC

SENT 2020Z 16 JUNE

BY TELEGRAPH:

ANKARA
ATHENS
COPENHAGEN
THE HAGUE
LISBON
OSLO
PARIS
UKDEL NATO
ROME
BELGRADE
BERNE
DUBLIN
HELSINKI
MADRID
STOCKHOLM
VIENNA
MOSCOW
UKMIS NEW YORK
BIS NEW YORK
WASHINGTON
BUENOS AIRES
CARACAS
RIO DE JANEIRO
MONTEVIDEO
SANTIAGO
ADEN (Pres)
AMMAN
BAHRAIN
BEIRUT
JEDDA
KUWAIT
TEHRAN
TEL AVIV
KHARTOUM
RABAT
ADDIS ABABA
DAKAR
CAPE TOWN
PRETORIA
BANGKOK
DJAKARTA
KATMANDU
POLAD SINGAPORE
TOKYO
VIENTIANE
OTTAWA
CANBERRA
WELLINGTON
NEW DELHI
KARACHI
RAWALPINDI
COLOMBO
KUALA LUMPUR
SINGAPORE
ACCRA
BATHURST
FREETOWN
LAGOS
KAMPALA
NAIROBI
LUSAKA
ZOMBA
VALLETTA
NICOSIA
KINGSTON
PORT OF SPAIN
GEORGETOWN

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CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG
PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS
GUIDANCE NO. 151 16 JUNE, 1967 (IP)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO CERTAIN MISSIONS TELEGRAM NUMBER GUIDANCE 151
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7/de

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CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG
PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS
GUIDANCE NO. 152 16 JUNE, 1967 (JIPGD)

CONFIDENTIAL.

MIDDLE EAST. GUIDANCE NUMBER 151.

(I) NASSER WILL FOR SOME TIME BE AN EMOTIONAL NECESSITY FOR ALMOST ALL ARABS. EVEN THOSE MOST HOSTILE TO HIM WILL RESENT CRITICISM OF HIM BY US.

(II) WE MUST FEED THE ARABS' OWN CRITICAL PROCESSES, BY RUBBING IN INDIRECTLY AND GRADUALLY, THE COST AND INCOMPETENCE OF NASSER'S, AND GENERAL EGYPTIAN, POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP.

(III) NASSER HAS DISSIPATED THE STRENGTH OF THE ARABS OVER THE YEARS BY INVOLVING THEM IN HIS PERSONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST (A) OTHER AND MORE SAGACIOUS ARAB LEADERS, AND (B) THE UK AND THE US POWERS, WHO, EVEN IF IMPERFECT FROM THE ARAB POINT OF VIEW, HAVE GIVEN MASSIVE AID TO THE ARABS. (WE OURSELVES HAVE BEEN PARTICULAR FRIENDS OF JORDAN.) ONLY LATTERLY DID NASSER CONCERN HIMSELF WITH ISRAEL, AND DISASTROUSLY.

(IV) IF BARRIERS (E.G. OVER OIL SUPPLIES AND THE SUEZ CANAL) ARE MAINTAINED AGAINST COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL INTERCOURSE BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES AND THE WEST, EVEN IF THEORETICALLY AGAINST ONLY THE U.S. AND U.K., THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL SUFFER. (E.G. THE EXTRA COST AND TIME OF EMERGENCY FOOD DELIVERIES FROM THE U.S.A. TO INDIA). THE WESTERN POWERS WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS, EVEN IF AT SOME COST TO THEMSELVES, SOME OF WHICH WILL RUB OFF ON TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

(V) ANY PERMANENT ABSORPTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST INTO THE SOVIET SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, WOULD DISTURB THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL BALANCE, AND HAVE INCALCULABLE CONSEQUENCES, ESPECIALLY FOR THE COUNTRIES OF AFRICA AND ASIA.

(VI) THE ROOTS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION LIE IN THE ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION IN RAISING THE ARMS LEVEL THROUGHOUT THE AREA AS A

/ RESULT OF.....

RESULT OF THEIR HEAVY SUPPLIES TO THE U.A.R. OVER THE YEARS, AND THEIR EXCESSIVE ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT OF SYRIA EARLIER THIS YEAR. THIS PRODUCED IRRESPONSIBLE SYRIAN INSPIRED RAIDS ON ISRAEL, INFLATION OF SHOUKAIRI AND THE P.L.O., ISRAELI WARNINGS TO SYRIA, NASSER'S ASSUMPTION (NEEDLED BY SYRIA) OF THE ROLE OF ACTIVE CO-ORDINATOR OF ARAB MILITARY PRESSURE ON ISRAEL, HIS INSISTENCE ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.N.E.F., HIS CONSEQUENT CLAIM TO CONTROL THE GULF OF AQABA (WHICH HE KNEW TO BE A FLASH POINT AND CASUS BELLI FOR THE ISRAELIS), AND THE ADVANCE OF EGYPTIAN FORCES INTO SINAI. THIS PROCESS WENT FORWARD AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF VIOLENT ARAB STATEMENTS ABOUT THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL, AND ISRAELI REPRISAL RAIDS AND WARNINGS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHO STRUCK FIRST (AND ISRAELI STATEMENTS IMPLY THAT THEY DID) IS NOT PARTICULARLY RELEVANT. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT GENERAL DE GAULLE QUICKLY DROPPED THIS CRITERION FOR DETERMINING THE FRENCH ATTITUDE. IN THE SHORT TERM NASSER, AND IRRESPONSIBLE SOVIET POLICY CREATED THE WAR CONDITION.

(VII) AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES SHOULD REALISE THAT THE ISSUES AT STAKE ARE UNIQUE AND OUGHT TO TRANSCEND THE GROUP LOYALTY THEY NORMALLY FEEL. IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THEY TEND TO SUPPORT THE ARABS OVER E.G. BORDER INCIDENTS AND TO ACCEPT THAT ISRAEL IS USUALLY THE AGGRESSOR. BUT THE BASIC ARAB POLICY NOW IN QUESTION IS THE INTENTION TO DESTROY ISRAEL, WHICH SURELY FEW AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES WOULD ENDORSE. IF THEY DO NOT, THEY SHOULD PRESS THE ARABS TO ACCEPT CO-EXISTANCE WITH ISRAEL, AS A NECESSARY BACKGROUND FOR A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT, WHICH WOULD OBVIATE RECURRENT MIDDLE EAST CRISES AND THEIR ATTENDENT RISKS.

(VIII) WE DO NOT AT THIS STAGE THINK IT USEFUL FOR ANY OF THE 4 POWERS TO PROPOSE TERMS, OR PARTICULAR ELEMENTS, FOR A SETTLEMENT. ON WITHDRAWAL YOU SHOULD BE GUIDED BY MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS BUT YOU CAN TAKE THE GENERAL LINE THAT WE ARE OPPOSED TO THE USE OF FORCE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, AND SUPPORT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES, BOTH PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED IN THE U.N.CHARTER. IT FOLLOWS THAT IN THIS CASE TOO, IT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE THAT A SOLUTION SHOULD BE IMPOSED BY FORCE. HOW THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL CAN BE RELATED TO A SETTLEMENT CONTAINING SATISFACTORY GUARANTEES

/ OF THE,.....

OF THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED, AND FAIR TREATMENT FOR ALL THE REFUGEES, IS THE PROBLEM FACING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: NEGOTIATION, COMPROMISE AND MEDIATION WILL BE REQUIRED, AND WE EXPECT THAT THE U.N. WILL PLAY A PROMINENT PART IN THE PROCESS. WE RECOGNISE THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES STRETCHING BACK FOR MANY YEARS.

(IX) NASSER'S BIG LIE ABOUT US/UK AIR SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL HAS IMMEASURABLY AGGRAVATED THE SITUATION, AND LED THE ARABS INTO MEASURES AGAINST THE WEST, THE EFFECT OF WHICH WILL CAUSE SENSELESS DAMAGE TO THEMSELVES, AND OTHERS ((IV) ABOVE), AND WHICH HAVE NO RELEVANCE TO THE ARABS' CASE OVER ISRAEL. THIS RECKLESS SLANDER IN WHICH HE INVOLVED AND MISLED KING HUSSEIN WAS AN ALIBI FOR HIS AND EGYPTIAN FAILURE ((II) ABOVE). THE SOVIET UNION'S CAREFUL REFUSAL (DUE TO THEIR VERY SENSIBLE DETERMINATION TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT) TO SPONSOR THIS LIE IS ALONE PROOF OF ITS FALSITY (THOUGH NOW THAT THE DANGERS OF THEIR BEING INVOLVED ARE SAFELY PAST, THEY ARE BEGINNING TO GIVE IT CURRENCY IN VARIOUS FORMS).

(X) NASSER'S EXAGERATED AMBITIONS ((III) ABOVE) LED HIS SUPPORTERS INTO INCREASING DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION, WHO EXPLOITED BOTH NASSER'S AND INDEED MORE LEGITIMATE ARAB, AIMS, TO EXTEND THEIR OWN INFLUENCE, MISCALCULATED THE SITUATION, AND THEN ABANDONED THE ARABS, C.F. THEIR OPPOSITION IN THE U.N. TO AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASE FIRE, WHICH MIGHT HAVE LEFT THE ARABS IN A STRONGER POSITION. THE ARAB STATES MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO BECOME PAWNS OF SOVIET POLICY.

SOSFA/CROSEC

SENT 0800Z 17 JUNE

BY TELEGRAPH:

ANKARA
ATHENS
COPENHAGEN
THE HAGUE
LISBON
OSLO
PARIS
UKDEL NATO
ROME
BELGRADE
BERNE
DUBLIN
HELSINKI
MADRID
STOCKHOLM
VIENNA
MOSCOW

UKMIS NEW YORK
BIS NEW YORK
WASHINGTON
BUENOS AIRES
CARACAS
RIO DE JANEIRO
MONTEVIDEO
SANTIAGO
ADEN (Pers.)
AMMAN
BAHRAIN
BEIRUT
JEDDA
KUWAIT
TEHRAN
TEL AVIV
KHARTOUM

RABAT
ADDIS ABABA
DAKAR
CAPE TOWN
PRETORIA
BANGKOK
DJAKARTA
KATMANDU
POLAD SINGAPORE
TOKYO
VIENTIANE
OTTAWA
CANBERRA
WELLINGTON
NEW DELHI
KARACHI
RAWALPINDI

COLOMBO
KUALA LUMPUR
SINGAPORE
ACCRA
BATHURST
FREETOWN
LAGOS
KAMPALA
NAIROBI
LUSAKA
ZOMBA
VALLETTA
NICOSIA
KINGSTON
PORT OF SPAIN
GEORGETOWN

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE PARIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 621

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

16 JUNE 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 621 OF 16 JUNE AND RFI IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO MOSCOW AND UK DEL NATO.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 616: MIDDLE EAST

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARISES WHAT M. COUVE DE MURVILLE SAID ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST IN HIS STATEMENT TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AT THE OPENING OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE ON 15 JUNE:-

A) ISRAEL INTENDS TO SETTLE THE PEACE DIRECTLY WITH EACH ARAB STATE CONCERNED AND DOES NOT WANT TO HAVE RECOURSE TO UNITED NATIONS PROCEDURES, WHICH SHE CONCIDERS HAVE PROVED TO BE INEFFECTIVE. THE ARABS FOR THEIR PART HAVE BEEN TRAUMATISED BY THEIR DEFEAT: THE EXTENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE SHOCK WHICH THEY HAVE RECEIVED CANNOT YET BE MEASURED:

B) THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN ARE CUT OFF FROM THE ARAB WORLD, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION AND MOST OF EASTERN EUROPE HAVE BROKEN OFF WITH ISRAEL. THERE IS THEREFORE THE RISK OF A RETURN TO A COLD WAR SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND ALL THE ELEMENTS NOW EXIST OF QUOTE A POLITICAL CRISIS OF EXCEPTIONAL GRAVITY UNQUOTE:

C) AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, IT IS CLEAR THAT NO-ONE CAN TAKE ANY INITIATIVE AT THE PRESENT MOMENT TO BRING ABOUT CONCERTED ACTION:

D) IT IS QUOTE NORMAL UNQUOTE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY TO WANT TO DEBATE THE SITUATION, AND FRANCE FOR HER PART GIVES HER CONSENT. BUT IT WILL BE FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL EVENTUALLY TO TAKE ACTIONS AND DECISIONS:

E) MEANWHILE, THE FIRST PRIORITY MUST BE TO RE-ENFORCE THE FRAGILE CEASE-FIRE. THERE IS ALSO THE IMMEDIATE HUMAN PROBLEM OF THE REFUGEES IN GAZA AND ARAB PALESTINE, WHO ARE ONCE MORE ON THE

/MOVE

MOVE, AND FOR WHOSE WELFARE WE ARE ALL DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE:

F) IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THE TWO SIDES WILL EVER BE ABLE TO APPROACH EACH OTHER OF THEIR OWN ACCORD OR EVENTUALLY BEGIN TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT IF THIS IS NOT FACILITATED OR EVEN INSPIRED FROM OUTSIDE THE AREA. THE COUNTRIES IN QUESTION ARE INDEPENDENT, AND INTEND TO REMAIN SO. BUT, IN THE END, IT IS THE GREAT POWERS WHO WILL ORIENT THE FUTURE. FRANCE FOR HER PART WILL ALWAYS BE READY TO WORK FOR UNDERSTANDING AND PEACE.

FO PSE PASS IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK 51 AND PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON 184 AND SAVING TO MOSCOW 36.

SIR P REILLY

SENT AT 1232Z/16
RECD AT 1232Z/16

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AT

18

Prime Minister

Today's Summary.
See para 12. and 22

16/6.

The Middle East Situation
16 June

Israel

The Israel Government has concluded an agreement with UNRWA giving it the privileges and the facilities which it requires to continue its work with refugees in Israel territory.

2. Currency regulations have been introduced in the occupied territories. There is not yet, however, freedom of travel between Israel and the occupied territories.

3. The Israel authorities are strenuously trying to restore normal conditions of life in Jerusalem. However the authorities continue to make if difficult for members of the Consular Corps to travel in Jerusalem and on the West Bank.

Suez Canal

4. The Swedes have reported in the strictest confidence that they have heard from a source "as reliable as could be expected in the circumstances" that there are 14 obstacles of one kind or another in the Canal. The Swedes have asked that this information should not be attributed to them in any discussion of it with other governments.

5. Evacuation The Canadian Ambassador in Cairo has been asked to approach the U.A.R. authorities at once to arrange for the evacuation of those who wish to leave British ships. The British Interests Section in Cairo

/are

are making plans for the journey.

6. We are in close contact with the ship owners but have not as yet obtained consular access to the ships.

7. Detailed information on the situation is hard to obtain because the Canal Zone is under heavy restrictions.

Jordan

8. H.M. Ambassador reports that there is widespread criticism of the Egyptians and that Russia is being blamed for not going to the help of the U.A.R. against Israel.

9. There is some evidence that Palestinians on the West Bank would not be averse to continued Israel occupation and the eventual absorption within the Israel State.

10. King Hussein has so far escaped attack but he will probably be forced to adopt a common inflexible Arab line.

11. Relief The International Red Cross in Geneva have now agreed to fly into Jordan the blankets and medical supplies made available by H.M.G. in Cyprus.

Libya

12. The Libyan Government have formally requested both the Americans and ourselves to withdraw from our military bases in Libya. H.M. Ambassador in Tripoli has been instructed to draw the Libyan Government's attention to the statement in the Defence Review that "there will be no attempts to maintain defence facilities in an independent country against its wishes";and to inform the Libyan Government that we are prepared to enter into immediate discussions. The Americans are also instructing their Ambassador in Libya to say that they are prepared to

/resume

resume discussions leading to withdrawal in accordance with the Libyan Government's request and the U.S. position in 1964 (since they wish, to the maximum extent possible, to relate their response to the 1964 discussions rather than to the current crisis).

Saudi Arabia

13. British shipping is being given all necessary facilities by the ports of Jedda, Dammam and Ras Tanura.

14. Heads of Diplomatic Missions were formally asked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to convey the Saudi Arabian authorities' request to their governments, that they should:

(i) condemn the Israeli aggression;

(ii) insist that Israel should withdraw to the frontiers which she held before 5 June;

(iii) ensure that Israel was not permitted to retain her gains in the recent conflict,

(iv) ~~but to~~ seek the support of other friendly governments for the foregoing objectives.

This formal request was made without the Saudi Arabian Government having in the first place announced to the public or the diplomatic missions that a state of war existed.

Iran

15. The Iranian Ambassador called on Sir D. Allen on 13 June. He made the following points:

(i) The Shah had urged King Hussein and King Faisal not to sever diplomatic relations with the U.K.

/(ii)

(ii) No Arab country would be prepared to negotiate a peace settlement directly with Israel.

(iii) It was important for the U.K. to maintain good relations with, and to help "the more sensible Arab States".

Algeria

16. The Manager of Barclays Bank in Oran has been taken off the aeroplane to Paris and has been refused permission to leave Algeria.

17. Algiers Radio announced that President Attassi of Syria would be arriving in Algeria during the morning of 15 June.

18. H.M. Ambassador has reported that extremists of the Revolutionary Council - the supreme organ of State - appear to be in control. They will pursue radical policies without counting the economic cost to Algeria.

Kuwait

19. The Kuwait Prime Minister has said in a newspaper interview that Kuwait would "pursue the battle". It was for this reason that the Amir had called for an urgent meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers. Other States would have to choose between support for the "aggressive zionists" and their friendship with the Arabs.

20. An article which strongly attacks the Soviet Union has appeared in a weekly Kuwait journal. The article states that the Russians have deceived the Arab world, that Russian support of the Arabs is confined to words alone and that the Soviet Union in fact supports Israel

/and her

and her territorial integrity. The Soviet Union is also accused of collusion with the U.S. and the U.K. in "the dirty plot".

Aden

21. Sheikh Mohammad Farid has severely criticized the Soviet Union on television. He accused the Russians of abandoning the Arabs after the Israel aggression.

22. U.S. Assessment of the Middle East Crisis

Dean Rusk told H.M. Ambassador in Washington that he thought that:

(i) the Russian demand for a meeting of the General Assembly was primarily a propaganda move although the idea of bilateral talks with other Heads of State might be entertained by the Russians;

(ii) little that was constructive was likely to emanate from the Assembly meeting;

(iii) it would be some time before attitudes ~~from~~ on both the Israel and Arab sides moderated;

(iv) essential elements in any settlement included acknowledgment of the existence of the State of Israel; the abolition of belligerence on the Arab side; a settlement on Tiran and Suez; progress on refugees and arms limitation; and a regime for the old city of Jerusalem.

(v) U.N. machinery in the Middle East was unlikely to survive the present crisis. Rusk concluded that U.S. policy was to be very cautious and to wait and see what countries in the area would do.

Rumanian Attitude to the Middle East Crisis

23. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs have informed the Israelis that their victory over the Arabs should not be made the opportunity for territorial expansion.

The U.N.

24. Security Council There has been no move to reconvene the Council.

25. The Assembly It is almost certain that the formal opening of the Special Session will take place on 17 June, but that the debate is unlikely to start before 19 June. Mr. Kosygin is to lead for the Soviet Union but other countries' representation is not yet definitely known.

Eastern Department

16 June, 1967

CKYLE
MIDEAST--LEADALL KOSYGIN
REUTER
(UNDATED) SOVIET PRIME MINISTER ALEXEI KOSYGIN PREPARED TONIGHT (THURSDAY) FOR A DRAMATIC FLIGHT TO THE UNITED STATES TO LEAD RUSSIA'S DELEGATION IN THE PROPOSED U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

AN ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE WHITE HOUSE ASSURED HIM OF A WELCOME FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON. A SPOKESMAN SAID THE AMERICAN LEADER WOULD BE GLAD TO MEET MR. KOSYGIN IF HE CAME TO NEW YORK.

THE SOVIET LEADER'S TRANSATLANTIC FLIGHT TO CONTINUE THE RUSSIAN ATTACK ON ISRAEL IN PERSON BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS HINGES ON THE VERDICT OF 122 MEMBER NATIONS.

A MOSCOW FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD GO IF THERE IS SUFFICIENT SUPPORT FOR THE RUSSIAN REQUEST THAT THE ASSEMBLY MEET IN EMERGENCY SESSION TO CONSIDER THE FUTURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE U.S. EMBASSY SPOKESMAN IN MOSCOW ALSO SAID IT HAD ISSUED VISAS FOR A 50-MEMBER DELEGATION, DUE TO LEAVE MOSCOW AT 1045 (0745 GMT) TOMORROW.
MORE MQ/DM 0021

PARIS AWAITS KOSYGIN

PARIS, FRIDAY.

MR ALEXEI KOSYGIN WILL VISIT PRESIDENT DE GAULLE HERE THIS AFTERNOON FOR SURPRISE TALKS ARRANGED AT THE SOVIET PRIME MINISTER'S SUGGESTION, INFORMED SOURCES SAID.

MR KOSYGIN AND THE PRESIDENT ARRANGED THE MEETING YESTERDAY DURING A CONVERSATION ON THE DIRECT TELEPRINTER LINE LINKING THE ELYSEE PALACE AND THE KREMLIN -- THE SO-CALLED "GREEN TELEPHONE". SOVIET PREMIER WILL MAKE HIS VISIT DURING A STOPOVER ON HIS FLIGHT TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK FOR A PROPOSED SPECIAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION TO DEBATE THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION. FRANCE HAS SUPPORTED THE SOVIET SUGGESTION FOR THE SESSION.

A PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED LAST NIGHT THAT THE TWO LEADERS WOULD MEET AT THE ELYSEE DURING THE AFTERNOON. THE TWO LEADERS ARE EXPECTED TO CONCENTRATE THEIR DISCUSSIONS ON HOW BEST TO APPROACH THE SEARCH FOR A MIDDLE EAST SOLUTION.

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PRESIDENT HOPES TO PERSUADE MR KOSYGIN TO AGREE NOW TO FOUR-POWER TALKS EXAMINING WHAT COULD BE DONE TO COOL PASSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PREPARE FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT LATER.

THE PRESIDENT IS EXPECTED TO SUGGEST AHAT A START COULD BE MADE WITH A FOUR-POWER MEETING IN NEW YORK DURING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION.

IF THE TWO REACHED FIRM AGREEMENT ON SUCH A MEETING AND THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN CONCURRED, PRESIDENT DE GAULLE WOULD PROBABLY BE PREPARED TO FLY TO NEW YORK TO TAKE PART.

A WELL-INFORMED SOURCE SAID LAST NIGHT AHAT FOREIGN MINISTER MAURICE COUVE DE MURVILLE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY GO TO NEW YORK FOR THE ASSEMBLY SESSION IN ANY CASE.

9.8AM

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

June 16, 1967

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary agreed in principle last night that the Prime Minister would send messages today to General de Gaulle and President Johnson.

I enclose drafts of these which the Prime Minister has approved subject to the Foreign Secretary's concurrence.

If you see no objection to the message to de Gaulle, perhaps you would ask Patrick Reilly to deliver it as soon as possible. The Prime Minister wishes the message to President Johnson to be dispatched not later than noon today. Perhaps you could let me have any comments on the draft before then.

I am sending a copy of this letter and the enclosures to Reid (Cabinet Office).

A. W. Palliser

D.J.D. Maitland, Esq., C.M.G., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office.

SECRET

T 174

DRAFT MESSAGE TO GENERAL DE GAULLE

I am glad to hear that you and Premier Kosygin will be meeting today. It will be most interesting to learn your impressions after your talk with him.

In particular, you will no doubt gain some hint of the Soviet objectives in the impending Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly. This will clearly be one of the most significant in the Organisation's history. Her Majesty's Ambassador tells me that you asked him yesterday whether the meeting of the Assembly was likely to affect my plans for my visit to you on Monday. My answer is that this must ~~I think~~ of course ~~depend on yourself and on your own reactions to your~~ take account of your talk with Premier Kosygin. If, in the light of that, you feel that you and I should both go immediately to New York, with the prospect of some constructive Four Power meeting at the Summit, then, disappointed as my wife and I should be to postpone a visit to which we so look forward, I would of course agree. We could no doubt have a full personal exchange in New York and I ~~might perhaps be able to visit you a little later on in~~ also Paris.

~~But~~, As things stand at present, and having regard to the fact that this Special Session of the General Assembly seems likely to last for several days if not weeks and be very largely an exchange of propaganda speeches, my firm disposition is to ask the Foreign Secretary to lead the British team at New York and to

adhere to the programme for my visit to you on Monday. As I said in my message to you yesterday, I look forward in any case to a full exchange of views with you about the Middle East. If we both, as I hope, decide to keep to our present plans, we could naturally discuss then the prospects for a [high-level] Four Power meeting at ~~some stage~~ Summit during the Special Session in New York; and ~~whether or not~~ at what stage we should both go there personally. ~~at any stage.~~

However, in the light of your talk with Kosygin, you may feel differently. If so, I should be glad to have your views.

Approved by the Prime Minister.

D

1676.

F.O. informed and are sending message.

Subject

COPY NO. 21

S E C R E T

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No T174/67

TELNO 1990 16 JUNE 1967 (P.S.)

SECRET.

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE, URGENTLY, FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT DE GAULLE.

BEGINS.

I AM GLAD TO HEAR THAT YOU AND PREMIER KOSYGIN WILL BE MEETING TODAY. IT WILL BE MOST INTERESTING TO LEARN YOUR IMPRESSIONS AFTER YOUR TALK WITH HIM.

IN PARTICULAR, YOU WILL NO DOUBT GAIN SOME HINT OF THE SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE IMPENDING SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THIS WILL CLEARLY BE ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT IN THE ORGANISATION'S HISTORY. HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR TELLS ME THAT YOU ASKED HIM YESTERDAY WHETHER THE MEETING OF THE ASSEMBLY WAS LIKELY TO AFFECT MY PLANS FOR MY VISIT TO YOU ON MONDAY. MY ANSWER IS THAT THIS MUST OF COURSE TAKE ACCOUNT OF YOU TALK WITH PREMIER KOSYGIN.

AS THINGS STAND AT PRESENT, AND HAVING REGARD TO THE FACT THAT THIS SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SEEMS LIKELY TO LAST FOR SEVERAL DAYS IF NOT WEEKS AND BE VERY LARGELY AN EXCHANGE OF PROPAGANDA SPEECHES, MY FIRM DISPOSITION IS TO ASK THE FOREIGN SECRETARY TO LEAD THE BRITISH TEAM AT NEW YORK AND TO ADHERE TO THE PROGRAMME FOR MY VISIT TO YOU ON MONDAY. AS I SAID IN MY MESSAGE TO YOU YESTERDAY, I LOOK FORWARD IN ANY CASE TO A FULL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH YOU ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. IF WE BOTH, AS I HOPE, DECIDE TO KEEP TO OUR PRESENT PLANS, WE COULD NATURALLY DISCUSS THEN THE PROSPECTS FOR A FOUR POWER MEETING AT THE SUMMIT DURING THE SPECIAL SESSION IN NEW YORK: AND AT WHAT STAGE WE SHOULD BOTH GO THERE PERSONALLY.

HOWEVER IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR TALK WITH KOSYGIN YOU MAY FEEL DIFFERENTLY. IF SO, I SHOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE YOUR VIEWS.

ENDS.

SOSFA SENT 1147Z 16 JUNE 1967 [COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING ST.]

PRISEC (F.O.)

S E C R E T

COPIED TO
Sir. B. Trend.

Copy on France, May, 1967
(Visit to Paris file).

AT

Subber

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL TELEGRAM

SERIAL No T176A/67.

COPY NO. .....

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT.A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

TELNO. 2009 16 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO PARIS TELEGRAM NO 2009 OF 16 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO RABAT (FLASH)

RABAT TELEGRAM NO 263, BEING REPEATED TO YOU: KING HASSAN'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE.

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS A SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT OUT OF LONDON ON SATURDAY 17 JUNE, AND WILL BE ON HIS WAY BEFORE M. BALAFREJ CAN GET HERE. ON SUNDAY 18 JUNE THE PRIME MINISTER RETURNS TO LONDON ONLY TO SET OFF FOR PARIS FOR HIS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT DE GAULLE.

2. SINCE WE HAVE NEED OF EVERY FRIEND WE CAN GET IN THE ARAB WORLD, YOU SHOULD CALL ON M. BALAFREJ WHEN HE GETS TO PARIS AND DELIVER THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE:-

BEGINS.

QUOTE I HAVE JUST HEARD THAT ~~YOU WERE CONSIDERING A VISIT TO~~ HIS MAJESTY HAS ASKED YOU TO CALL ON ME IN LONDON ON 17 OR 18 JUNE ON YOUR WAY TO NEW YORK. IT IS MOST UNLUCKY THAT MY ENGAGEMENTS ON THOSE TWO DAYS MAKE IT PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO MEET. I SHOULD WELCOME THE CHANCE OF A DISCUSSION AT SOME OTHER EARLY DATE. IN THE MEANTIME GEORGE BROWN, MY DEPUTY AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXPECTS TO FLY TO NEW YORK HIMSELF ON 19 JUNE, AND ~~LOOKS FORWARD TO MEETING~~ WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO SEE YOU ON MY BEHALF ~~YOU~~. HAROLD WILSON UNQUOTE

ENDS.

SOSFA SENT 2117Z/16 JUNE 1967

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET]

P R I S E C (F.O.)

SSSSS CONFIDENTIAL

Subject

24

COPY NO.

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO. 6710 16 JUNE 1967 (PS)

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL TELEGRAM SERIAL No. T 175/67

SECRET

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON THAT IS BEING SENT ON THE DIRECT LINE BEGINS :-

DAVID BRUCE TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT YOU WOULD PROBABLY NOT DECIDE UNTIL TODAY HOW TO HANDLE THE SPECIAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT ANY POSSIBLE MEETING WITH KOSYGIN. I WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS VERY PROMPT RESPONSE TO OUR ENQUIRIES AND SHALL OF COURSE BE GLAD TO KNOW YOUR PLANS AS SOON AS THEY ARE REASONABLY FIRM.

FOR MY PART, I REMAIN BROADLY OF THE VIEW EXPRESSED IN MY MESSAGE OF YESTERDAY. BUT MY FINAL DECISION IS BOUND TO BE AFFECTED BY DE GAULLE'S TALK TODAY WITH KOSYGIN. THE GENERAL MAY BE URGED TO ATTEND THE SESSION IN PERSON WITH PERHAPS THE BAIT OF A FOUR POWER SUMMIT DANGLED BEFORE HIM. IF HE DECIDES TO GO, I SHALL DO LIKEWISE. HE ASKED OUR AMBASSADOR IN PARIS YESTERDAY WHETHER THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY WAS LIKELY TO AFFECT MY PLANS FOR MY TALK WITH HIM ON MONDAY. I HAVE SENT HIM A SHORT REPLY SAYING THAT THIS MUST CLEARLY DEPEND TO SOME EXTENT ON THE CONCLUSIONS HE DRAWS FROM HIS TALK TODAY WITH KOSYGIN. IF HE DECIDES IN THE LIGHT OF THAT THAT HE WISHES TO GO AT ONCE TO NEW YORK, THEN CLEARLY I SHALL GO TOO AND SHALL EITHER HAVE MY TALK WITH HIM THERE OR TRY TO FIT IT IN ON OUR EVENTUAL RETURN. BUT I HAVE SAID THAT MY PRESENT DISPOSITION IS TO STICK TO THE TIME-TABLE FOR MONDAY. THE ASSEMBLY WILL PROBABLY GO ON FOR DAYS, AND IF AT ANY POINT IT LOOKS AS IF THERE IS A PROSPECT AND A NEED FOR A TOP-LEVEL FOUR POWER MEETING , THEN HE AND I CAN GO OVER AT THAT STAGE TO MEET WITH YOURSELF AND KOSYGIN. NOTHING IS MORE RISKY THAN TO PREDICT HOW THE OLD MAN WILL HANDLE A TACTICAL SITUATION. --BUT MY SLIGHT HUNCH IS THAT HE AND I WILL MEET AS PLANNED AT THE TRIANON ON MONDAY.

SOSFA SENT 1441 16 JUNE [COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

PRISEC (F.O.)

SECRET

77777

T175/67 22

SECRET

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM PRIME MINISTER

David Bruce told me last night that you would probably not decide until today how to handle the Special Assembly of the United Nations and what to do about any possible meeting with Kosygin. I was grateful for this very prompt response to our enquiries and shall of course be glad to know your plans as soon as they are reasonably firm.

For my part, I remain broadly of the view expressed in my message of yesterday. But my final decision is bound to be affected by de Gaulle's talk today with Kosygin. ~~He has~~ The General may be urged to attend the Session in person with perhaps the bait of a Four Power Summit dangled before him. If he decides to go, I shall do likewise. He asked our Ambassador in Paris yesterday whether the Special Session of the Assembly was likely to affect my plans for my talk with him on Monday. I have sent him a short reply saying that this must clearly depend to some extent on the conclusions he draws from his talk today with Kosygin. If he decides in the light of that, that he wishes to go at once to New York, then clearly I shall go too and shall either have my talk with him there or try to fit it in on our eventual return. But I have said that my present disposition is to stick to the time-table for Monday. The Assembly will probably go on for days, and if at any point it looks

as if there is a prospect and a need for a top-level Four Power meeting, then he and I can go over at that stage to meet with yourself and Kosygin. Nothing is more risky than to predict how the old man will handle a tactical situation. But my slight hunch is that he and I will meet as planned at the Trianon on Monday.

Approved by the Prime Minister

1676

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

PERSONAL TELEGRAM

SERIAL No T179/67 Sent by Prime Minister

Copy to FO.

Cabinet Office

17/6

PRUS001
1959 ZULU 16 JUN 67
FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE PRIME MINISTER
SECRET NODIS
CAP67542

FRIDAY, JUNE 16, 1967 3:50 P.M.

YOUR MESSAGES OF THE LAST TWO DAYS HAVE BEEN HELPFUL, AS ALWAYS.

NONE OF US CAN PREDICT WHAT SITUATIONS MAY ARISE IN THE DAYS AHEAD, BUT MY PRESENT THINKING IS THIS.

FIRST, AT THE MOMENT I DOUBT THAT ANYTHING USEFUL CAN COME FROM MY PERSONAL PARTICIPATION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

SECOND, FROM THE BEGINNING OF THIS CRISIS I HAVE NOT LOOKED WITH FAVOR ON A FOUR-POWER MEETING OUTSIDE THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL. IT IS SOMETHING OF AN ILLUSION THAT THE FOUR POWERS HAVE THE CAPACITY TO DESIGN AND IMPOSE SUCCESSFULLY A PEACE PLAN ON THE NEAR EAST. THE STATES OF THE AREA HAVE MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT THEY ARE NOT SUBJECT TO EFFECTIVE CONTROL FROM OUTSIDE. WHAT THE MAJOR POWERS CAN DO IS TO TRY TO CREATE A CLIMATE IN WHICH THE NATIONS OF THE AREA THEMSELVES MIGHT GRADUALLY SETTLE THEIR AFFAIRS ON A PEACEFUL BASIS. BUT I AM NOT CONFIDENT THAT A FOUR-POWER SESSION IS THE BEST WAY TO DO THIS.

MOREOVER, I SHOULD THINK BOTH OF US WOULD WISH TO AVOID THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING THE FOUR OF US SPLIT OR OTHERWISE BE STRAINED IN SUCH A SESSION.

I HOPE WE CAN KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT IN THE DAYS AHEAD AS THE SITUATION EVOLVES, AND WE MIGHT WISH TO COUNSEL TOGETHER SHORTLY AFTER THE SMOKE CLEARS TO ASSESS THE SITUATION AND SEE WHAT IS REQUIRED TO MOVE THINGS FORWARD TOWARDS OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE OF STABLE PEACE IN THE AREA.

MESSAGE ENDS

PRO-DOCUMENT
PUT IN PLACE

- 2 FEB 1999

Cl

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group/Class PREM 13

Piece 1621

T.173/67
T.175/67
T.177/67

THREE 4 PAPERS EXTRACTED AND TEMPORARILY RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) PENDING COMPLETION OF REVIEW

(date) 17-3-97

(Signed) T. R. Curran

Dec Paris Embassy Cables 17/6 T 172/67.

TRANSLATION OF GENERAL DE GAULLE'S MESSAGE

I have studied your messages of June 15 and 16 with great care. I thank you for letting me have your thoughts on the Middle East crisis.

I had a talk here yesterday with Mr. Kosygin. He struck me as disposed in the direction of a settlement which, in the last analysis, would be a peaceful one. But this will not be achieved without a great deal of toughness and conditions so far as he is concerned.

We shall have, on Monday and Tuesday, a full opportunity to discuss this problem as well as the other questions of interest to our two Governments.

My wife and I look forward to this opportunity of seeing you together with Mrs. Wilson.

June 17, 1967

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE

A LONDRES

Le 17 Juin 1967

L'AMBASSADEUR

Prime Minister

Copy to : F.O.
Sir B. Trend.

Monsieur le Premier Ministre,

Je vous prie de bien vouloir trouver ci-après le texte du message que Monsieur le Président de la République m'a demandé de vous faire tenir :

"Vos messages des 15 et 16 Juin ont retenu toute mon attention. Je vous remercie de m'avoir fait part de vos reflexions sur la crise du Moyen_Orient.

J'ai eu hier un entretien avec M. Kossyguine. Il m'a paru disposé à s'orienter vers un réglement qui serait, en fin de compte, pacifique. mais cela n'ira pas sans beaucoup de sévérités et de conditions de sa part.

.../

Nous aurons, Lundi et Mardi prochains, tout loisir de parler de ce problème, ainsi que des autres questions qui intéressent nos deux Gouvernements.

Nous nous réjouissons, ma femme et moi, de cette occasion de vous voir en compagnie de Madame Wilson.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, les assurances de ma haute considération. C. de Gaulle"

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

Rae Couve

COPY NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

TELNO. 2022 17 June 1967 (NEAD)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO PARIS TELEGRAM NUMBER 2Ø22 OF 17 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO RABAT.

RABAT TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 265 AND 267: KING HASSAN'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE.

IT SEEMS FROM TELEPHONE CONVERSATION MALLET/FIELDING THAT THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF ARRANGING A MEETING IN PARIS ON SUNDAY EVENING ARE OVERWHELMING.

2. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE DELIVER THE PERSONAL MESSAGE IN MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 2Ø09 WITH THE FOLLOWING AMENDMENTS:-

(A) DELETE QUOTE YOU WERE CONSIDERING A VISIT TO UNQUOTE IN FIRST SENTENCE AND REPLACE BY QUOTE HIS MAJESTY HAS ASKED YOU TO CALL ON ME IN UNQUOTE.

(B) DELETE QUOTE LOOKS FORWARD TO MEETING YOU UNQUOTE IN LAST SENTENCE AND REPLACE BY QUOTE WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO SEE YOU ON MY BEHALF UNQUOTE.

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]
SOSFA SENT 1235Z 17 JUNE
PRISEC (F.O.)

CONFIDENTIAL

77777

CONFIDENTIAL COPY NO:

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELNO 630
CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
17 JUNE 67

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 630 OF 17 JUNE 67 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO RABAT AND UK MIS NEW YORK
YOUR TELNO 2022 (NOT TO UK MIS NEW YORK)
KING HASSAN'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE.

AS HIS MOVEMENTS WERE UNCERTAIN, I MET M. BALAFREJ AT ORLY AND GAVE HIM PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE IN YOUR TELNO 2009 AS AMENDED IN YOUR TEL UNDER REFERENCE. HE SAID THAT HE WAS OF COURSE VERY SORRY BUT THAT HE UNDERSTOOD AND HE HOPED THAT HE WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET THE PRIME MINISTER BEFORE LONG. IT WOULD BE AN EXCELLENT THING IF MR WILSON COULD COME TO NEW YORK. MEANWHILE HE WOULD CERTAINLY HOPE TO MEET YOU THERE.

2. HE WILL BE GOING ON TO NEW YORK THIS EVENING OR TO-MORROW MORNING. QUAI D'ORSAY HAVE TOLD US THAT THE GENERAL WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE RECEIVING HIM AND MOROCCAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CONFIRMED THIS.

FO PASS IMMEDIATE RABAT 3 AND UK MIS NEW YORK 52.

SIR P REILLY SENT1534Z/17
RECD 1534Z/17

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET]

PRISEC (F.O.)

CONFIDENTIAL

P.10

RESTRICTED

CYPHER/CAT.A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO UKMIS NEW YORK

TELNO. 2974 17 JUNE 1967 (UN (POL))

RESTRICTED.

FOR YOUDE FROM LAMBERT.
EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION: CREDENTIALS.

FULL LIST OF DELEGATION IS AS IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

2. THE FOLLOWING WILL BE REPRESENTATIVES:-
SECRETARY OF STATE
LORD CARADON
SIR PAUL GORE-BOOTH
SIR HAROLD BEELEY
SIR LESLIE GLASS

3. THE FOLLOWING WILL BE ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVES:-
SIR MORRICE JAMES
MR. HAYMAN.
MR. BRENCHLEY
MR. YOUDE
MR. DARWIN

4. YOUR PARAGRAPH 3 AGREED.

5. MR. K. HOLROYD OF THE C.O.I. WILL BE WITH THE PARTY BUT PRESUMABLY YOU WOULD NOT INCLUDE HIM IN THE DELEGATION.

6. WE WILL ARRANGE FOR THE LETTER OF ACCREDITATION TO BE BROUGHT BY THE PARTY ACCOMPANYING THE FOREIGN SECRETARY.

SOSFA SENT 1131Z/17 JUNE 1967

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

U.N. DEPT.

SSSSS RESTRICTED

NOTE OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION ON JUNE 18, 1967 WITH MR. SPRINGER OF THE AGUDAS ISRAEL WORLD ORGANISATION

Mr. Springer telephoned to speak to Mrs. Marcia Williams this afternoon and was put on to me. He said that he had had reports from reliable sources of massacres and arrests of Jews in Arab countries. He was telephoning because he understood that the Prime Minister was later/going today to Paris. He wondered therefore whether it would be possible for the Prime Minister to discuss this question with General de Gaulle. He said that the Prime Minister had been very helpful in the past in relation to Jewish problems and he asked me to draw the Prime Minister's attention to his concern about the fate of Jews in Arab countries and expressed the hope that it would be possible for this to be discussed with the French.

I said I would take note of what he had said, and report it. I could not, of course, say whether or not this would be a matter which it would be possible for the Prime Minister to raise during the course of his very short visit to Paris.

D.H. ANDREWS

June 18, 1967

(c.c. Mr. MacLehose
Foreign Office)

P.a. 20/6.

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 639 18 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 639 of 18 June
Repeated for information to Washington, U.K. Mis. New York, Amman and Saving to U.K. Del. NATO.

Your telegram No. 1098.

The strength of Israeli and world Jewish feeling about Jerusalem should not be underestimated. No Israeli Government could now give it up without falling. Similarly Zionist and Jewish pressures in the outside world will be exerted strongly against Governments seen to be urging the Israelis to relinquish their two thousand year old dream. The case would not be the same if we were seen to be urging, what is a legitimate British and christian interest that we expect the most cast iron guarantees from the Israelis for the freedom care of and well being of all holy places and complete freedom of access to them for all religions (something the Jordanians did not give).

2. With regard to refugees, I take it that our policy is that the Israelis must not try and push out genuine inhabitants of the West Bank and that they should do everything to attract back those who have already left. Yet, on unchecked figures provided by the Jordan Government of a new influx of refugees (who may well not all be from the West Bank but inhabitants of the East Bank who have come back or people who were living on the East Bank slightly too near the firing line for comfort) we have offered a considerable sum of money for reconstruction and rehabilitation i.e. to try to ensure the permanent settlement of these people on the East Bank. To this extent we are surely working against a return of the West Bankers to their homes under Israeli occupation. In this context paragraph 5 of Amman telegram No. 670 to you seems relevant.

3. With regard to the survival of King Hussein, the situation has also changed. Hitherto the major British interest in this which we expected the Israelis to share, was that, if he went, a pro-Nasserite regime would be installed which might lead to an Israeli occupation of the West Bank leading to a general conflagration with the Arabs with incalculable consequences. The chain of recent circumstances has been the other way round. Whatever they may say to us, Israeli interest in the survival of Hussein as the Monarch of the East Bank or his continued success must be minimal. Indeed it might be better for them to have an overtly progressive regime on the East Bank on whose behaviour they could calculate. King Hussein, as a result of his recent actions and his possible future actions as forecast in paragraph 6 of Amman telegram No. 670 must best be reckoned by the Israelis as being a fairly incalculable factor. Moreover, as long as he retains links with United Kingdom and the Americans he must be assumed to be using his leverage with us against Israel. It is only if the Israelis think that Hussein may still represent an element in Jordan which is prepared to be realistic and come to some sort of peace settlement that he is of any interest to them at all.

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 141, New York No. 125, Amman No. 162 and Unnumbered Saving to U.K. Del NATO.
(repetition to Amman referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts)

MR. HADOW.

F.O./C.O./WH.
Eastern Department

CONFIDENTIAL

Sent 1600/18 June
Recd 1600/18 June
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FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

TELNO 1117 18 JUNE, 1967 (EASTERN)

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ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 1117 OF 18 JUNE 1967
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
AMMAN, JERUSALEM, BEIRUT, PARIS AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO,
JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, TRIPOLI AND BENGHAZI.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1098 PARA 2.

JERUSALEM.

SINCE I EXPRESSED THESE VIEWS TO THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR I HAVE SEEN THE REPORT (MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1085) THAT THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT MAY DECIDE TOMORROW TO LEGISLATE ON MONDAY FOR ANNEXATION OF THE OLD CITY TO ISRAEL.

2. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS UP URGENTLY WITH THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER OR SOME OTHER SUITABLE MINISTER OR SENIOR OFFICIAL AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS. WHEN ON 22 MAY NASSER ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION TO BLOCKADE ELATH HE HAD THE OVERWHELMING SUPPORT OF EGYPTIAN AND OTHER ARAB OPINION AND TEMPORARILY ACHIEVED A DIPLOMATIC VICTORY AND A POSITION OF HIMSELF WHICH HE HAD NEVER HAD BEFORE. IT WAS NEVERTHELESS THE BIGGEST BLUNDER AND MOST IRRESPONSIBLE ACT OF HIS CAREER. THE EVIDENCE IS ALSO STRONG THAT IT WAS DONE WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR APPROVAL OF HIS SOVIET FRIENDS. THIS ACTION BY NASSER TURNED A DANGEROUS BUT MANAGEABLE SITUATION INTO AN UNMANAGEABLE ONE: AND FLOUTED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN A MANNER WHICH MADE IT NECESSARY FOR HMG AND OTHERS TO REACT NOT ONLY ON ACCOUNT OF DANGERS INHERENT IN THE MOVE, BUT IN DEFENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER.

3. THERE ARE REPORTS IN THE ISRAEL PRESS THAT THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT IS CONTEMPLATING EARLY ACTION TO ANNEX THE OLD CITY.
I CAN WELL BELIEVE THAT THERE IS PRESSURE WITHIN ISRAEL FOR

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THE GOVERNMENT TO PRESENT THE WORLD WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI BY TAKING THIS ACTION AND THAT IN SO DOING THEY WOULD HAVE EMOTIONAL SUPPORT FROM THE JEWISH PEOPLE EVERYWHERE. NEVERTHELESS I THINK THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT SHOULD REALISE THAT SUCH AN ACTION ON THEIR PART WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SQUARE WITH THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE UNDER WHICH THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT JUSTIFY THEIR RECENT USE OF MILITARY FORCE. MOREOVER, TO ACT UNILATERALLY WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE INTERESTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OR THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD INEVITABLY PROVOKE SEVERE CRITICISM AT THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

4. I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE A PARTICULAR CLAIM THAT OUR VIEWS ON THIS SHOULD BE GIVEN FULL WEIGHT BECAUSE WE HAVE IN RECENT WEEKS STOOD UP FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER AGAINST UNILATERAL ACTS AND FOR THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST. THE COST TO OUR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS OF OUR SO ACTING HAS BEEN A HEAVY ONE AND WE DO NOT YET KNOW THE FULL PRICE.

5. THE RECIPIENTS OF THIS TELEGRAM SHOULD PROTECT THE SOURCE OF THE INFORMATION IN MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1085 TO TEL AVIV.

SOSFA SENT 2015Z 18 JUNE

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FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

TEL. NO. 2026 18 JUNE, 1967 (EASTERN)

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FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER.

THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, 17 - 18 JUNE.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF F.O. TELEGRAMS AS AT 1830 B.S.T. SUNDAY. SUPPLEMENT ON TELEGRAMS RECEIVED OVERNIGHT WILL BE TELEGRAPHED FIRST THING TOMORROW MONDAY.

JORDAN. REFUGEES.

THE LATEST ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES WHO HAVE PASSED FROM THE WEST TO THE EAST BANK IS BETWEEN 100,000 TO 150,000 PERSONS. A CENSUS IS TO BE TAKEN BY THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT AND UNRWA.

2. ARABS ON THE EAST BANK WHO WERE SEPARATED BY THE WAR FROM THEIR HOMES ON THE WEST BANK HAVE BEEN REFUSED PERMISSION TO RETURN BY THE ISRAELIS.

3. H.M. AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO INFORM KING HUSSEIN THAT H.M.G. ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE £500,000 FOR EXPENDITURE ON URGENT REHABITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMMES. HUSSEIN HAS ACCEPTED OFFER. THE CANADIANS WILL ALSO BE SENDING 2=1/2 MILLION DOLLARS

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WORTH OF FOOD TO THE MIDDLE EAST OF WHICH 1 MILLION DOLLARS WILL BE DISBURSED ON THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES.
THE AMERICANS HAVE AGREED TO SEND 5 THOUSAND TENTS TO JORDAN.
THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE SET UP TWO COMMITTEES TO ORGANISE RELIEF.

INTERNAL SITUATION.

4. KING HUSSEIN HAS RE-SHUFFLED HIS GOVERNMENT BY DROPPING TWO MINISTERS AND SOME OFFICIALS KNOWN TO BE HOSTILE TO NASSER. THEIR REPLACEMENTS HAVE DEFINITE PRO-NASSER SYMPATHIES. H.M. AMBASSADOR CONSIDERS THAT THIS RE-SHUFFLING OF THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE FIRST MOVE IN A BREAK WITH THE WEST, BUT RATHER THE KING'S ATTEMPTS TO MAINTAIN HIS CONTACTS WITH THE WESTERN POWERS WITHOUT ANTAGONISING HIS RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS.

'' THE BIG LIE''

5. KING HUSSEIN HAS INDICATED TO H.M. AMBASSADOR THAT THE INFORM -ATION WHICH WE HAD GIVEN HIM DISPELLED MOST OF HIS SUSPICIONS. IT IS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THE KING IS SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO ISSUE A DIRECT DENIAL.

JERUSALEM.

6. THE MAYOR OF ISRAELI JERUSALEM STATED THAT THE ISRAEL CABINET WOULD MEET ON 18 JUNE. THE CABINET WOULD PROBABLY TAKE A DECISION LEADING TO THE PASSING OF LEGISLATION ON THE 19TH JUNE TO INCORPORATE THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM INTO THE STATE OF ISRAEL. HOWEVER THE REST OF THE WEST BANK WILL PROBABLY REMAIN UNDER MILITARY RULE.
ISRAEL.
7. DEMOBILISATION IS BEING CARRIED OUT AT A BRISK PACE. ACCORDING TO THE ISRAEL DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ONLY SUFFICIENT FORCES WILL BE KEPT IN BEING TO CONTROL CAPTURED

/TERRITORY

TERRITORY AND TO PATROL NEW FRONTIERS.

SUEZ CANAL.

8. WE STILL LACK EXACT INFORMATION ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE CANAL IS PHYSICALLY BLOCKED. BUT IT IS INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THE RE-OPENING OF THE CANAL WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THE U.A.R. AS A POLITICAL MATTER EVEN IF, AS MAY BE THE CASE, THE PHYSICAL OBSTRUCTIONS COULD BE REMOVED FAIRLY QUICKLY. ARRANGEMENTS ARE PROCEEDING FOR THE EVACUATION OF PASSENGERS AND A PROPORTION OF THE CREWS OF THE BRITISH SHIPS STRANDED IN THE GREAT BITTER LAKE.

OIL.

LIBYA.

9. THE GENERAL MANAGER OF B.P. WAS SUMMONED BY THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM ON 17 JUNE. HE WAS ASKED TO TELL B.P. THAT THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT WISHED THE COMPANY TO REQUEST H.M.G. TO FOLLOW A POLICY IN THE UNITED NATIONS MORE FAVOURABLE TO THE ARAB CAUSE. THE OUTCOME OF THE ARAB MINISTERS' DELIBERATIONS ON OIL AT THE KUWAIT CONFERENCE WOULD DEPEND ON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE B.P. REPRESENTATIONS. IN THE MEANTIME LIBYA WOULD NOT RESUME THE EXPORT OF ITS OIL PRODUCTS. SIMILAR REPRESENTATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE GULF OIL CO. VIS-A-VIS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

SAUDI ARABIA.

10. OIL PRODUCTION BY ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL COMPANY IS PROCEEDING NORMALLY AT SOME 2 MILLION BARRELS A DAY, AND THIS IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE.

ISRAEL.

11. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE SUPPLY-ING OIL TO THE ISRAELIS. AN ISRAEL SHIP HAS APPARENTLY BEEN LOADED WITH RUSSIAN CRUDE OIL IN THE BLACK SEA.

MEETING OF ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS.

12. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE DURING THE NIGHT OF 17-18 JUNE IN KUWAIT. NO NEW DECISIONS WERE APPARENTLY REACHED OTHER THAN TO ADHERE TO THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE BAGHDAD CONFERENCE ON OIL. ALL THOSE WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING HAVE SINCE LEFT FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEETING IN NEW YORK.

/SAUDI ARABIA.

SAUDI ARABIA.

13. THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR HAS STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY SENIOR SAUDI OFFICIALS THAT THEY DID NOT BELIEVE ''THE BIG LIE'' AND THAT, THOUGH IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION, DID NOT WISH TO SEVER DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.K. HOWEVER THE SAUDIS FELT THAT THERE WAS AN OVER-RIDING NEED FOR THE U.K. TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT WOULD COUNTER THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE WHOLLY ON THE SIDE OF ISRAEL. THIS WOULD HELP THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT TO HELP THE U.K.

YEMEN.

14. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN TAIZ HAS REPORTED THAT DEMONSTRATIONS ORGANISED BY THE EGYPTIANS IN WHICH EGYPTIAN TROOPS TOOK PART, OCCURRED OUTSIDE BUILDINGS OCCUPIED BY THE RUSSIANS. THESE REPRESENTED A PROTEST BY EGYPTIAN TROOPS AGAINST THE FAILURE OF THE RUSSIANS TO INTERVENE ON THE U.A.R'S BEHALF DURING THE WAR.

CYPRUS.

15. ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS HAS TOLD BRITISH M.P.S THAT THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT DID NOT BELIEVE STORIES OF DIRECT BRITISH INTERVENTION IN THE ARAB/ISRAEL WAR, BUT COULD NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR HAVING GIVEN THE ISRAELIS ''INDIRECT HELP'' E.G. OUR SPARE PARTS.

UNITED NATIONS.

16. THERE HAVE BEEN NO DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

17. THE FORMAL OPENING OF THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION TOOK PLACE AT 9.30 A.M. ON 17 JUNE. MR. KOSYGIN ATTENDED BUT TOOK NO PART IN THE PROCEEDINGS.

18. THE APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS (AS FOR AN ORDINARY SESSION) WITH PAZHWAK OF AFGHANISTAN PRESIDING, AND OF A CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE WERE QUICKLY MADE. THE AGENDA WAS ADOPTED AFTER AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN GOLDBERG (U.S.A.) AND SOME OF THE ARAB DELEGATIONS. GOLDBERG REPEATED AMERICAN RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE

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FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2026 TO PARIS

NEED TO CALL AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION SINCE THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD NOT BEEN IN DEADLOCK. HE SOUGHT TO DIVERT THE ASSEMBLY FROM A STERILE CONDEMNATION OF ISRAELI ''AGGRESSION'' AND FROM DEMANDS FOR AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWL AS A PRECONDITION OF PEACE TALKS, INTO MORE CONSTRUCTIVE CHANNELS. JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA REJECTED THIS APPROACH BUT THE DISCUSSION WAS CUT SHORT BY THE PRESIDENT, THE AGENDA ADOPTED AND THE ASSEMBLY ADJOURNED AT 10.30 A.M.

ATTENDANCE.

19. AMONG THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE ANNOUNCED THEIR DELEGATIONS TO THE SPECIAL SESSION ARE:-

ITALY (THE PRIME MINISTER AND SIGNOR FANFANI)

PAKISTAN (FOREIGN MINISTER)

TURKEY (FOREIGN MINISTER)

IRAN (FOREIGN MINISTER).

FRANCE AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

20. DIRECTOR OF THE NORTH AFRICAN DEPARTMENT IN THE QUAI D'ORSAY, WHO WAS ON A VISIT TO TUNISIA, HAS TOLD OUR AMBASSADOR THAT HE HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION FROM THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR IN PARIS THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE PREPARED TO MAKE ALMOST ANY CONCESSIONS TO OBTAIN RECOGNITION FROM ARAB STATES AND WERE THEREFORE PREPARED TO HAND BACK (EXCEPT FOR THOSE AREAS WHICH WERE CONSIDERED STRATEGICALLY VITAL) MOST OF THEIR CONQUESTS TO THE ARABS.

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IMMEDIATE TRIPOLI TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 506 18 June 1967

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 506 of 18 June
Repeated for information to U.K. Mis. New York and Troops CYRENAICA for Wakefield.

I had an extremely frank and friendly one and a quarter hours with the Libyan Prime Minister this morning 18 June.

2. I made it clear that I was hurt and aggrieved at the treatment we had received. I complained of the behaviour of the Libyan News Services and emphasised strongly the principles of Her Majesty's Government's policy and the reasons for it. I drew particularly on your Nottingham speech and expressed the hope that this would enable him to give British policy and action much fairer treatment in the local Press and radio and so to moderate the attitudes of the Unions in the port and petroleum installations.

3. I mentioned Russian oil sales but said that I hoped that we could very soon get back to normal trade with our traditional friends such as Libya.

4. On bases I spoke as instructed but said that with regard to El Adem and Tobruk we should have to see what the King wished when the time came and Maziq agreed. He drew my attention to the fact that in deference to the King's wishes no reference had been made to abrogration of the Treaty.

5. Maziq explained that the oil embargo had been largely due to his fear of sabotage of installations but that a resumption of flow would have to depend on general Arab policy and events at the United Nations. He expressed a hope that the Big Four might find a solution to the problem.

6. I secured an assurance that British aircraft would not be impeded at Idris Airport.

7. In general I found Maziq friendly, somewhat defensive and apologetic and as regards bases he seemed in no hurry having achieved his immediate political objective by his public statement on 17 June.

8. Full report by bag.

Foreign Office pass Immediate to U.K. Mis. New York No. 7 and MOD for Troops CYRENAICA.

MR. SARELL

Sent 1150Z 18 June
Recd 1323Z 18 June

[Repeated as requested]
[Sent to D.C.C.]

F.O./C.O./WH.

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PRIORITY AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 695 18 June 1967

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 695 of 18 June Repeated for information to UKMission New York, Washington, Jedda, Kuwait and Tel Aviv.

My telegram No. 692: Arab/Israel.

After discussing with the Jordan Prime Minister this morning Her Majesty's Government's offer of £500,000 for expenditure on urgent rehabilitation and reconstruction projects (your telegram No. 1186 to me) Counsellor and I went on to emphasise to Saad Juma the importance to Anglo-Jordan relations of killing the lies about United Kingdom/United States intervention on Israel's side in the recent fighting. The Prime Minister assured me that Jordan wanted the facts, whatever they were, to be known. He had therefore provided the Jordan Delegation to the United Nations with all the information from Ajlun Radar. He told me that despite Egyptian pressure on Jordan to issue a statement condemning United Kingdom/United States complicity in Israel's attack Jordan had refused. In reply to my question about reports from Moscow he said that the Russians had told Boumedienne during his recent visit that there was no (repeat no) help from the United Kingdom or United States to Israel during the recent fighting.

2. On inter-Arab relations, the Prime Minister was bitter about the U.A.R.'s baleful influence on Arab policies and he enquired hopefully whether we had any information to support the reports which Jordan had seen about Nasser being in a situation similar to that of Soekarno in Indonesia. The Prime Minister went on to say that King Hussein had sent cables to other Arab leaders pressing for an Arab Summit either before or on next Saturday 24 June. Jordan would like to see this take place in Khartoum and looked to the results of this conference to establish a sensible Arab policy in the face of their recent defeats. He added that Jordan would be "walking on eggs" since she wished both to work in concert with other Arabs and to retain her links with the West and not to break off relations with either the United Kingdom or the United States. However, there might be strong Arab pressures on Jordan to break with us.

F.O. pass Routine UKMis New York 71, Washington 122, Jedda 75, Kuwait 39 and Tel Aviv 130.

Mr. Adams

Sent 1515Z/18 June 1967
Recd 1645Z/18 June 1967

[Repetition to Jedda and Tel Aviv referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts]

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